@rafaelmgrossi With that material plus centrifuge components and experts, Iran could produce enough material for a bomb in about a year--perhaps rather faster. Weaponization efforts could run in parallel until the very end. (4/n)
@rafaelmgrossi The standard response here is, "well, we can just bomb then again."
And, yes, that's true!
But bombing Iran once a year seems like a catastrophic outcome. And it requires intelligence to be pretty much perfect every time. (5/n)
@rafaelmgrossi Moreover, Iran already has facilities which are deeper than Fordow and thus likely beyond reach of the MOP.
@rafaelmgrossi @ArmsControlWonk As is obvious, I'm pessimistic about where we're heading. But let me say this: If there is any opening for diplomacy, take it! Even a "bad deal" could be pretty attractive right now. (7/7)
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The claim that Iran had 60 days to make a deal is disingenuous since the United States was hardly ready, and did not conduct, an intensive, detailed negotiation. (1/n)
For example, there were times when Iran was willing to talk but the United States wasn't (presumably because it needed more time to prepare).
🧵The stated goal of Israel’s military campaign is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. With operations ongoing, it's too early to reach a conclusion.
But I can highlight outstanding questions that will determine whether Israel will achieve its nuclear goal. (1/n)
Let's focus on three areas:
👉Fordow
👉Enriched uranium stockpile
👉Centrifuge components
BLUF: As of now, key facilities, material, and equipment are--or are likely--intact.
CAVEAT: The situation is fluid and uncertain. (2/n)
FORDOW is an enrichment plant buried in a mountain. While there are reports of some strikes against the facility, IAEA DG @rafaelmgrossi reports this morning that no damage is visible. (3/n)
🧵Initial thoughts on Russia's new nuclear doctrine, based on a machine translation of Putin's comments. (I have not seen the doctrine yet; my assessment may change when I do).
BLUF: It's not tied as directly to the Ukraine war as others think. (1/n)
@ChatGPTapp As has been reported, Putin is saying he might use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state that attacked Russia in concert with a nuclear-weapon state.
This mirror U.S. declaratory policy until 2009 (I think), which contained a similar provision. (3/n)
This thread is a transparent attempt by Colby to foreclose scrutiny of his behavior around the insurrection on Jan 6, 2021. I want to explain what he did and why it shouldn't be ignored.
(Like all my tweets, these are my personal views.)
My criticism of Colby is nothing to do with his conservative views. We were friends—good friends—for years. We regularly had lunch or dinner. I went to Rio for his wedding. He came to mine. Throughout that time, we disagreed a lot about policy—domestic and foreign—but...
(2/n)
… we discussed those disagreements in a good-faith, productive way. We found common ground on nuclear policy and wrote together. I read part of his book manuscript and he thanked me in his acknowledgments.
Ukraine has reportedly attacked the Russian early-warning radar at Armavir. This strike was a bad idea. It provided only limited military benefit to Ukraine and exacerbates nuclear risks.
The Armavir radar is part of Russia's "strategic" early warning system. It is designed to detect an incoming nuclear strike and enable Russia to launch its nuclear forces before they are destroyed.
However, such radars can also contribute to nonnuclear warfighting--not least by detecting nonnuclear ballistic missiles and enabling defenses. I assume that Ukraine hit this radar to help U.S.-supplied ATACMS penetrate Russian defenses. (3/n)