Unit economics + impact on various players
Shopify × Stripe × $COIN USDC:
Status quo take rate source: Timothy Chiodo (UBS)’s excellent report.
Gross take rate = same, with (up to) 0.5% cashback to merchants
Processing partner fees (i.e. Stripe) = assume same as card
$COIN fees = 1%, but assume Shopify gets 50% discount (coinbase.com/commerce)
Consumer rewards = 1% (per Tobi interview) — not considered “yield sharing” under the GENIUS Act
Cross-border (14% of $SHOP merchants):
“All USDC payments convert to local currency, no FX or multi-currency fees”
(shopify.com/enterprise/blo…)
If I’m understanding card rails correctly, cross-border merchants do pay extra for FX:
Example: U.S. card → USD checkout → Asian merchant paid in local currency. Network converts USD → SGD at wholesale rate + 1bp spread = ≈1.25% FX + assessment fees. Two biz days later (T+2 Visa, T+1 Mastercard), the acquirer deposits SGD 135.20 into merchant’s account, net of fees. Cardholder’s statement still shows USD 100.00 — no FX on their side.
→ So stablecoin rails give real savings to cross-border merchants.
Net take rate / margin ends up similar for now — but no reason gross take rate or fees won’t compress over time. But even then, net take rate impact on merchant acquirers should be comparable?
Also surprised Stripe hasn’t pushed its own stablecoin rails post-Bridge.
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For merchants in general, switching to stablecoin rails, or issuing their own stablecoins (in the case of big merchants) feels like a no-brainer.
With net margins often in the low single digits, cutting 1–2% in payment fees could boost profits by 50% or more.
CPCA released Dec-22 and FY22 China NEV and PV sales.
In FY22, China’s domestic NEV sales reached 6.5M units (+98% of YoY). Penetration reached 28%.
China accounted for 60% of global NEV sales in 2022.
Local brands dominate the NEV market, taking 85%+ of the market share (vs. 50% for PV).
NEV market is fairly concentrated, with BYD taking 29% of the share (followed by Wuling 10% and TSLA 7%). The PV market is more fragmented, with Top 3 OEMs (VW, Toyota, Honda) taking 25%
Since 1Q 2021 (BYD's market share bottomed due to competition), BYD's market share has increased from 12% (1Q21) to 32% (4Q22).
TSLA's market share (for domestic retail sales) dropped from 12% (FY20) to 7% (FY22)
Contrarian view: China’s policy setting is an open book. Given its top-down nature, you basically get "free investment advice".
The Central Economic Work Conference is super insightful as it sets the tone for where the economy is heading.
Below are priorities set by CEWC 2022:
(For 2023)
- [No.1] Restoring and expanding domestic consumption
- “Platform Enterprises” (e.g. BABA) will be supported to “fully display their capabilities”
- Supports Property, EV, Elderly Living
- Suports private sectors; pro foreign investors
VERY Pro-market. Two highlights:
1/ Putting consumption as No.1 has far-reaching implications
Over the past 8 years, this is the FIRST time “demand/consumption” replaced “supply-side reform” as the focus.
After being depressed for 3 years, China (consumption) will take over US as the world’s growth engine.
TSLA is positioned to be an outsized beneficiary of IRA (boosts both demand & margin)
Impact on EPS:
$0.4/sh. from manufacturing credit
$0.5/sh. from sales credit should TSLA choose to raise prices. Even if they don't, it could maintain prices despite cost deflation in FY23.
Sales Credit (to consumer)
~70% of its US sales will qualify for the $7,500 sales credit, with another 15% likely quality for $3,750.
This would give TSLA a lot of levers to pull even in a recessionary environment - vehicles are effectively cheaper, plus input cost deflation
Manufacturing Credit (to TSLA)
All the models (other than Model 3 RWD) will receive the full $45/kWh credit
$0.4/sh. EPS benefit, assuming 1) TSLA shares the $35/kWh cell manufacturing credit with Panasonic 50/50, and 2) $10/kWh realized as a direct tax credit to TSLA
Crazy moves this week on China stocks probably mark the beginning of deglobalization in the financial market.
- (-30%) / +30% round-trip in 5 days
- No fundamental news (see below, very interesting dynamic around the delisting news)
- Overnight rebound, mostly driven by local $
- How the de-listing news got circulated was VERY odd...
The 5 names first appeared on SEC website on 3/8, but it wasn't until 3/10 when people "found it".
One sellside found it and circulated it -> HK HF community reacted overnight -> (-30%)
Classic panic selldown.
- How the market reacted was also abnormal...
De-listing concern is nothing new.
Most ADRs already have HK dual-listings.
The HK-listed names (e.g. Meituan) had nothing to do with it, but got sold nonetheless.
EM Asia, with low credit penetration(<5% Pop. has credit cards), is naturally a very attractive market for BNPL
What’s interesting is the business model played out in a VERY different way vs. RoW
Case study: % of Rev from Merchants: Kredivo (<10%) vs global peers (80%+)
When a BNPL platform earns the bulk of rev from customers, it is essentially a credit card!
Net trx margin is double the level of global peers (5%+ vs. 1.5-2.2%):
- Higher gross rev (consumers pay more)
- Cheaper repayments: ACH-based payment rails vs. linked cards w/ high MDR
Why charging consumers not merchants:
- Close to 0 MDR
- Aggressive pricing of e-wallets + GPN/ regulations pushing to cap trx fees
- Merchants are "spoiled"
- Consumers are credit-starved (no credit bureaus/high % of temp workers) & hence willing to pay