Thread by @MassDara

For the second time, Russia finds itself with few military options to support a critical partner in the Middle East. This thread explains Russia’s military options and limitations for supporting Iran before, during, and after this conflict. /1

Note: this thread doesn't delve into the political balancing Russia engages in across the Middle East, which informs their choices. Here, I address Russian military and defense base capacity and how it shapes options. /2

I didn't expect the Russian military to intervene last minute to head off IDF operations – there was no viable “dash to Tehran” type of scenario here for Russia. And, the cooperation treaty between Russia and Iran has no mutual defense clause. /3

Russia had options to support Iran with military equipment during a building crisis for months BEFORE the IDF operation began: delivery of extra air defense systems or modified Shaheds, accelerated delivery of fighter aircraft to Iran if needed, but it's not so simple. Why:⬇️ /4

Russian SAM systems are heavily committed to the war in Ukraine and now guard critical infrastructure and airbases across Russia. Yet, could Russia have spared a token battery/battalion for Iran in the last few months? Yes. Did they? don't think so./5

It’s not easy for Sukhoi to surge additional delivery of fighter aircraft in production for Iran - particularly for the Su-35 they purchased, making that option unlikely. /6 airforce-technology.com/news/iranian-r…

Russian production of Shahed/Geran drones has accelerated, and it produces by some estimates between 1-2 thousand a month. Some could have been sent to Iran **and may still be sent to Iran or proxies** at the cost of availability to nightly strikes against Ukraine. /7

VKS tactical aviation is not fully engaged in Ukraine although parts exhibit signs of stress on crews and airframes ( Su-25s, A-50s). Could they have deployed a squadron or smaller? Yes, technically, with a huge amount of risk / 8

The VKS has experience deploying to Iran; it occasionally used the Hamadan/Nojeh airbase to deploy to Syria starting in 2015. But unlike Syria, the mission of any hypothetical VKS deployment to Iran would be complicating IDF air/missile strikes, which the VKS can't do well /9

For starters, the VKS could not enforce any no-fly zone before the conflict in Iran and certainly cannot do so now. It would take too many aircraft, and Russia’s airborne sensors (A-50) are stressed due to Ukraine operations and losses. /10

Secondly, while VKS tactical aviation may train for aerial refueling (needed to maintain any type of constant air presence for CAP/NFZ), they haven't done it in Syria or Ukraine and couldn’t surge that capacity now for Iran when they have no control over the air space. /11

The VKS operates this way since they don't have a large tanker fleet. They use frequent sorties, short of their full combat radius. This is a limit that impacts longer flight times or pursuing fleeting or dynamic targets (see this report for more) / 12 rand.org/pubs/research_…

When the VKS operated in Syria, it couldn’t prevent coalition forces from operating. They would often sortie and intercept coalition air forces operating in areas they didn’t like, and at times engaged in dangerous and unprofessional activity /13

But now Operation Rising Lion has been underway for one week. The IDF has disabled large parts of Iran’s Air Force, air defenses, military leadership, and C2. The IDF controls large parts of Iranian airspace. Russia is unlikely to send the VKS into such an environment /14

While the VKS would be outclassed in technical capabilities by the IDF, and the United States and Israel have the sensors in place to track the airspace and movements, that was mostly true in Syria. A big limiting factor is logistics. /15

Logistics for any Russian military presence or deployment of weapons would likely come from ports in the Caspian. Could Russia put deliveries on its navy ships to ‘shield’ them from attacks as they did in Syria? They could, technically. With risk. /16

The IDF is experienced at targeting Russian-origin weapons cargo once it is offloaded in Mediterranean ports (consistently without killing Russians), regardless of whether it came off a Russian Navy ship or commercial vessel. /17

Bottom line: while the IDF operation is underway, I think it would be a major departure for how the Russian military has been used in the past to try to force in the VKS or deploy air defense systems. This is not a “dash to Pristina” or “dash to Damascus” environment. /18

The Kremlin might feel differently about this if there is a concerted effort at regime change, but they would still face these constraints, and would have to contend with IDF operating in the airspace (at a minimum). /19

Most likely Russian activities that threaten US assets and Israel: Russia has a large production capacity of Geran/Shaheds and could attempt to supply them by offloading them from Navy ships in the Caspian, or get them to Iranian proxies./20

The DPRK has offered to send assistance to Iran, and Russia could certainly facilitate that transit via rail in Russia/neighboring countries, or via the sea in the Caspian, although at risk of it being intercepted pier-side by IDF strikes /21

Russia could provide targeting support and advanced ASCMs to the Houthis to be a menace to IDF Navy or US/NATO ships in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea / 22

It’s too soon to consider what things look like for Iran after this IDF operation concludes, but the Russian defense industrial base will be first in line to try to sell equipment to them, whether Tehran wants or needs it, I leave it to the Iran experts. /23

Russia has many other intelligence or active measures it can use to support Iran, and it’s not always visible, as @NicoleGrajewski said, it is not so simplistic as to say that Russia has completely abandoned Iran in its time of need /24

Russia has several ground-based warning radars that if it chose to, it could, in principle, provide Iran with some sort of situational awareness of air traffic– such as the Kontayner over-the-horizon radar system /25

I would think that drones are the most plentiful option that Russia could supply to Iran, who in turn could pass them to their proxies to target Israeli and American facilities. /26

The Kremlin is not in a military alliance with Iran. However, Russia not taking any steps to send aid before this conflict began, or during, may raise questions about their reliability as a partner, and not just for Iran. They may try to increase efforts when the dust settles/27

Perhaps Iran didn't request aid from Russia in the first place - i defer to Iran watchers on that point. But in the end, what I see are again the limitations of Russian expeditionary power in the middle east, and the cost of the war in Ukraine. /end

PS Never thought we’d see a day when Rusich, a Russian neo-Nazi mercenary group, is praising the Israelis while condemning the Russian Air Force, and making some very valid points about Russian airpower while they are at it. Odd timeline we are on /