Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the US have failed to target significant elements of Iran's nuclear materials and production infrastructure. RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures. 🧵 1/17
Netanyahu's justification for conducting this strike was that "Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs -- nine." He refers to Iran's stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let's consider. 2/17
The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17
No one even knows where the HEU is now! @rafaelmgrossi says Iran moved it. Lil' @marcorubio says nothing can move in Iran. But trucks are moving in Iran. Trucks and heavy equipment showed up at least two days ago to seal the tunnels to protect them. @planet took a picture. 4/17
Trucks also showed up at the Fordow FEP the day before the strike, possibly to relocate sensitive equipment, and certainly to cover those entrances with dirt. Iran just isn't a no-drive zone at the moment. 5/17
To be fair, some Trumpkins acknowledge Iran still has the material. @JDVance says they're going to "have conversations with the Iranians about" it. 🙃 The talking point is that the US has knocked out Iran's ability to further enrich it and convert it to metal, so its fine. 6/17
IT'S NOT FINE. Yes, the strikes on the enrichment plants at Qom (Fordow FEP) and Natanz (PFEP and FEP) appear successful. But there has been no effort to strike the enormous underground facility next to Natanz where Iran can make more centrifuges and maybe do other things. 7/17
In 2022, Iran moved a centrifuge production line to "the heart of the mountain" there. This facility is huge -- we estimated 10,000 m2 or more -- and we don't really know what else it might house (like enrichment or conversion). 8/17
Also, Iran recently announced a "new enrichment facility in a secure location" and told the @iaea it was ready to start installing centrifuges. The @iaea was set to inspect the facility, near Isfahan, before the bombing. It hasn't been bombed AFAIK. 9/17
Let me say again: Iran said it had a new enrichment facility. The @iaeaorg was about to go see it. But before that could happen, Israel struck other facilities in Iran -- but not the new one. See the problem? 10/17
This means Iran has retained 400 kg of 60% HEU, the ability to manufacture centrifuges, and one, possibly two underground enrichment sites. That is also to say nothing of possible secret sites, which opponents of the JCPOA used to invoke all the freaking time. 11/17
Let's say Iran decides to rush a bomb. Iran can install ~1.5 cascades a week. In six weeks, it could have 9 cascades of IR-6 machines. It would take those machines about 60 days to enrich all 400 kg to WGU. Altogether that's about five months although IMMV. 12/17
Look, I get it. Watching bombers conduct an >11,000 km precision bombing raid is awesome. I am the sort of wierdo who happily read a 528 page book about the first Black Buck raid of the Falklands War in 1982. I really do get it. 13/17 amazon.com/Vulcan-607-Rem…
But what does it say of two of the most amazing military operations in modern memory are still unable to fully eliminate Iran's nuclear program? I think that's proof that this is tactical brilliance may be in service of a foolhardy strategy. 14/17
RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER have not slowed the Iranian program nearly as much as the JCPOA. We hold diplomacy to much higher standards than bombing. The same people who endlessly complained about the JCPOA "sunsetting" are now happy to delay Iran's bomb by much less. 15/17
This is why I said the strike is about regime change. As late as May, @DefenseIntel said Iran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program. When asked about that, @marcorubio said intel was "irrelevant." It's only irrelevant if the problem is the regime, not the program. 16/17
We ought to judge this strike by its real purpose, not the legal camouflage of preemptive self-defense. If the strike leaves the current regime, or something very much like it, in power with a nuclear option then it will have been a strategic failure. 17/17
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References to "tactical" nuclear weapons in this otherwise great @guardian story by @hugolowell are misleading. The US would drop a strategic B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator with a yield of 300 or 400 kilotons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 15 and 21 kt. theguardian.com/world/2025/jun…
Here are the nuclear weapons in the US "enduring stockpile" from @ENERGY's stockpile management plant. Note that the B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator is labeled as a "strategic bomb" -- and for good reason. energy.gov/sites/default/…
The yield of the B61-11 is classified, but it is a converted B61-7 bomb. The yield of the -7 and -11 are usually given as more than 300 kilotons. @nukestrat says the B61-11 was increased to 400 kt. Either way, this is a very powerful nuclear weapon.
I see @SangerNYT asked why Israel hasn't hit the stockpile of enriched uranium. My understanding is that the hex is stored in the tunnels at Isfahan and Israel hasn't been able to destroy the hard, deeply buried targets. Thread.
Isfahan UCF has some tunnels that are are about 100 m under a mountain that Israel has not yet tried to hit. The Iranians were pretty proud of these tunnels, which were constructed around the same time as Fordow by the same dwarves (aka the Passive Defense Organization).
This is pretty esoteric knowledge that is only covered in specialists journals like ... the @nytimes. 😉 (Sorry, I just appreciate Bill Broad and want to give him some love.)
This is probably the the new North Korean uranium enrichment facility that @iaeaorg DG @rafaelmgrossi briefed the Board of Governors about. @sam_lair and I have a summary on the blog. Nice shot by our friends at @planet. armscontrolwonk.com/archive/122048…
The dimensions, layout and other features do resemble the Kangson UEP when it was constructed. Here is a 2002 image of the Kangson under construction -- the central enrichment hall is about 93 m long, which is the right length for two 164-centifuge cascades end-to-end.
Trump's offer to Iran, as reported by @BarakRavid, is a dollar-store-JCPOA.
The JCPOA -- which Trump abandoned -- had all of these provisions, usually in ways that were stronger or more carefully constructed.
He's trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. A thread.
@BarakRavid Here is the original story. The proposal was "described to Axios by two sources with direct knowledge — one of whom provided a point-by-point breakdown." This is a paraphrase, so sometimes its hard to know what they are getting at. axios.com/2025/06/02/ira…
@BarakRavid Here is the text of the JCPOA. You don't have to take my word for it; you can look it up yourself. europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460…
The claim of 25 missiles a month is falsely attributed to the @DI_Ukraine. What @DI_Ukraine says, according to other news outlets, is 25 IRBMs per YEAR, not per MONTH. babel.ua/news/113282-ro…
Oreshnik is the first two stages of the Yars missile. Oreshnik production rates should be similar to Yars production rates, which the Russians claim is "about 20 launchers and their supporting systems per year." web.archive.org/web/2021041112…
Russia has issued a new (2024) "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence" (основы Государственной Политики Российской Федерации В Области Ядерного Сдерживания). Same wine, new bottle. 🧵. static.kremlin.ru/media/events/f…
BLUF/TLDR: Four significant changes from 2020 but these changes are all (1) at the margin, (2) consistent with past Soviet/Russian policy, and (3) stuff that I believed was the policy in fact, even if it had been unstated.