Ok, I’m going to say it. This was somewhat over complicated, and looks more like the perfect execution of the plan they would had prepared assuming that it was a US pre-emptive strike and that they were the first ones in.🧵1/8
2/ But, over a week of Israeli strikes has brought the Iranian defence network to its knees, and their Air Force have been able to operate even 4th generation aircraft overhead Iran with impunity. Air supremacy is a tough state to achieve but it has been over Iran.
3/ The deception feint of the Pacific route seems more of a political stunt than a military tactic, especially as it mirrored & signposted the very nature and timing of the attack it was meant to mask. It also used up precious strike power and tankers. But a nice option to have!
4/ The significant screen package would have been justified if the IADS (Integrated Air Defence System) was functioning, but that has long been neutered by Israel’s actions. There would have been a challenging risk vs reward calculation based on the need to keep US pilots safe.
5/ The use of 4th and 5th generation escorts and sweep would have alerted any defences, so it’s an interesting tactic for what was essentially a B2 strike mission. But all that said and done it was executed flawlessly with a 100% hit rate - not bad for a 40 hour round trip!
6/ The big question now is was it enough and what has it done to reverse or cease Iran’s nuclear ambition? Nobody else could have carried out such a mission and it will be studied as deeply as the recent Israeli strikes. And the two nations’ fighting styles contrast nicely.
7/ The Israelis overcame mass by using innovative tactics and a very aggressive attitude to risk. The US have thrown their considerable mass at the problem, with effort to spare. With decoys, and 2 x Carrier groups not even used, they had plenty of spare capacity.
8/ What can the UK learn? We may want to emulate Israel more than the US due to our scale and budget. But a long range penetration capability gives you political choices that nothing else short of nuclear strikes can. Those looking to Ukraine for lessons may need to glance South.
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A very complex and fatiguing mission that resulted in 7 x B2s dropping 2 x GBU-57 MOP bombs each on the two primary nuclear sites of Fordo and Natanz, with Isfahan being struck by at least 24 submarine launched TLAMs (Tomahawk missiles).🧵1/7
2/ The B2s launched overtly into the Pacific yesterday were a deception (but it is not clear what that achieved, other than reducing the size of the actual bomber force). The real strike package flew across the Atlantic, and joined up with fighter aircraft already in the region.
3/ The B2s released their weapons on the two primary sites, protected and proceeded by a package of 4th and 5th generation fighters as a screen and decoy. These would have been used to suppress any potential threat - but no missile intercepts were observed.
A few guesses (leaks?) ahead of next weeks’ release of the long awaited UK Defence Review👇. So what can we expect and what should we look out for? 🧵1/18
2/ The budget is set: 2.5% rising to 3% by next Parliament (Healey says 2034). And there are rumours of a future 3.5% target for NATO nations. Whilst 2.5% will probably only paper over the cracks, the higher %s will depend on National economic performance and HMT good will.
3/ Those hoping for a shopping list may be disappointed - the detail may come later. But how it frames the threats of Russia & China will signpost where the primary focus will be. I expect Russia to be that now, but with China seen as the critical pace setter on future threats.
Does the UK have a Defence Strategy problem? All we ever hear these days is that our Defence is underfunded, overspent, gapped & overstretched. So what can the 2025 review do to fix it, because we already know what the budget is. 🧵1/20
2/ The fundamental truth is that over the last few decades we have spent less & delivered even less, yet our ambition of global reach and influence has hardly wavered. Previous reviews have singularly failed to bridge this gap, whilst many plead for money we just don’t have.
3/ The UK, of course, is not alone in seeking a post Cold War peace dividend, and on some of the key numbers we still compare favourably with allies, and we remain one of NATO’s highest spenders in % GDP terms and real terms.
The @RoyalAirForce presents its first Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP) - “Stormshroud”. 🧵1/7raf.mod.uk/news/articles/…
2/ Also known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) or Loyal Wingmen, this is a combination of the Tekever AR3 drone tekever.com/models/ar3/ and Leonardo’s Britestorm electronic warfare payload uk.leonardo.com/en/britestorm
3/ It provides a “stand in” jammer to blind/decoy enemy air defence systems, allowing other aircraft/weapons to penetrate hostile airspace un-targeted and unhindered. Previously this would have been a role for dedicated aircraft such as the EA-18G Growler. boeing.com/defense/ea-18g…
There has been a lot of fuss made recently about combat aircraft numbers in the UK. I think that aircraft fleet management is worth a thread to try and explain how it works, and why just focussing on the numbers ordered, bought and delivered is only part of the story.🧵1/20
2/ Aircraft have some important characteristics that make them rather unique. The most critical is their “fatigue life”, which is a function of activity cycles that eventually weaken an aircraft to its cleared limit or life - extending that is rarely an option.
3/ Cycles can be measured against flight hours, pressurisations, use of certain equipment (e.g. undercarriage), and especially g-force. It should not be surprising that combat aircraft have the most extreme flight envelope. Each cycle is carefully tracked against a cleared limit.
In case you didn’t know, it’s the SDR silly season in the UK. There have been a few stories recently about our combat aircraft - how many, who owns them and what type? This one tries a whole new approach by trying to rehash the SDR of 15 years ago. A “Where do I Start” 🧵1/13
2/ The article takes the premises of: (A) a combat air shortfall exists, and (B) the Carrier strike capability must be preserved. I agree wholeheartedly on the former point, but looking at the problem solely through the lens of the Carriers skews and limits the airpower aspects.
3/ Firstly, the ”ageing” Typhoon remains the most plentiful (& still capable) aircraft in the RAF inventory. And Ukraine has proved that the Russian threat is rather vulnerable to far less sophisticated counters. There is plenty of life and potential left in the Typhoon yet.