My initial reaction to the victory of former President Donald #Trump in the 2024 US presidential election, and the implication for #Iran, is that it bodes ill for the Islamic Republic, but that this time they're playing with a slightly better hand in some respects: 1/ 🧵 1. Second term Trump administration is likely to be more hawkish on Iran for at least three reasons:

(a) His foreign policy and national security team is likely be led by Iran hawks such as Mike Pompeo and Tom Cotton. 2/

An initial assessment of the possible assassination of Hassan #Nasrallah by the #Israel:

1. Is there a possibility he's still alive?

2. What it means for #Iran's attempt to lay down a "new equation" vis-a-vis Israel

3. Three scenarios on how Iran may respond

4. The material and reputational damage for the Islamic Republic

5. Possible long-term implications for Iran's national security policy. 1/ 1. Is there a possibility Nasrallah is still alive?

Yes, it's possible, and Hezbollah's radio silence may be to re-establish a semblance of operational security and make sure he is in a [relatively] safe position before announcing it.

But more likely than not he is dead. 2/

Could this be a game changing election in the political history of the Islamic Republic?

Yes - for worse, and possibly better.

A few key observations, including a possible shift in the composition of the voting base of the reformists. 1/

https://twitter.com/KianSharifi/status/1807095317604577579

1. #Iran's voter turnout hit a record low of 40% (incl. ≈5% invalid ballots) for structural reasons but also some factors unique to this election.

(A) Iranians' sanction (تحریم) on elections which began in earnest in 2020/21 cycle continues and deepened this time around. 2/

A few preliminary thoughts on the #Israel|i strike on the #Iran|ian diplomatic facility in Damascus, Syria:

1. According to #IRGC public relations seven of its personnel (including its senior most general in Lebanon and Syria) were killed. 1/

https://twitter.com/alihashem_tv/status/1774823653940588863

This takes the total number of #Iran|ian personnel killed by #Israel in #Syria since 7 October 2023 to 16.

2. In November 2023 Iran's FM said killing of its personnel there would not go unanswered but it's unclear if there has been any direct retaliations for these deaths. 2/

The lack of a viable #Israel|i strategy to the #Iran nuclear issue after nearly two decades of dealing with it is shocking.

#Bennet tells #Blinken Iran can be deterred from 90% enrichment via #Russia level sanctions.

There are some problem with this. 1/ axios.com/newsletters/ax… While #Iran and #Russia sanctions regimes are complex and comparison is hard #Iran sanctions are arguably more comprehensive. Critically its energy exports are sanctioned whereas #Russia's are relatively unfettered. Iran is a template for Russia sanctions not other way around. 2/

Now that the smoke has cleared somewhat, a few thoughts on the assassination of Mohsen #Fakhrizadeh:

1. What does it mean for Iran's nuclear program?

2. How will it affect future #JCPOA talks? And

3. How will it affect Iranian and regional politics? 1/ What does it mean for Iran's nuclear program? #Fakhrizadeh is said to have headed the AMAD plan: Scientific and technological projects allegedly aimed to give the IRI the capability to build a nuclear explosive device. This murder represents both practical and symbolic blows. 2/

Excited to share my first piece in 18 months and in @ForeignPolicy, co-authored w/ Simon Miles, an assistant professor @DukeSanford, completing a book on US-Soviet relations during the early 1980s based on new Eastern bloc archival sources. 1/ foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/30/wha… Context: @mike_giglio had an excellent piece last month on how the #Trump admin may be executing a strategy of "maximum pressure" against #Iran, partly inspired by the book "Victory" & its claim that Reagan used this strategy to defeat the Soviet Union. 2/ buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegi…

New @nytimes piece captures recent wave of #Iran|ian nationalism, particularly among non-principlists (-conservatives), that seasoned analysts have been noting for some time. But there are some important caveats to consider. nytimes.com/2017/11/26/wor… 1/ Article starts w/ beheading of Mohsen Hojaji by #ISIL. Then, bizarrely, article attributes cause of nationalist wave to #Trump & #Saudi. ISIL carried out terrorist attack on #Tehran!!! It is arguably larger structural factor that triggered wave since 2014, but largely ignored! 2/