Thread by @IranWonk

What is the model for system change in #Iran?

1. The Islamic Revolution is NOT the model

2. 1979 remains ground-zero of Iranian politics
(Iranian opposition unity has no meaning)

3. Leader principle

4. External intervention and polarization as triggers for system change 1/

1. The Islamic Revolution is NOT the model

A question I repeatedly received during the 12-day war was if I thought it would trigger a mass uprising to overthrow the Islamic Republic system.

My simple answer was "no".

But this question struck me as besides the point. 2/

A mass uprising to overthrow the system has not been the norm for successful system change in Iran's contemporary history.

- In 1921 and 1953, system change happened through foreign-backed military coups and elite defection. 3/

- In 1941 the ruling system was overthrown through military invasion and foreign occupation.

- Even in 1979, the Shah's departure and Army neutrality were necessary conditions for the mass uprising's swift victory, otherwise, it could have played out different. 4/

Zooming forward to the last 16 years, four mass uprisings in 2009, 2018, 2019, and 2022 demonstrated the Islamic Republic's waning legitimacy and a large-scale public desire for system transformation or change - averaging one major upheaval every four years - but failed. 5/

Here, I would separate the Green Movement from the other mass protests, as it was a radical-reformist mass uprising aimed at transforming the system, rather than fundamentally changing it (this fine but key distinction was often missed by the mainstream Western coverage). 6/

Even as I wholeheartedly supported the Green Movement and actively organized for it, I (and others) correctly identified it as a "color revolution", for which the conditions for success simply did not exist in Iran.

I wrote this at time👇7/

The other three protests had or developed a fundamentally anti-system character as seen in their slogans which called for the "death" of the system and its leadership, and rejected the reformist-principlist or moderate-hardliner binary as the center of Iranian political life. 8/

These anti-system mass protests have grown larger, lasted longer, and became more violent over time. They demonstrated that a critical mass of people exist willing to put life and limb at risk - at enormous personal cost like death or execution - to destroy the status quo. 9/

But even then I didn't think the conditions for their success existed because, while Iran's aging leaders were unified, had high resolve, and were well prepared to repress the uprising, the mass protests lacked leadership, organization, strategy, and discipline. 10/

2. 1979 remains ground-zero of Iranian politics
(Iranian opposition unity has no meaning)

In a recent polemic against Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, two leftist academics argued that a democratic and sovereign future would only come to Iran via "collective political struggle". 11/

Whether they mean radical reform or revolution, this essentially misses or ignores the reality that the conditions for "collective political struggle" do not exist in Iran and will not for the foreseeable future. 12/

The repressive apparatus of the Islamic Republic has simply been too successful in obliterating and atomizing any political alternative from emerging in Iran, including independent and strong civil and social organizations that could underlay such a political alternative. 13/

Reformism, meanwhile, has largely failed to provide a successful alternative to deliver meaningful, consistent, and durable change mostly for reasons outside its control.

The anemic reformism of Masood Pezeshkian is a pale shadow of the vibrant promises of Mohammad Khatami. 14/

For example, in 2025, the mandatory hijab remains a controversial issue of political contestation within the system.

The space women have carved out for themselves on this issue is mostly a function of the system's loss of hegemony, mass non-compliance, and civic activism. 15/

The failure of reformism and lack of space for viable new alternatives to emerge inside Iran has left Iranians with a desolate political landscape, basically contesting and relitigating the same issues for decades now without meaningful forward momentum and change. 16/

Shifting to the system-anti-system political struggle, this desolation and lack of generational change has meant that the anti-system political opposition still organizationally and psychologically remains in 1979. 17/

Monarchists either seek to turn back the clock, or replace the revolutionary republic with a constitutional monarchy.

The MEK seeks to reverse its post-revolution defeat to the Khomeinists.

Leftists basically accept the revolution but seek to nudge it on the correct path. 18/

(Iranian pan-Kurdish nationalists are a fourth major group but by their nature lack agency to drive major political change and don't want or have been unable to carve out a viable position by weaving themselves into the fabric of the Iranian core's political mainstream). 19/

Of these groups only one can form the basis for a viable anti-system political alternative.

Leftists are too weak and fragmented, and in the current war and crisis have essentially accommodated themselves to the Islamic Republic based on their anti-imperialist nationalism. 20/

The MEK is frighteningly well-organized, disciplined, well-funded, and networked among Western elites.

But its hybrid Islamist-leftist ideology, cult-like structure, and track record of serving as a literal instrument of foreign masters denies them mass legitimacy. 21/

Only CP Reza Pahlavi and his opposition faction have the potential to form the core of a viable political opposition. (I'll return to this shortly). 22/

But there is no basis for him to work with the others due to their opposed stances on 1979 as the ground zero of their politics, and the fact that such a union would alienate the base of the Pahlavi faction and his real and potential military, elite, and social base in Iran. 23/

I should add that the "Iranian diaspora" as a generic entity, at least the current generations, lacks the ability to form their only viable new alternative due to the absence of a post-79 organizing principle (this most likely would need to come from within Iran itself). 24/

Moreover, while diaspora Iranians have found success in many walks of life by accommodating themselves to foreign (mostly Western) institutions, at the intra-Iranian level I find they lack the constitution and discipline for organized mass political work. 25/

3. Leader principle

With the lack of institutions for Iranians (including in the diaspora) to organize political alternatives around, and their inability to do mass political work together on an equal basis (working with Iranians is like herding cats), only one model works. 26/

The three, somehow successful, factions today in Iranian political life all operate according to a "leader principle": The Khomeinists and MEK based on an political-religious leader-follower relationship, and the Monarchists based on a king-subject relationship. 27/

(If you're thinking to yourself this bodes ill for a future democratic system in Iran, you're right. A new socio-cultural basis for political organization could emerge in the future, I just don't see the conditions right now, partly thanks to repression within Iran itself.) 28/

This is part of the reason I think CP Reza Pahlavi can't accommodate himself to the smaller political factions and influencers, because they want to organize based on equality, but putting himself on their level gives him few benefits while undermining his leader status. 29/

CP Reza Pahlavi's potential political viability for a system change scenario - really the only alternative I can envision - either as a monarch, constitutional monarch, ceremonial president, or transitional figure, is based on a few factors. 30/

1. The resonance of monarchy in the psyches of many Iranian as the central institution and organizing principle of political life fore 2,500+ years.

2. Organic and cultivated nostalgia among many Iranians for life in Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty from 1921(1925)-1979. 31/

3. Name-recognition of CP Reza Pahlavi as the only non-system major Iranian political figure within Iran itself, the diaspora, and the rest of the world. 32/

4. The surge in elite and popular belief and adherence to Aryan nationalism inside Iran and the diaspora in recent decades, which is the only viable ideological alternative and rival to Shia political Islam, and only CP Reza Pahlavi can credibly claim the mantle. 33/

4. External intervention and polarization as triggers for system change

As I noted at the outset of the 12-day war, "system change" is not my basecase, there are more plausible scenarios, and the game remains the Islamic Republic's to win or lose. 34/

https://x.com/IranWonk/status/1937152469571674463

But prospect for this scenario to come to pass have grown dramatically since 13 June.

Critically, as I emphasized at the outset, a mass uprising (popular revolution) is not the most likely mechanism for this scenario to happen. 35/

https://x.com/IranWonk/status/1939022412839780517

Rather, I could see it come to pass through dual pressures.

First, if Israel (and the United States), move from the current phase of the conflict, which has focused on degrading Iran's military response function, missile forces, nuclear option, to system destabilization. 36/

Second, the Islamic Republic refuses or is unable to transform in the medium-to-long term and pivot from its failing and unsustainable path, which its been on since at least 2017 (for reasons within and outside its control), accelerating polarization of elites and society. 37/

External intervention in the direction of system destabilization will weaken the system, while polarization divides it from itself and society. 38/

Under these conditions, many Iranian elites as well as in society, will look for a viable alternative path out, and as I've pointed out, there's really only one game in town (that I can see). I've been shocked by the kind of system elites inside Iran considering this option. 39/

Iranian elites and society are risk averse, hence why most didn't join the 2017, 2019, and 2022 protests.

As I've said before, rather than fight a Syria-style revolution and civil war, with an uncertain outcome, they would rather meet a winner near the finish line. 40/

The winner will have to present them - above all the military and elites - with a positive political horizon (including some form of amnesty for all but the most egregiously implicated in the Islamic Republic), and credible signals it can and will carry them out. 41/

The main mechanism for system change is military action and political defection, accompanied by popular support and other forms of social validation as a secondary factor. It's enough for the masses to acquiesce or stay him, allowing "the winner" to crush system remnants. 42/

Of course, for CP Reza Pahlavi and his faction to become "the winner", there are also a few issues the will have to address:

- Create a larger, more capable, and better disciplined organization able to execute key functions and organize their diasporic base. 43/

- Gain the firm backing of the US and Israel (most other important players will fall in line).

Critically, the Pahlavi faction will have to negotiate an honorable exit for Iran from the conflict that does not humiliate the nation and knee cap themselves. 44/

- Systemize military and elite defection from the Islamic Republic system and organize it into a strategy and politico-military campaign to seize power, buttressed by harnessing and mobilizing any social support that arises. 45/

- Improve outreach and communication to Iranians and the diaspora as well as the Western media, civil society, and society, presenting their nationalist alternative in an authentically democratic and human rights-accepting framework. 46/

Frankly, this faction's has an image and communication problem - fueled by their political immaturity and lack of message and emotional discipline (a problem endemic to Iranians, myself included) - that belies their growing strength in the context of Iran's war and crisis. 47/47