What is the model for system change in #Iran?

1. The Islamic Revolution is NOT the model

2. 1979 remains ground-zero of Iranian politics
(Iranian opposition unity has no meaning)

3. Leader principle

4. External intervention and polarization as triggers for system change 1/ 1. The Islamic Revolution is NOT the model

A question I repeatedly received during the 12-day war was if I thought it would trigger a mass uprising to overthrow the Islamic Republic system.

My simple answer was "no".

But this question struck me as besides the point. 2/

🧵to lay down first draft of my top-5 short-to-medium term (three to 12 months) scenarios about the future of the Islamic Republic and conflict in the context of the #Iran-#Israel war.

The list is in order of likelihood today.

Expert or well considered feedback welcomed. 1/ Caveat 1: Current assumptions of scenarios are that:
(a) Iran's Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is not killed.

(b) US does not enter the conflict in a large-scale offensive capacity.

Caveat 2: Scenarios will become more/less likely based on events and re-ranked accordingly. 2/

Interesting thread on how Iranian defense choices led it down a path where it lacked adequate air defenses in the Iran-Israel war (I wondered what happened in JF-17 “Thunder” talks).

I think it may provide some sign posts about where #Iran's defense industry could be headed. 1/

https://twitter.com/PandemicTruther/status/1934358798904541316

Prior to 07 October 2023, #Iran's deterrence strategy was based on three main pillars:

1. The Axis of Resistance

2. Aerospace programs (namely missiles and drones) and

3. Nuclear hedging strategy. 2/

🧵on why I think #Iran will eventually return to the negotiating table and wave the flag of compromise

🧵 overview:

1. Iran can resist the US and Israel but not deter them

2. Iran's best option is compromise

3. Follies of the nuclear option

4. Regime change is unlikely 1/ 1. Iran can resist the US and Israel but not deter them

My contention since soon after 07 October 2023 has been that Iran's best chance to end the conflict in its favor was the coordination application of overwhelming force to attempt a halt in the war and negotiations. 2/

Happy to see the Persian-language press in #Iran, especially a high quality outlet like @ecoirantv, covering the launch of the new book on #China by my dear friend and former colleague @JosephTorigian.

Iranians' interest in this groundbreaking book will likely be threefold: 1/

https://twitter.com/JosephTorigian/status/1932081543616274935

1. General interest in China and its leader Xi Jinping

2. Interest in China-Iran relations (and bottlenecks to its advancement)

3. Debate on how Iran should align in US-China superpower competition (pro-US, pro-China, or neutral). 2/

Mega🧵dissecting informative 3-hour discussion b/w what I'm told is an #IRGC-linked outlet (Tamam Rokh) and two -connected security and #Syria experts in #Iran, Hadi Masoomi Zare, and Ali Samadzadeh, on the loss of Syria and what the future may hold. 1/ Disclaimer: I casually took notes on the video while I was engaged in other work so there may be some imprecision or errors in my summarization of the lengthy discussion.

For Persian-speakers interested in Iranian foreign and national security policy its worthwhile to watch. 2/

"Syria" or Syria-fication has a different meaning in Iranian domestic politics although we can debate the implications of Bashar al-Assad's fall for politics.

1. "Syria" in Iran's politics has become a byword for the dangers of revolutionary or armed opposition to the state. 1/

https://twitter.com/hdagres/status/1865954614358446169

Many Iranians, who experienced one revolution that led to an outcome they have come to see as worse than what existed under the ancien regime, view Syria's experience and destruction since 2011 as a cautionary tale of what could happen to Iran if they move beyond reformism. 2/

My initial reaction to the victory of former President Donald #Trump in the 2024 US presidential election, and the implication for #Iran, is that it bodes ill for the Islamic Republic, but that this time they're playing with a slightly better hand in some respects: 1/ 🧵 1. Second term Trump administration is likely to be more hawkish on Iran for at least three reasons:

(a) His foreign policy and national security team is likely be led by Iran hawks such as Mike Pompeo and Tom Cotton. 2/

An initial assessment of the possible assassination of Hassan #Nasrallah by the #Israel:

1. Is there a possibility he's still alive?

2. What it means for #Iran's attempt to lay down a "new equation" vis-a-vis Israel

3. Three scenarios on how Iran may respond

4. The material and reputational damage for the Islamic Republic

5. Possible long-term implications for Iran's national security policy. 1/ 1. Is there a possibility Nasrallah is still alive?

Yes, it's possible, and Hezbollah's radio silence may be to re-establish a semblance of operational security and make sure he is in a [relatively] safe position before announcing it.

But more likely than not he is dead. 2/

Could this be a game changing election in the political history of the Islamic Republic?

Yes - for worse, and possibly better.

A few key observations, including a possible shift in the composition of the voting base of the reformists. 1/

https://twitter.com/KianSharifi/status/1807095317604577579

1. #Iran's voter turnout hit a record low of 40% (incl. ≈5% invalid ballots) for structural reasons but also some factors unique to this election.

(A) Iranians' sanction (تحریم) on elections which began in earnest in 2020/21 cycle continues and deepened this time around. 2/

A few preliminary thoughts on the #Israel|i strike on the #Iran|ian diplomatic facility in Damascus, Syria:

1. According to #IRGC public relations seven of its personnel (including its senior most general in Lebanon and Syria) were killed. 1/

https://twitter.com/alihashem_tv/status/1774823653940588863

This takes the total number of #Iran|ian personnel killed by #Israel in #Syria since 7 October 2023 to 16.

2. In November 2023 Iran's FM said killing of its personnel there would not go unanswered but it's unclear if there has been any direct retaliations for these deaths. 2/

The lack of a viable #Israel|i strategy to the #Iran nuclear issue after nearly two decades of dealing with it is shocking.

#Bennet tells #Blinken Iran can be deterred from 90% enrichment via #Russia level sanctions.

There are some problem with this. 1/ axios.com/newsletters/ax… While #Iran and #Russia sanctions regimes are complex and comparison is hard #Iran sanctions are arguably more comprehensive. Critically its energy exports are sanctioned whereas #Russia's are relatively unfettered. Iran is a template for Russia sanctions not other way around. 2/

Now that the smoke has cleared somewhat, a few thoughts on the assassination of Mohsen #Fakhrizadeh:

1. What does it mean for Iran's nuclear program?

2. How will it affect future #JCPOA talks? And

3. How will it affect Iranian and regional politics? 1/ What does it mean for Iran's nuclear program? #Fakhrizadeh is said to have headed the AMAD plan: Scientific and technological projects allegedly aimed to give the IRI the capability to build a nuclear explosive device. This murder represents both practical and symbolic blows. 2/

Excited to share my first piece in 18 months and in @ForeignPolicy, co-authored w/ Simon Miles, an assistant professor @DukeSanford, completing a book on US-Soviet relations during the early 1980s based on new Eastern bloc archival sources. 1/ foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/30/wha… Context: @mike_giglio had an excellent piece last month on how the #Trump admin may be executing a strategy of "maximum pressure" against #Iran, partly inspired by the book "Victory" & its claim that Reagan used this strategy to defeat the Soviet Union. 2/ buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegi…

New @nytimes piece captures recent wave of #Iran|ian nationalism, particularly among non-principlists (-conservatives), that seasoned analysts have been noting for some time. But there are some important caveats to consider. nytimes.com/2017/11/26/wor… 1/ Article starts w/ beheading of Mohsen Hojaji by #ISIL. Then, bizarrely, article attributes cause of nationalist wave to #Trump & #Saudi. ISIL carried out terrorist attack on #Tehran!!! It is arguably larger structural factor that triggered wave since 2014, but largely ignored! 2/