Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
4/ At the operational-strategic level, not much has changed since 2024. There have been taken steps - changes in training, drone scoring systems, system for transfers between units, and the move to a corps structure - but key problems in organizational leadership are still there
5/ In my view, this likely reinforces Putin’s belief that victory remains within reach - one of several factors driving his decision to prolong the war, despite the mounting toll both within Russia and his troops along the front lines
6/ The original post by Krotevych, written in Ukrainian, can be found here:
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible:
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...
The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds
That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization
🧵Thread with key findings from Frontelligence Insight analysis on Russia’s Motorcycle Assault Groups: structure, tactics, training, equipment, battlefield performance, and the conditions that enabled them
2/ Though called “assault” groups, Motorcycle Assault Groups serve diverse roles beyond direct assaults - handling diversion, reconnaissance, behind-the-lines infiltration, logistics, and flanking support in larger operations.
3/ More importantly, motorcycles act mainly as rapid transport, ferrying troops to their objectives rather than acting as combat platforms. As analysts @KofmanMichael and B.A. Friedman note, a better analogy is “dragoons” - mounted infantry who rode into battle but fought on foot
Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), a respected investigative group that has tracked Russian military affairs for over a decade, has published a new report on the production of T-90 tanks. 🧵Thread about their key findings on Russia’s tank production and expansion efforts:
2/ By early 2022, just before the invasion, Uralvagonzavod had started mass production of the upgraded T-90M "Proryv." The army had received 66–85 tanks, plus 10 sent to the Kazan Tank School. In total, Russia had about 65–85 T-90Ms and 370–380 older T-90s around February 2022
3/ CIT estimates that Uralvagonzavod built 60–70 T-90Ms in 2022. Production reportedly rose to 140–180 tanks in 2023. In 2024, output may have reached 250–300 tanks. All current T-90Ms are newly built, and hull production does not appear to be a limiting factor.
Nearly every week, headlines, X threads, and opinion pieces tout drones as the new defining technology of modern and future warfare. While there is certainly truth to that, it’s worth stepping back and examining this "now-mainstream" idea. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine has become the first battleground where drones have fundamentally reshaped the battlefield. By estimates, over 70% of battlefield losses are from the drones. Even if the exact figure varies depending on the source or methodology, most assessments place it above 50%
3/ In many ways, Ukraine has done for drones what "Operation Desert Storm", and later the "Shock and Awe" campaign in Iraq did for modern warfare: reshaping assumptions and demonstrating the transformative role of air supremacy and advanced technology across all levels of combat
Чому США такі «беззубі», коли мова йде про дії проти головних геополітичних суперників? Чому здається, що країна скотилась в ізоляціонізм і фактично ігнорує міжнародну систему, яку сама ж будувала десятиліттями? Короткий 🧵тред на основі цифр, графіків і моїх спостережень:
2/ Умовною відправною точкою можна вважати події 11 вересня та подальше вторгнення в Афганістан і Ірак. Ці два десятиліття воєн у США відомі як GWOT (Global War on Terror) - Глобальна війна з тероризмом, розпочата Джорджем Бушем-молодшим за майже повної підтримки обох партій
3/ З часом, коли стало очевидно, що в Іраку немає зброї масового ураження, а "перемога" в Афганістані сумнівна, підтримка почала падати. Згідно з опитуванням Pew Research Center, вже у 2019 році 62% американців і 64% ветеранів війни в Іраку вважали, що війна була того не варта