THREAD: On 21 June 2025 the United States bombed Iran, concentrating its massive firepower on three Iranian nuclear installations. It was, by any measure, and like the war launched by Israel on 13 June, an unprovoked attack. None of the justifications offer pass the smell test. As for the status of these attacks under international law, any such analysis is irrelevant, because international law as we have known it no longer exists. For good measure Israel and the United States have most likely also administered a fatal blow to the nuclear regulatory regime.
I continue to maintain that the latest developments were not inevitable, and that the Trump administration did not assume office with a determination and plan to go to war against Iran. The evidence suggests that Trump, and key members of his entourage, were serious about pursuing negotiations with Tehran, but that Trump and his de facto Secretary of State Steve Witkoff were then persuaded on a different course of action by a coalition consisting of Israel, its loyalists in the US (including within the administration), and anti-Iran war hawks.
First, to put forward unrealistic demands in the negotiations conducted with the Iranians on the pretext these were achievable, and then to endorse an Israeli attack on Iran on the pretext that it would improve Washington’s negotiating position and force it to accept Washington’s unrealistic demands. Once Israel launched its war a concerted campaign ensued, designed to convince the Narcissist-in-Chief in the White House that he could not afford to look weak, that he had a unique opportunity to clinch a foreign policy victory, and that in sharp contrast to Iraq it would be “One and Done” and quickly followed by a prostrate Iran accepting a deal.
It seems doubtful the US attacks were as decisive and successful as claimed by Trump. The US is also said to have sent messages to Iran that regime change is not on the US agenda, and that no further attacks were planned. Together with Iranian claims that the inflicted damage fell far short of destruction, and that key machinery and materials had been safely relocated elsewhere before the bombings, this could have resulted in a relatively restrained Iranian response, or at least one where it did not necessarily feel compelled to directly attack US forces and assets.
Iran could for example have directed its fury at Israel, which Iran views as responsible for its current predicament, or withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which unlike Israel Iran has ratified. It could additionally have chosen to prevent shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20-30 per cent of global energy exports pass, and coordinate efforts with AnsarAllah to similarly block Bab al-Mandab, shutting off the Suez Canal through which 10-15 per cent of global trade reaches its destination. While this would reduce Iranian oil exports to zero, and severely affect China (which imports most of its oil from the Persian Gulf), it would send prices at the pump in the US through the stratosphere at the height of the summer driving season. That won’t go down very well with the MAGA base which voted for Trump in significant part on account of his proclaimed opposition to costly and needless forever wars in the Middle East.
With Trump’s short White House address several hours after the attacks, the situation changed dramatically. The US president essentially demanded an Iranian capitulation to the US and Israel, and threatened additional attacks if it demurs. Trump demanded that Iran unconditionally end the war, but made no similar demand of Israel, which not only initiated it but continues to escalate its bombing of Iran. To the contrary, he made a point of emphasizing the intimate coordination between the US and Israel, and his close partnership with Israel’s prime minister, the indicted war criminal and fugitive from international justice Binyamin Netanyahu.
The message received by Iran – loud and clear – is that Israel retains full US support to continue its attacks on Iran as it deems fit, and that if Iran continues to retaliate it can expect further bombing by the US. The Iranian leadership has repeatedly demonstrated that it is not impulsive and responds with calculation. But it is very likely to have concluded that it now can no longer afford not to inflict losses directly on the US, and that indirect damage will only expose it further and dangerously weaken its negotiating position. This is most likely also the calculation shared by Israel and its allies in Washington, who in the wake of any successful Iranian retaliation against the US will promote the argument that only regime change in Tehran will resolve the issue.
Iran is in a very unenviable position. Significantly weakened and still isolated, with strategic allies in Russia and China that are far less dependable than is the US for Israel, Tehran is damned if it acts, and damned – arguably more so – if it does nothing. At the same time Iran has spent many years preparing for precisely the scenario it is confronted with today, and it is most unlikely to prioritize self-preservation if the price is capitulation. Expanding the conflict to the region, and inflicting losses directly and indirectly on the US, appears to be its most likely course of action. In a calculated rather than impulsive fashion.
The Iranian leadership, and any successor if this one is deposed, will also come under tremendous elite and popular domestic pressure to cross the nuclear threshold and break Israel’s regional monopoly on the possession of a nuclear arsenal. If Tehran reaches the conclusion that the only alternative to a Middle Eastern North Korea is a second Iraq, and succeeds, the US-Israeli war will have had the unintended consequence of transforming Iran’s nuclear enrichment program from negotiating leverage into an atomic bomb.
Interviewed on Al Jazeera English Harlan Ullman, the main author of the “shock and awe” military doctrine, surmised that the US attack on Iran most likely represents the beginning of a new conflict rather than, as touted by Trump, the end of one. Sounds about right. Fasten your seatbelts. END
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THREAD: Various reports suggest that the United States is debating direct participation in Israel’s war against Iran. In addition to the massive supply of arms and funds to its Israeli proxy, the mobilization of anti-missile defenses to protect it from Iranian retaliation, and the provision of diplomatic and political support, this would mean that US forces would become directly involved in attacking Iranian territory and assets. How did we get here?
Since Israel launched its war of aggression on Iran, various theories have been floated about the role of the US. One popular interpretation is that the Trump administration’s very different approach to Tehran relative to that during its first term was all a ruse. A joint US-Israeli decision to attack Iran was purportedly made from the very outset, and the negotiations were convened in order to lull Tehran into a false sense of security, and were never meant to be serious. In other words, everything went exactly as planned. This strikes me as excessively simplistic.
When the second Trump administration assumed office, the failure of its previous approach was visibly apparent. Its 2018 renunciation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear agreement, enabled Iran to become a nuclear threshold state, with possession of a nuclear weapon essentially just one political decision away. While the policy of “maximum pressure” that replaced the JCPOA had produced a permanent and growing economic crisis in Iran, and contributed to anti-government sentiment and protests, they affected neither the coherence and political will of the Iranian leadership, nor significantly weakened its grip over the country.
THREAD: On 11 June GHF, the US-Israeli project to seize control of humanitarian relief efforts in the Gaza Strip from specialized international agencies, in order to further Israel’s genocidal agenda, issued a press release. In it, GHF claimed that a bus “carrying more than two dozen” Palestinians working for the project was “brutally attacked by Hamas”, with “at least five fatalities” and “multiple injuries”, and that others “may have been taken hostage”. GHF additionally claimed the attack “did not happen in a vacuum”, because “For days, Hamas has openly threatened our team”.
In an updated statement the following day, 12 June, GHF claimed the attack resulted in eight dead and twenty-one wounded, and that Hamas was preventing the injured from receiving treatment at Nasir Hospital in Khan Yunis.
In a separate communique, also issued on 12 June, Hamas announced that its forces had killed at least twelve members of the Popular Forces, the militia led by convicted drug smuggler Yasir Abu Shabab, and which is armed by Israel and operates under its direction. The Hamas statement added that its forces had wounded many more of Abu Shabab’s gunmen and captured others. The Popular Forces for their part responded that there had in fact been an exchange of fire between its gunmen and Hamas, and that it managed to kill several Hamas attackers. Press reports however indicate that some if not all of the Hamas casualties resulted from Israeli forces intervening on their militia’s behalf. It remains unclear if GHF, Hamas, and the Popular Forces militia were referring to the same encounter or separate ones.
THREAD: Until several weeks ago I was unfamiliar with the neo-conservative polemicist Douglas Murray. In my defense, I had also not previously heard of the comedian Dave Smith. Why their 10 April debate has generated so much comment and discussion remains something of a mystery. Presumably this has at least as much to do with it being hosted by Joe Rogan, the most popular English-language podcaster, as with the substance of the exchange itself.
I haven’t yet viewed the debate in its entirety, and probably won’t, and will therefore refrain from commenting on it in detail. Regarding one of the main controversies generated by the event, namely questions about the standing of a US comedian to have a clear position on events in a region of the world he has never visited, such criticism is akin to maintaining that those who never visited South Africa during the decades of white-minority rule should have been disqualified from forming an opinion on apartheid and mobilizing for the country’s freedom.
How many Americans who passionately supported or opposed their country’s wars against Vietnam or Iraq made it a point to visit these countries, let alone familiarize themselves with the societies in question? Virtually none. Whatever Smith’s faults, he at least doesn’t claim to be a journalist reporting on the Middle East, in which case his lack of direct familiarity with the region would deserve further scrutiny.
THREAD: I have on several occasions pointed out that Ayaan Hirsi Ali is a fraudster who invented her origin story out of thin air. Like other immigrants who embrace far-right politics, she is motivated by a combination of opportunism, self-promotion, and callous, gratuitous contempt for those who genuinely experience the challenges she falsely claims as her own. Combine with the requisite insecurity, identity crisis, and burning desire to be accepted by the dominant culture, add a hefty dose of insufferable narcissism, et voila, the far-right immigrant template is complete.
I wrote the below in 2006, in response to a disingenuous defence of Hirsi Ali by the unlamented Christopher Hitchens. At the end of this thread I provide a link to the documentary that I reference in this thread. The link is to a copy of the Dutch documentary with (accurate) English subtitles, and I can’t recommend it highly enough for those unfamiliar with the sheer scale and brazen nature of Hirsi Ali’s fraud. Here’s my 2006 text:
Christopher Hitchens's most recent defence of Ayaan Hirsi Magan (aka Ayaan Hirsi Ali), "Dutch Courage", published in Slate on 22 May 2006, was – judging by the reference to a 19 May 2006 New York Times op-ed by Ian Buruma, completed on or after that date. Yet it fails to account for a slew of facts that were by then public knowledge. Together with other facts that have been in the public record for considerably longer, these collectively either undermine or reverse many of Hitchens’s assertions:
THREAD: As of this writing, intensive Israeli air raids and shelling throughout the Gaza Strip has killed more than 350 Palestinians, and wounded hundreds more, in the space of several hours. How did we get here?
In January the incoming Trump administration forced Israel to accept a ceasefire proposal that had been largely formulated by the Israeli government and unveiled in late May 2024 by US President Joe Biden.
At Israel’s insistence it was not a comprehensive agreement that would see each party simultaneously implement all of its obligations in reciprocal fashion, but rather a process consisting of three stages.
THREAD: After absorbing the unwelcome news Wednesday morning that their American idol, Donald Trump, is negotiating directly with Hamas, Israel flunkies became positively ecstatic when the US president later that day issued an apocalyptic and indeed genocidal threat against “the People of Gaza”: If Hamas does not immediately, and presumably unconditionally, release all the remaining captives in the Gaza Strip along with the corpses it holds, “you are DEAD”. What are we to make of these very contradictory developments?
To its credit, the Trump administration has ventured where its Democratic predecessor never contemplated going: negotiating with not only its Israeli proxy but also its Palestinian adversary in order to achieve an agreement.
Speaking to all parties involved in a dispute is of course standard diplomatic practice, particularly where resolution of a crisis that has consumed tens of thousands of lives is concerned. Palestine has been one of the rare exceptions to this template. Washington for decades refused to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) until it jumped through a succession of increasingly narrow hoops, and in fact recognized the PLO only after Israel did so in 1993.