OECD does some of the best data work on China & industrial policy.
Here they look at 14 manufacturing industries and 482 top firms—⅔ global output, ½ in OECD and ⅓ in China.
In nearly all industries, Chinese firms invest more, are more productive, but earn less profit.
They've developed a very cool database—the OECD MAnufacturing Groups and Industrial Corporations (MAGIC) database—that they draw on to do this, and have written several other reports comparing industrial policies and subsidies across countries.
In other recent work they look at semiconductor subsidies across the globe.
Firms in China receive far higher subsidies as a percent of revenue ~10%.
They also derive much more of their revenue domestically (~50%) and hold far more of their assets domestically (~90%).
China has systematically gained market share across these 14 sectors.
Below market borrowing is the largest subsidy differentiator in their subsidy database.
A brilliant synopsis. Soviet collapse needs to be disaggregated to be properly assessed. At the very least:
1) regime change 2) state capacity implosion 3) territorial disintegration
Wish I'd found earlier. Written in 2014 and a mere 8 citations...alas practically invisible.
Link:
Barnes also has a book, Owning Russia (2006), on the political economy of the struggle to take control of productive assets during collapse that probably deserves more than the mere 180 citations it has. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.275…
In a separate paper he also raises something I've also found confusing: the emphasis people put on oil to explain the fall.
I pretty strongly concur that it was a minimal factor. About on par from a budget perspective with G's anti-alcohol campaign.
Link: ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/upl…
Historically, regicide was an epidemic. It was safer to fight in a war than to be a Chinese Emperor or European King.
But who killed the kings, historically speaking?
Mostly: other elites in the inner circle.
Of post Qin unification Emperors that died on the throne, 70%+ were killed by their the inner court, (ministers, eunuchs, relatives etc).
Europe was a bit more varied, but roughly 35% of European kings that died on the throne did so at the hands of their own ministers or family members.
Ironically, mass revolts, which have received so much theorizing and historic attention, have rarely been responsible for regicide. Just 1% in China and 5% across Europe.
In contemporary totalitarian regimes, estimates are that of those overthrown or executed, insiders within their ruling circles were responsible for 64.9%.
Great summary of political economy of farm sector reform. The real incentives and constraints. Rozelle & Swinnen, “Why Did the Communist Party Reform in China, but Not in the Soviet Union?” (2009)
Much better than recent “entrenched elites would've killed Gorbachev” storybooks.
The issue was not really elite level opposition.
It was the very very difficult political-economic transformation problem whose resolution almost certainly would require a period of disorganization and recession.
If the Soviets wanted more efficient use of resources and to reduce the increasingly costly budgetary outlays supporting decreasingly productive farms, the only sensible path forward was large-scale restructuring with obvious losers. As they discuss sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
(this is what happened after the Party-state imploded.)
BTW this is also the case in industry see eg:
Olivier Blanchard and Michael Kremer, Disorganization (1997), jstor.org/stable/2951267
Before I came across this paper I had already encountered the critiques of Diamond's fractured land hypothesis by Hoffman (2015), Hui (2005), and Turchin & Greer. Many new comers (eg Huang 2023) have piled on. But IMO all are wanting.
This essay assesses the book's big idea: China is an engineering state facing off against America, a lawyerly society. The book is well-informed and packed with wit.
I look at two imperfect data sets: undergraduate and graduate enrollment, and the education backgrounds of government leaders.
In China there's no doubt: the children are jazzed on the world of atoms. An astounding 34% of China's roughly 20 million undergrads study engineering.
BUT there are more American undergraduates in STEM than one might expect.
I re-grouped US college majors by Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison.
For both, the combined share of science + engineering + medicine is ~45%.