Others have now raised this topic a few times, so allow me to share some thoughts on the BYD (and broader) supply chain financing story:
1⃣ BYD's high payables number actually reflects the strength of its underlying business model and market dominance for two key reasons (ability to extract favorable supplier terms; how that number is driven in part by rapid expansion in production capacity)
2⃣ Establishing industry norms that forces larger players like BYD to adhere to standard payment terms (voluntarily or involuntarily) is a positive step forward for the whole industry, leading to more efficient overall financing approach.
3⃣ BYD and other market leaders that also run large negative working capital balances are generally not a risk of insolvency by adhering to new industry norms as they are generally under-leveraged (with traditional debt financing) and will simply plug the financing hole with more traditional debt and equity financing. In BYD's case, I expect all or most of it to be to replaced with debt (long-term bonds).
1⃣ BYD's high payables figure reflects strength of its underlying business model and is in part a reflection of its rapid growth in production capacity
While the high payables figure has been portrayed as a potential weakness (with some even raising the idea that BYD is insolvent), actually it reflects the opposite.
BYD uses its scale to extract favorable terms from its suppliers. It trades volume for pricing as well as non-pricing advantages, like extended payment terms. It does this because that's what extremely competitive companies do: they try to exploit every advantage they have over the competition.
As BYD has only gotten bigger and more powerful, it has maintained its ability to sustain structural negative working capital state on its balance sheet.
Companies that can maintain negative working capital are often extremely competitive. This is a very desirable business model to run for rapidly growing companies because as revenue grows, working capital becomes a source of funding.
Amazon's marketplace business was an example of this. Amazon collects payment upfront and then pays out sellers later. This leads to a negative working capital balance, which is effectively a very low-cost form of growth financing for its marketplace business.
Ability to maintain negative working capital is even more rare in a capital-intensive businesses like the car sector. That reflects just how dominant BYD has become.
This doesn't mean it's a good thing for the industry overall (and I'll touch on this in the next point), but it does reflect on the increasing dominance of BYD individually.
The second element here is that the high payables number in part reflects rapid expansion of production capacity.
This point is a bit more speculative, as BYD does not break out its payables by supplier. But the key point here is that there are different types of suppliers and associated industry norms on payment standards.
One way to think about this is how supplier payment terms might vary between (i) third-party raw material and component suppliers that show up in Cost of Goods Sold and (ii) suppliers for the long-term buildout of PP&E that go into those massive BYD factories that shows up in CapEx.
Typically raw materials/component suppliers get paid in anywhere from 30-60 days.
But for "suppliers" to the buildout of these massive BYD factories (think general contractors, large equipment suppliers, etc.), the industry norm on payment terms could be much, much longer.
And because BYD is so highly vertically integrated (which ties to CapEx intensity) and still growing faster than the industry, it is building a disproportionate share of the PP&E in China's overall car sector (including upstream suppliers).
This means that a larger proportion of its bills are related to CapEx vs. COGS-related.
And if the industry norm on CapEx supplier payment terms is 180-day payment terms vs. 60 days for component suppliers, then BYD's payables will be elevated even if it were adhering to those industry norms.
Now the reality is likely that BYD is doing the above but also extracting the most favorable terms from suppliers, which compounds the problem.
It has since agreed in principle to adhere to industry norms, and next I will explain why this is a good thing overall for the car sector in the long run.
2⃣ Establishing industry norms on supplier terms is good for overall financing efficiency in the broad car sector (including upstream suppliers).
In undergrad finance classes I remember learning about the efficient capital frontier. While we learned it mainly from a stock portfolio perspective (which I remain skeptical about), I think the framework is actually more useful to apply here at the company/asset level.
Basically larger firms — especially those in market-leading positions — like BYD should have a cost of capital advantage over smaller firms (like all of BYD's suppliers). This makes sense and while I haven't done an exhaustive study, I am highly confident BYD can raise funding at lower cost than the company that supplies it with say components that go into making its in-car refrigerators.
Extended supplier payment terms are a form of extremely low-cost working capital financing. BYD is "borrowing" from its supplier at zero financing cost; either that, or it can negotiate favorable "pay early" terms at very high effective rates of return which indirectly lowers what is probably already a low headline component supply price.
Because the suppliers will have much higher costs of capital vs. BYD, what's happening here is that this is forcing smaller suppliers in the industry to take on a disproportionate share of working capital financing, even though their cost of capital is presumably much higher than a company like BYD.
This is good for BYD (and per above, reflective of its market dominance), but it is inefficient from an industry perspective.
Further, BYD is using this as a funding advantage against its competitors (hence the loud complaining from smaller competitors like GWM):
This is good for the industry, as it shifts the burden of financing working capital from firms with higher cost of capital to those with lower cost of capital.
This doesn't remove the 内卷 (involution) but instead re-directs this competitive impulse to other efforts where there are greater positive societal spillovers, e.g. more rapid technology development, cost efficiencies and creative designs and market segmentation.
3⃣ It will be fairly trivial to rightsize the balance sheets to adhere to new industry standards on payment terms, especially for BYD
I did some very rough math on BYD and calculated that in a conservative case it would have to raise ~$15B to reduce its COGS payable days to ~30 days (I estimate ~40% of its trade payables are associated with long-term CapEx).
BYD's balance sheet is under-leveraged (by traditional debt financing metrics i.e. ignoring the working capital deficit).
It could easily raise this amount in LT bonds alone. Assuming 5% cost of debt, this adds ~$750M in incremental interest expense.
People have a tendency to compress complex, multi-decade stories into simple narratives that follow cause-and-effect storylines, often ones that tie into pre-existing narratives. This creates the risk of dangerous over-simplification.
In this case, the prevailing narrative goes something like this:
▪️ "China failed to build a competitive auto industry for decades."
▪️ "Then Tesla entered the market and became the magic fix that enabled China to develop a globally competitive car industry."
▪️ "Therefore, we should apply the same magic fix to our own industry."
In my view, this is a dangerous over-simplification. Reducing the story to a simple cause-and-effect narrative often leads to blissfully naive solution sets that fail to address the core issue: how do we re-industrialize America?
Believing that simply inviting Chinese car companies into the U.S. will serve as a "magic fix" — just as Tesla supposedly was for China — misses the mark, for two key reasons:
1. The "magic fix" narrative is a gross oversimplification of five decades of development in China's auto and broader industrial/manufacturing sectors.
2. The fundamental challenges China faced over those decades are very different from the ones the U.S. faces today.
None of this is to say that inviting Chinese automakers to invest FDI in the U.S. cannot be part of a LT solution**. But it must be done thoughtfully — and only in tandem with addressing core domestic issues — if the goal is truly to re-industrialize this country in a meaningful way.
** Of course, all of this assumes they even find the risk/reward decision to commit long-term capital to the U.S. in today’s geopolitical climate remotely attractive compared to FDI opportunities elsewhere.
1⃣ First, let me go through several points that were brought up in the excerpted sections of the interview as well as the post to show how reality was much more complex than presented**
** I full interview is not out and I haven't seen it, so perhaps there will be more nuance there; this is mainly a reaction to how the narrative on the rise of China's auto industry has been grossly oversimplified and in certain cases, simply wrong.
"The impact was brutal. When Tesla's Model 3 launched in 2020, it quickly became China's best-selling EV. BYD's total vehicle sales actually fell 7.7% that year to just 427,000 units."
This excerpt suggests that Tesla's market entry in China was the direct cause-and-effect reason why BYD's sales declined in 2020.
This is wrong. It may have played a minor role, but there were many other reasons why BYD's vehicle sales declined.
Since this post in January 2024, Chinese NEV production has increased from a ~10-11 million run rate to ~>16 million as of mid-2025 and virtually ALL of the increase has been absorbed by the Chinese market …
Can we please stop with this fiction that there are "only 2-3 profitable Chinese EV companies"?
I count at least 8 profitable NEV operations + CATL/Huawei. And it is the only market that is close to profitable selling NEVs at the sectorwide level after accounting for subsidies.
In 2023, the first year after Beijing ended buyer rebates, China's car sector sold an ~9.5M NEVs generating revenue of ~$233B ($24.6k ASP).
Sectorwide gross margin was ~21% (~14% ex-subsidies) with operating profit of ~1.4B (negative ~$21B after subsidies).
Note that comparable figures in the U.S. in 2023 were:
▪️ $66B in sector-wide revenue
▪️ $2.6B (4%) in gross profit (negative $13B, or -19%, after subsidies)
▪️ -$27B in operating profit (negative $42B after subsidies)
There was only one profitable operation before subsidies: Tesla. And after subsidies, Tesla's U.S. car operation was not profitable.
Indeed, I suspect the only solidly profitable segment of Tesla's car operations today (ex-subsidies) are its exports out of Gigafactory Shanghai.
Saying Apple "invests $55B in China every year" is financially illiterate nonsense.
We know exactly how much Apple has invested in China, as it discloses annually in its annual 10-K.
Apple has cumulative investment in "Greater China" (includes HK/TWN) of $4.8B as of 9/2024.
Included in this $4.8B balance sheet figure are leasehold improvements on Apple Stores, "inventoy prepayments" and owned "capital assets at its suppliers' faciliities" like molds and specialized equipment sitting in Foxconn's factories.
Again, the $4.8B represents the cumulative aggregate of long-lived assets that Apple has in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
And notably, Apple has been liquidating (a.k.a. converting to cash and repatriating) this tangible asset base.
The whole China-US supply-demand debate is polluted by shoddy economic reasoning and false narrative premises that have led to piss-poor strategy and policy implementation:
▪️ U.S. demand isn't fixed but driven by income (both wage- and capital-related), which is driven by productivity. Lower productivity — whether from trade war-related economic adjustments or retaliatory actions — will negatively impact income, which leads to lower sustainable demand.
▪️ The U.S.-China bilateral goods balance overstates the surplus as it does not account for offsetting deficits that China runs with other countries, the large FDI income and services deficits and other factors. Thus focusing on this metric has led policymakers to seriously overestimate the economic leverage American "demand" has over China.
▪️ Focus on China's "low consumption" has long been a red herring. It is demand — which like the U.S. and or any economy, is driven by income and productivity — that matters in the long run.
▪️ China's "low consumption" is mainly a function of its gross capital formation (GCF) levels being high. GCF is mostly domestic. And people forget GCF is merely a form of deferred consumption: all economic activity (GDP) becomes consumption at some point; "consumption" and "gross capital formation" are merely differentiated by the question of whether it is consumed now or consumed later. This concept might be less confusing if we properly referred to "consumption" in a GDP concept by its more accurate technical name, "household expenditures".
▪️ China's persistent "low consumption" or "low household expenditures" is not a function of debt or institutional "constraints" but policy choice that is largely underpinned by demographics: China's current labor force complements capital-intensive development. And Chinese housing and infrastructure buildout is not close to being complete.
▪️ That said, the former (labor force priority) is changing rapidly, driven by actual demographic change, automation and the trade war, all of which force costly economic adjustments on the economy.
▪️ The trade war-related adjustments lead to productivity boosts in the long run. Offshoring labor-intensive export processing work that dominates Chinese exports to the U.S. is what China needs to do in the long run to become an advanced, high-income fully developed economy.
▪️ Both the U.S. and China need to undertake costly economic adjustments in the short- to medium-term. The "winner" out of the trade war is the one that can (i) more rapidly undertake these adjustments and (ii) make the right adjustments that lead to productivity growth in the long run.
"U.S. demand isn't fixed"
There are many analysts out there — e.g. those who like to use the phrase "supplier of demand" — who seem to rather ignorantly assume that American demand is some constant, magical force without considering the fundamental sources of real demand, which is productivity and global trade ... and how the trade war might impact both of these.
The American economy is highly productive! A key part of productivity growth, particularly over the last three decades, has been the continuous rise of the American MNC, especially in sectors like technology/Internet and pharma.
American MNCs have gone out into the world and absolutely crushed it. Their rise drives the incomes of well-paid employees (mainly located in the U.S.) and capital income in the form of dividends, share buybacks and rising market capitalizations (which support persistent capital inflows).
Rising incomes support rising demand. American MNCs directly and indirectly enable American households to increase their purchases of physical goods from places like China.
The obvious corollary to this is that any relative decline in such a key source of rising American incomes will also correspondingly impact American demand.
For example, if China undertakes retaliatory action against American MNCs operating in China, generating hundreds of billions of dollars of revenue selling to Chinese households (not counted in the trade balance, by the way), then this will impact American income (and demand) in exactly the same way that the Trump tariffs forcing Chinese exporters to make painful adjustments.
American share of global demand would have to decline until American MNCs can find new markets, just like Chinese share of global supply would decline until Chinese exporters adjust their business models.
It's exactly the same, just involving different types of companies and reflected in different categories on the Balance of Payments.