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Vitaly Profile picture
Vitaly
@M0nstas
will publish maps here: https://t.co/EHnEEtKZCl Some alternative: https://t.co/2QzEH3u6gx
Jun 24 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Pokrovsk Sector Analysis
RU forces hold dominant terrain across the Vovcha basin. The axis toward Filia is collapsing incrementally. However, AFU retains positional control on the elevated northern bank - limiting RU freedom of maneuver in the valley. /1 Image A key Russian option is to secure the Zirka–Yalta triangle and flood it with drone operators. With stable ammo supply, this zone could influence the entire sector. It is relatively secure from AFU counterattacks, allowing sustained drone operations. /2 Image
Jun 14 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
The war is evolving into a series of endless pockets. Russia tested its drone-oriented strategy in Sudzha and is now scaling it across the entire front in the shadow of the drone "swarm".
1/ Image Ukraine relies on fortified strongholds. But the joints between these defensive zones create weak noman points. Russia identifies and exploits these seams with systematic uneven pressure.
2/
Apr 6 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
Pokrovsk is the most data-rich direction, as GSUA publishes detailed reports about enemy activities in the area.
Every evening, GSUA publishes attacks and losses, showing 5-8 casualties per attack, with a noticeable correlation. Image The ratio of casualties to attacks started to change after March 20, as summertime began to affect the morning and evening reporting of data.
A lot of attacks have been occurring at dusk, that will diverge the data sets. Image
Mar 25 • 15 tweets • 4 min read
Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad

By the end of November, the future appeared grim. However, recent successful operations by the AFU have brought a glimmer of hope, stabilizing the front lines pushing back the enemy.
Despite these positive developments, the battle is far from over.
0/13 Image 1/ After stabilizing the Kursk axis, Russia may shift its focus to Pokrovsk, aiming to secure the Malynivka road junction and the Udachne mine to sustain offensive momentum.
Mar 17 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
1/9 Threw russian reports into GSUA data to find some patterns.
New battlefield correlation data reveals fascinating insights into Russia's war tactics and reporting patterns. This matrix exposes key relationships - and potential misinformation - in combat operations. Image 2/9 Russian territorial gains strongly link with their attacks and troop losses. This confirms the "costly advance" pattern - Russia gaining ground primarily through persistent attacks and willingness to accept casualties.
Mar 15 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
0/7 Analyzing russia's combat efficiency in Ukraine through correlation data.
This matrix reveals key relationships between russian tactics, losses, and territorial gains - providing statistical evidence of what's working and failing on the battlefield. Image 1/7 Analysis of Russian losses in Ukraine reveals telling patterns. Combat engagements (repelled Russian attacks) strongly correlate with Russian troop losses (0.60), confirming the high casualty rate of offensive operations against prepared positions.
Dec 9, 2024 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
#4Fun
There are 3 interconnected graphics: the number of repelled attacks and Russian losses @GeneralStaffUA
and territorial changes by @Deepstate_UA
While the raw data is difficult to interpret, applying a 7-day average reveals some patterns. Image
Image The DS data has some lag and may require adjustments, but it offers valuable context, particularly for interpreting the number of unrepelled attacks. Since September, there have been five distinct spikes in Russian losses.
Jun 16, 2023 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
#Thoughts
🇷🇺 "Lost" fortification section on the Volnovakha front.

There must be at least two lines.
Majority of 🇷🇺 fortifications are build on the hill behind the water stream and the link between those valleys.
For some reason second line is missing on the Vremiivskiy lendge. Image Without control of Vuhledar there was no chance to build anything along Kashlahach river.
The ledge made the area too deep to justify the construction 25km away from the front.
Incomplete uneven fronts complicates and hight expectations postponed the decision, So non were build. Image
Jun 16, 2023 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
#Map #Volnovakha
Reports about 🇺🇦 activities near Vuhledar opens another window of opportunity at Volnovakha.

The city is extremely important on that flank and for Mariupol liberation, there are no options to avoid the fight before any further movement.

Image Volnovakha is a watershed, all the rivers goes there so its a natural direction for the offense.
Defense is defined by
a1. main fortifications protected by the streams and lowlands
a2. the forest that protects the city from the North.
a3. 20km deep buffer. Image
Jun 9, 2023 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
#Map fortifications and roads
Probably under impression after previous 🇺🇦 operations 🇷🇺 decided to concentrate their efforts on the roads, ignoring underdeveloped direction of Azov Upland.

@Nrg8000 map Image @Nrg8000 Logic of 🇷🇺 fortifications is next
1. Protect hubs (crossroads and storages)
2. Protect the elevation (force the enemy to go always uphill)
3. Protect the Black Sea Lowland access (fast track) ImageImageImage
Jun 7, 2023 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Flooded areas of Kherson, Hola Prystan and Krynky.

Comparing to the topographic map. ImageImageImageImage Kherson main indicator is the roundabout in Korabel district.
Topography is not precise and show difference in 7-9m
Bohoroducka street is at 11m level

both are similarly flooded.

That show that elevation map isn't accurate for this but still useful.
https://t.co/TIpXbvRyWy twitter.com/i/web/status/1… Image
May 25, 2023 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
Another 20 destroyed artillery units reported.
For some reason no talks about the reported artillery position strikes.

The first such event was reported at Jan 11, the next in Jan 27, next Mar 7, it has never been a consistent event.
Everything has changed in May. ImageImage Other distinct categories in the reports are
S-300 - were reported several times
MLRS - there were only 3 cases, all in April
EW - 13 were hit in May 19,20 and reported constantly since April.

EW is a Special equipment category and it has spiked in March. Image
May 24, 2023 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
Lapin APC leader
@GeoConfirmed
50.453339, 35.630437
FJ3J+84Q Glotovo, Belgorod Oblast, Russia

https://t.co/EtHgEXMorm twitter.com/i/web/status/1… Image @GeoConfirmed Lapin the squadron commander
50.461037, 35.640967

@GeoConfirmed
ImageImage
May 23, 2023 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
As far as I understand young republic didn't last for long. The results would be clear tomorrow.
Russia should deploy more troops from their reserves on the border to avoid this in future, diverting resources away from the battlefield. Apparently russian isn’t concerned with the attack of BNR, so it will continue.
Image
May 12, 2023 • 9 tweets • 4 min read
#Map Bakhmut madness
The topography at the west of Bakhmutka river provides some advantage for SE offense but at the end it favors those who is uphill.
The whole battlefield is 30km wide and 9 km deep so no deployment will hide.

*It’s made for entertainment. Image 1. Berkhivka hill.
It could be a good place for defense but fully exposed to the downhill attacks from the West and there are no positions to cover the area without exposure to the counter artillery. Can be used to launch an attack to a low ground.
May 10, 2023 • 9 tweets • 4 min read
#Map #Klishchiivka pushback
First reported somewhat significant 🇺🇦 gain in a couple of months happens at the area where 🇷🇺 was struggling since capture of Kurdumivka.
The area is estimated from 2 to 8 km² and makes no difference.
What matters is momentum and positions.
0/X Image Bakhmut is more than just a city - it's a lowland area east of the Donbas canal and offense can't stop on any point until canal is reached.
So 🇷🇺 should hold positions along the canal whatever the cost or start trading South and regroup.
May 1, 2023 • 8 tweets • 7 min read
April in two pictures ImageImage April was the month of Bakhmut, there were some sparse attacks at Avdiivka and continues leveling of Mariinka, but AFU still keeps the presence in the city despite all the odds. ImageImage
Mar 24, 2023 • 8 tweets • 4 min read
#Map #Bakhmut
One month of last days. Western tanks are still no where near the front, 🇷🇺 has stuck on the outskirts of the city, but managed to capture 60km² around Bakhmut.
Let's take a look at quality of those kilometers. The funnel of Bakhmut
In order to capture the city you must avoid city fights.
There are couple of ways how to force a surrender:
Erase from a distance or encircle it.
🇷🇺 has no resources for any of that.
Mar 9, 2023 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
First time all the available missile titles were used in the combined strike.
Air-defence was not ready for that, or some missiles were guided around it.

There were
58 possible targets and only 34 were shot down.
Kh-47, Kh-22 and S300 missiles are out of reach still. Image That would be the first massive strike in a month
Feb 16 attempt can be ignored but...
🇷🇺 launched 12 Kh-101 then and in 3 weeks after that 28 Kh-101 missiles were launched.
Same for Kalibr missiles 8/20
that looks like it's a production ceiling.
Image
Feb 12, 2023 • 7 tweets • 5 min read
#TalkingPoint #Losses
Watch the strong trend on increased losses since December.
But the growth started back in September.
Kharkiv and Kherson operations added to the overall trend, but that half year trend is obvious. Those increased losses aren’t believable on their own.
One of the best explanation of them is increased number of troops and @Kartinamaslom5 did a great description of it.
Increased losses are correlated with increased number of deployed forces.
Jan 15, 2023 • 8 tweets • 5 min read
#TalkingPoint #mobilization
There are rising talks about Belarus involvement into the war.
My expectations ~100K would be added to 🇷🇺 forces.

With all the current forces it should make ~1M army.

The main question where all of them could be deployed. Where 1M army can be deployed?

There are 5 major directions
1 main objective to fully capture annexed territories🤯
Ignoring Kherson front as impossible for a full-scale invasion over the Dnipro (1M is not enough for that)

Let's explore those directions.