Pokrovsk Sector Analysis
RU forces hold dominant terrain across the Vovcha basin. The axis toward Filia is collapsing incrementally. However, AFU retains positional control on the elevated northern bank - limiting RU freedom of maneuver in the valley. /1
A key Russian option is to secure the Zirka–Yalta triangle and flood it with drone operators. With stable ammo supply, this zone could influence the entire sector. It is relatively secure from AFU counterattacks, allowing sustained drone operations. /2
The Vovcha’s meandering course compounds AFU movement constraints. With Vesele’s defensive belt compromised, the southern bank becomes indefensible over time. AFU likely to conduct phased withdrawal to preserve force integrity. /3
The war is evolving into a series of endless pockets. Russia tested its drone-oriented strategy in Sudzha and is now scaling it across the entire front in the shadow of the drone "swarm". 1/
Ukraine relies on fortified strongholds. But the joints between these defensive zones create weak noman points. Russia identifies and exploits these seams with systematic uneven pressure.
2/
By applying steady pressure across the entire line, Russia prevents Ukraine from executing effective countermeasures, one way missions insures that the point will be secured. This allows incremental gains on the flanks and creates multiple protrusions - the “claws.”
3/
Pokrovsk is the most data-rich direction, as GSUA publishes detailed reports about enemy activities in the area.
Every evening, GSUA publishes attacks and losses, showing 5-8 casualties per attack, with a noticeable correlation.
The ratio of casualties to attacks started to change after March 20, as summertime began to affect the morning and evening reporting of data.
A lot of attacks have been occurring at dusk, that will diverge the data sets.
What about the comparison of absolute numbers?
Almost every third attack happens in Pokrovsk,
but only 20% of Ivans are reported from that direction, making it seem cost-effective.
That doesn’t match the visual evidence.
By the end of November, the future appeared grim. However, recent successful operations by the AFU have brought a glimmer of hope, stabilizing the front lines pushing back the enemy.
Despite these positive developments, the battle is far from over.
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1/ After stabilizing the Kursk axis, Russia may shift its focus to Pokrovsk, aiming to secure the Malynivka road junction and the Udachne mine to sustain offensive momentum.
2/ Meanwhile, AFU are working to push Russian units beyond the Solona River and maintain control over the M04 and T0515 roads, which are critical for logistics and maneuverability.
Ukraine can also prepare some alternative path to M04 over the fields towards Dobropillia.
1/9 Threw russian reports into GSUA data to find some patterns.
New battlefield correlation data reveals fascinating insights into Russia's war tactics and reporting patterns. This matrix exposes key relationships - and potential misinformation - in combat operations.
2/9 Russian territorial gains strongly link with their attacks and troop losses. This confirms the "costly advance" pattern - Russia gaining ground primarily through persistent attacks and willingness to accept casualties.
3/9 What's striking is the disconnect between Russian advances and Ukrainian equipment losses. These operate as separate clusters with minimal relationship, suggesting Russia's territorial gains aren't achieved through equipment superiority.
0/7 Analyzing russia's combat efficiency in Ukraine through correlation data.
This matrix reveals key relationships between russian tactics, losses, and territorial gains - providing statistical evidence of what's working and failing on the battlefield.
1/7 Analysis of Russian losses in Ukraine reveals telling patterns. Combat engagements (repelled Russian attacks) strongly correlate with Russian troop losses (0.60), confirming the high casualty rate of offensive operations against prepared positions.
2/7 Russian guided bomb (KAB) usage shows negative correlation (-0.27) with combat engagements, suggesting these weapons are deployed separately from ground assaults, likely targeting rear areas while infantry attacks elsewhere.