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"The refusal of one decent man outweighs the acquiescence of the multitude."
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Nov 28 7 tweets 4 min read
Historically, regicide was an epidemic. It was safer to fight in a war than to be a Chinese Emperor or European King.

But who killed the kings, historically speaking?

Mostly: other elites in the inner circle.

Of post Qin unification Emperors that died on the throne, 70%+ were killed by their the inner court, (ministers, eunuchs, relatives etc).

Europe was a bit more varied, but roughly 35% of European kings that died on the throne did so at the hands of their own ministers or family members.

Ironically, mass revolts, which have received so much theorizing and historic attention, have rarely been responsible for regicide. Just 1% in China and 5% across Europe.

In contemporary totalitarian regimes, estimates are that of those overthrown or executed, insiders within their ruling circles were responsible for 64.9%.Image Source for the above is page 68, chapter 4 "A Quantitative History of Regicide in China," in the Quantitive History of China book in the QT. Image
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Nov 25 5 tweets 3 min read
Great summary of political economy of farm sector reform. The real incentives and constraints. Rozelle & Swinnen, “Why Did the Communist Party Reform in China, but Not in the Soviet Union?” (2009)

Much better than recent “entrenched elites would've killed Gorbachev” storybooks. Image The issue was not really elite level opposition.

It was the very very difficult political-economic transformation problem whose resolution almost certainly would require a period of disorganization and recession.

Coupled with G's misbegotten notions.
Nov 17 10 tweets 5 min read
The single best paper I'm aware of on why China was historically unified and Europe politically fragmented.

G e o g r a p h y Image Human population density mediated by agricultural viability. Secondarily, nature and location of topographical features eg mountains and rivers.

(pics via Phillips Atlas of World History) nber.org/system/files/w…Image
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Aug 28 25 tweets 10 min read
On Dan Wang's new book: Breakneck

This essay assesses the book's big idea: China is an engineering state facing off against America, a lawyerly society. The book is well-informed and packed with wit.

But I wanted more data. So I assembled some.🧵
cogitations.co/p/litigation-n… I look at two imperfect data sets: undergraduate and graduate enrollment, and the education backgrounds of government leaders.

In China there's no doubt: the children are jazzed on the world of atoms. An astounding 34% of China's roughly 20 million undergrads study engineering. Image
Jul 18 15 tweets 5 min read
🚨✍️ NEW POST — Industrial Colossus: China vs 1950s America

In a number of ways, China mirrors America at the height of its industrial powers.

Despite UN projections and the dreams of some industrial maximalists, as share of global manufacturing, China is peaking. 🧵 Image
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I highlight two reasons:

1) A global scramble for industrial might is intensifying

2) Domestically: China is having its own post-Moses moment. A Leninist-inflected legalism and proceduralization.
cogitations.co/p/industrial-c…
Jul 2 21 tweets 10 min read
Finally read this. It's quite good for what it is: a journalistic gloss on Apple’s manufacturing history and embedding in China.

Most impressively to me, the author broke through the Apple omerta to get nearly 200 Apple employees to talk. But there are some issues. 🧵 Image A study of Apple in China is a great microcosm to understand the rapid upskilling of China’s workforce. I doubt any foreign company played a more important role facilitating China’s manufacturing rise.

China’s vocational schooling: not rly. Apple: yes.
Jul 1 7 tweets 4 min read
I did not see any good answers to these questions, so I put together a selection of readings on science and technology in the Soviet Union. 🧵
Science, Tech, and Industry Development Overviews
1. Science and Industrialization in the USSR - R. A. Lewis, 1979
2. The Technological Level of Soviet Industry - R. Amann, J. M. Cooper and R. W. Davies, 1977.
3. Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union - R. Amann and J. M. Cooper, 1982
4. “Technology and the transformation of the Soviet economy” by R.A. Lewis in The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945 - R.W. Davies et al, 1994Image
Jun 20 7 tweets 3 min read
China will account for 45% of global manufacturing in the next few years... is a stat that keeps getting quoted but is completely implausible. (1/5)Image The stat comes from a 2024 UN report that, for whatever reason, used average growth rates from 2010–2019 to extrapolate linearly from 2024.

But as the data—their data!—show, China's annual increase in manufacturing share is now 1/3 of what it was in the early 2010s (2/5) Image
Jun 19 7 tweets 4 min read
OECD does some of the best data work on China & industrial policy.

Here they look at 14 manufacturing industries and 482 top firms—⅔ global output, ½ in OECD and ⅓ in China.

In nearly all industries, Chinese firms invest more, are more productive, but earn less profit. Image
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They've developed a very cool database—the OECD MAnufacturing Groups and Industrial Corporations (MAGIC) database—that they draw on to do this, and have written several other reports comparing industrial policies and subsidies across countries. Image
Jun 18 14 tweets 6 min read
🚨 New essay: on Torigian’s biography of Xi Zhongxun.

This isn’t a book about Xi Jinping. It’s a study of the Chinese Communist Party, centered around the life of a man who rose, fell, and rose again inside its Leninist machinery.

And it's a book about suffering and meaning 🧵 Image Xi Zhongxun knew suffering. He buried siblings lost to famine. At 14, he tried to kill his teacher. Soon after, he lost both parents. His first wife was only available because her husband was beheaded by a warlord.
cogitations.co/p/the-life-and…
Jun 15 6 tweets 3 min read
A new working paper finds fully  80% of China’s corporate equity involves some state stake (> 0% ownership)

≈ 45% is majority-owned by the state (≥ 50%)

≈ 30% is wholly state-owned (100% ownership) Image They devise new estimates for total numbers of SOEs in the Chinese economy by tracing “ownership trees” from central and local SASAC and finance bureaus / departments. They count:

- 362,693 firms 100% state-owned
- 539,238 firms >50% state-owned
- 866,757 firms >0 state-owned Image
Feb 20 6 tweets 2 min read
Today's Leviathan by Proxy is a uniquely American, superficially antistatist form of big government: of the people-placating incumbents, by the outsourcing bureaucrats, for the entrenched interest groups. Image Congress, not the bureaucracy itself, is at the root of the problem: Image
Feb 4 23 tweets 13 min read
The Soviet reform experience is a repository of ostensible lessons. But are we learning the right ones?

My new essay assesses one debate: the role of "entrenched interests" in the failure of Soviet economic reform and the USSR's ultimate demise. Image At the center of the analysis are assessments of the General Secretary’s power as well as the nature of “entrenched bureaucratic interests” within a Leninist system. The essay suggests some potential lessons—and pitfalls—relevant to China analysis today.
cogitations.co/p/from-reform-…
Jan 6 5 tweets 3 min read
The Soviet partocracy led one of the most miserable and fearful existences of any ruling class in history, and this fact helps explain its rapid demise in 1991. Image This is from Peter Rutland's (1994) critical review of Peter boettke's "Why Perestroika Failed" Image
Dec 7, 2024 5 tweets 4 min read
The Soviet centrally planned economic system proved that it could work, that it could adequately (though not efficiently) mobilize and allocate resources, and that its rate of extensive growth could be quite high. But implementing and diffusing technology was among its most decisive achilles heels. Joseph Berliner's 1976 book exhaustively investigated the USSR's economic structure (price system, firm and gov organization, incentives and decision rules) to explain from the perspective of an enterprise-level manager the factors promoting and inhibiting innovation.Image
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The last chapter is a particularly good summary of his findings and can be read for free
archive.org/details/innova…
Oct 30, 2024 5 tweets 2 min read
Interesting but very pedantic chapter on the evolution of administrative divisions in China.

Faults scholars for static approaches to the study of administrative hierarchy because that is "in contradiction to the party-state power to define and change space and time in China." Image
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Beginning in the early 1980s the Party-state transformed prefectures from a dispatched office of a province to a level in the administrative hierarchy in its own right.

The number of cities—prefecture and county—multiplied. From under 200 in the 1970s, to over 650 by the 1990s. Image
Oct 21, 2024 20 tweets 11 min read
Does Xi really represent a massive departure from his predecessor? China's "Third Revolution"?

A brief thread showing the trajectory under Xi in many ways follows quite closely that under Hu Jintao.🧵 Image One interesting thing I've rarely seen commented on are the "four major tests" (四大考验) first identified under Hu at 17th CC's 4th Plenum in 2009.

1) Governing test 2) Market economy test 3) Reform and opening test 4) External environment test cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094…Image
Apr 3, 2024 23 tweets 10 min read
LGFVs are core to the story of China's economic development, and now central to many of the countries biggest challenges.

To scratch my own curiosity about them, and in hopes of adding texture to today's headlines, I explore the history of their rise and (potential) fall. Image It is a long and comprehensive post, and no offense will be taken should the reader choose to treat it as a source for reference material. Efforts were made, however, to make it an enjoyable read. cogitations.co/p/the-rise-and…
Mar 30, 2024 6 tweets 2 min read
Criminally under-utilized resource providing most systematic overview of China's fiscal system I've seen.

A lot of data, long time horizon (1970s-present), and very in the weeds. Currently open access, authored by Peking's Lin Shuanglin. No english cites yet? Image General fiscal revenue (not including off-budget or other funds) has ebbed and flowed since 1978. In that year it was 30% of a small base GDP.

Then declined to just 10% prior to the 1994 fiscal reforms.

Steadily rising to nearly 25% in 2015. Now slowly dropping.
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Dec 3, 2023 17 tweets 4 min read
In his 2019 post "A Study Guide for Human Society," @Scholars_Stage argues that if your foray into the study of such a grand inquiry starts with big history books like Guns, Germs, and Steel, "you are doing it wrong."

I will beg to differ. A🧵on reading. scholars-stage.org/a-study-guide-… But first I agree wholeheartedly with the piece's fundamental premise: "History is the most important thing you can read."

"Why? Only a strong background in history can you tell you when writers in other fields are full of crap."

Prioritize history, deprioritize social science: Image
Nov 23, 2023 12 tweets 3 min read
This Thanksgiving, here's something to be thankful for: The End of History and the Last Man by Francis Fukuyama. Despite being one of the most debated books of the last half century, few have actually read it! A shame, considering it’s one of the great books of our time.
Image Here, in Fukuyama’s own words, is the central inquiry of the book: “is liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions so serious that they will eventually undermine it as a political system?”

End of History is a book of political philosophy, exploring human nature and the socio-political systems man creates.

It tries to ask and answer the question: is there a form of socio-political system which is capable of fundamentally satisfying man as man? If so, the discovery of such a system would herald the end of history in the sense of mankind’s ideological and socio-political evolution.