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Jun 29 17 tweets 5 min read Read on X
Stories of undercover operatives who stay behind enemy lines and later fight in special ops units, through some of the war’s toughest battles, are usually found in movies or games. But this isn’t fiction. Here are key points from our interview with Artem "Skhidnyi" Karyakin 🧵:Image
2/ Artem, a native of Donbas, says he witnessed signs of Russian influence long before 2014. In his hometown of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), a mining city in Luhansk Oblast with no historical ties to the Don Cossacks, a so-called “Don Cossack” group appeared in the early 2000s
3/ By 2014, the same “Cossacks” were seizing government buildings in Kadiivka - this time armed and operating under Russian flags. Many weren’t local; they had come from the Russian Federation, as had others who helped take control by force during the spring occupation efforts. Image
4/ In response, local residents organized rallies, distributed leaflets and stickers. The turning point came in spring 2014, when two schoolboys raised a Ukrainian flag atop a slag heap and were shot at. After that, many pro-Ukrainian residents began to flee the town Image
5/ Artem chose to stay. In July 2014, while under occupation, he created a Twitter account. What began as an effort to show life in the occupation soon turned riskier: he began posting locations of Russian troops, often including maps showing where equipment was stationed
6/ In the fall of 2014, Artem was contacted via Twitter by Ukrainian intelligence and army contacts, who urged him to stop posting details publicly and share them privately instead. From then on, he secretly tracked Russian troop movements and enemy positions in occupied areas
7/ Over the years, this also came to include information about factories and enterprises under Russian control, the socio-political climate, local sentiment, and data on collaborators - those who had joined the Russian side in combat or taken positions in the security services.
8/ After leaving Donbas in 2021, Artem found himself in Kyiv as the full-scale war began in 2022. He walked to the nearest unit — the TDF and took up a defensive position on the Bucha-Irpin outskirts. By summer, he had joined the 8th Regiment of Special Operations Forces Image
9/ Artem’s first combat deployment was in August 2022 in Bakhmut, then under heavy assault by Russian forces, including Wagner PMC fighters. Shortly after, he took part in the liberation of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast. His most recent mission brought him to Kursk Image
10/ The Kursk operation was unique in many ways. It was there he first encountered maneuver warfare - a style he found more challenging than fighting along a clear front line. In Kursk, Artem faced new Russian approach: fiber-optic drones operating up to 10–15 km deep Image
11/ Another key difference was that, for the 1st time, Artem and his unit were operating as a “foreign army.” He was careful not to mirror the behavior of Russian forces in his own hometown. In Russia, he told civilians they wanted to liberate Ukrainian cities, not to take theirs
12/ Artem’s also said that they faced the forces of two different totalitarian states. Engaging North Korean troops marked another distinction from the battlefield in Ukraine - though in a way, their tactics in Kursk closely resembled those used by Wagner fighters in Bakhmut. Image
13/ When it comes to Donbas, Artem believes liberation and reintegration are entirely possible - but not easy. Russia created conditions in which nearly every second family in occupied Donbas has lost a relative to the war - direct consequence of the forced mobilization
14/ But it’s important to understand, Artem says, that Donbas, especially the areas occupied since 2014,is a region where civic engagement is weak. People's views and actions are largely shaped by their immediate environment, not by deep-rooted convictions.
15/ Even now, many no longer view Russia in a positive light. After years under the Russian flag, they’ve come to see the reality - that there is little to gain, and the forced sacrifices were not worth it. Artem knows this firsthand; he lived among them for most of his life Image
16/ Thank you for reading. To follow more from Artem "Skhidnyi" - follow him on X @samotniyskhid. If you liked this thread, please like and share the first post to help boost visibility. You can also support him directly via pay_pal: samotniyskhid@gmail.com
The full interview is available on Frontelligence Insight on stack, featuring more detail and nuance than we could fit here due to post length limits. Follow us there (it's free) for more stories like this one.

frontelligence.substack.com/p/slag-heaps-h…

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Jun 29
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.

🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
Read 6 tweets
Jun 26
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible: Image
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...

The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds Image
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds

That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
Read 8 tweets
Jun 26
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization
Read 4 tweets
Jun 23
21st-Century Dragoons: Dissecting Russia’s Motorcycle Assault Tactics

🧵Thread with key findings from Frontelligence Insight analysis on Russia’s Motorcycle Assault Groups: structure, tactics, training, equipment, battlefield performance, and the conditions that enabled them Image
2/ Though called “assault” groups, Motorcycle Assault Groups serve diverse roles beyond direct assaults - handling diversion, reconnaissance, behind-the-lines infiltration, logistics, and flanking support in larger operations.
3/ More importantly, motorcycles act mainly as rapid transport, ferrying troops to their objectives rather than acting as combat platforms. As analysts @KofmanMichael and B.A. Friedman note, a better analogy is “dragoons” - mounted infantry who rode into battle but fought on foot
Read 20 tweets
Jun 22
Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), a respected investigative group that has tracked Russian military affairs for over a decade, has published a new report on the production of T-90 tanks. 🧵Thread about their key findings on Russia’s tank production and expansion efforts: Image
2/ By early 2022, just before the invasion, Uralvagonzavod had started mass production of the upgraded T-90M "Proryv." The army had received 66–85 tanks, plus 10 sent to the Kazan Tank School. In total, Russia had about 65–85 T-90Ms and 370–380 older T-90s around February 2022 Image
3/ CIT estimates that Uralvagonzavod built 60–70 T-90Ms in 2022. Production reportedly rose to 140–180 tanks in 2023. In 2024, output may have reached 250–300 tanks. All current T-90Ms are newly built, and hull production does not appear to be a limiting factor. Photo credit: Uralvagonzavod
Read 9 tweets
Jun 21
Nearly every week, headlines, X threads, and opinion pieces tout drones as the new defining technology of modern and future warfare. While there is certainly truth to that, it’s worth stepping back and examining this "now-mainstream" idea. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine has become the first battleground where drones have fundamentally reshaped the battlefield. By estimates, over 70% of battlefield losses are from the drones. Even if the exact figure varies depending on the source or methodology, most assessments place it above 50%
3/ In many ways, Ukraine has done for drones what "Operation Desert Storm", and later the "Shock and Awe" campaign in Iraq did for modern warfare: reshaping assumptions and demonstrating the transformative role of air supremacy and advanced technology across all levels of combat
Read 10 tweets

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