In today’s Wumao Soup, I’ll introduce how and where the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) online propaganda and influence operations work. Due to China’s massive population and advances in AI, CCP-aligned online content has become increasingly visible.
1/20
Like Russia’s troll farms, China has its own troll army: the “50 Cent Party” or “Wumao” refers to state-linked online commentators who are reportedly paid ¥0.50 per post to steer discussions away from criticism and amplify CCP narratives on social media.
2/20
Back in 2017, a research paper estimated that the Wumao produced almost 500 million fabricated comments annually to distract readers and shift topics. In that sense, Wumao operates very similarly to the Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” model:
Today, online propaganda is deeply embedded in Chinese society. The Ministry of Culture holds regular training sessions, and participants must pass an exam before becoming certified “Internet commentators.” Their mission: to provide “public opinion guidance.”
4/20
Like Russia, the CCP also conducts aggressive influence operations outside China. A leaked propaganda directive outlined their key objectives: 1) Criticize the US 2) Downplay Taiwan’s existence 3) Frame communism as a “better democracy” — without directly attacking democracy
5/20
4) Cherry-pick violent events and social unrest to claim capitalism and democracy are incompatible 5) Portray US foreign policy as “forcing Western values” and equate it with invasion 6) Promote positive developments in China
6/20
Russian troll farms share many of the same goals, but studies show they rarely coordinate with their Chinese counterparts. China mainly targets the US, while Russia focuses on Ukraine and the EU. For years, Russia’s influence operations were also far more advanced.
7/20
The CCP’s main propaganda weapon in the West is TikTok. It’s hugely popular with ~170 million users in the US, and over 130 million in Europe. In Finland, 50% of 13-18-year-olds get their news from TikTok, highlighting its massive influence among younger audiences.
8/20
A 2024 study by Finkelstein et al. investigated whether TikTok downplays CCP-critical content and amplifies pro-CCP messaging. They found that TikTok showed much less anti-CCP content than other platforms.
9/20
The study also compared the reach of pro- vs. anti-CCP content. Even though users engaged more (likes/comments) with anti-CCP posts, TikTok disproportionately amplified pro-CCP ones, pointing to algorithmic bias, not user preference.
10/20
A survey of over 1200 Americans revealed that those who spent more time on TikTok had significantly more positive views of China’s human rights record and were more likely to consider China a good travel destination. Usage was linked to real-world attitude shifts.
11/20
For years, we’ve mostly focused on Russian online influence operations. But we shouldn’t overlook China, which can mobilize massive “online armies” through internal policy. Unlike Russia, China also has a huge edge in generative AI.
12/20
China can — and likely already does — use automated accounts to flood social media with anti-Western and pro-CCP narratives. Combined with algorithm manipulation, this enables the CCP to dominate online discourse and subtly shift public opinion in their favor.
13/20
Recently, I’ve been reviewing pro-CCP content on TikTok, and it’s exactly what you’d expect. Here are some examples:
Disciplined Chinese kids doing synchronized or “productive” performances in kindergartens:
14/20
Drone shows, often thinly veiled demonstrations of military strength. One recent stunt featured “drone firefighters”:
15/20
“Futuristic” cities, often highlighted by Western influencers. China actively recruits social media influencers to travel there and produce positive content.
16/20
Massive construction projects filmed by drones are also a common form of propaganda:
17/20
One of the most effective forms of manipulation is the “comparison video,” which contrasts China’s infrastructure or society with negative aspects or events in the US or Europe. Their favorite targets seems to be the US public transportation system.
18/20
Of course, it’s not just the videos; the comment sections are flooded with Chinese bots and trolls. The most upvoted comments usually praise China and criticize the US. Comments pointing out Chinese oppression are typically suppressed and downvoted.
19/20
In conclusion, China’s online propaganda model blends Russia’s “Firehose of Falsehood” with its own “Wolf Warrior diplomacy.” It promotes China’s achievements while highlighting and exaggerating the West’s issues.
20/20
The 2nd edition of “Vatnik Soup — The Ultimate Guide to Russian Disinformation” is officially out!
In today’s Vatnik Soup, we’ll explain the context of the upcoming Budapest Blunder, and how it follows the infamous Alaska Fiasco from two months ago and Trump’s absurd delaying of serious aid to Ukraine and effective sanctions on Russia for the past nine months.
1/20
Two months ago, Trump embarrassed the United States by rolling out the red carpet for war criminal dictator Putin and overall acting like a pathetic servant eager to meet his master. Of course, the Alaska Fiasco didn’t bring peace any closer.
Worse, the main outcome of the humiliation was to delay serious sanctions, which the US Congress, in rare bipartisan unity against Russia, was on the verge of passing. Two weeks by two weeks, Trump Always Chickens Out, postponing any real pressure on Putin for 9 months now.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce American propagandist Alexandra Jost, aka “Sasha” (@sashameetsrus). She’s best known for being paid by the Russian state to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda — and for doing it with a big smile.
1/23
Alexandra, now 26, was born in Hong Kong. Her father is from Texas, and her mother is from Siberia. According to her, she has “dreamed of living in Russia since childhood.” Sasha's mother runs a dance studio in Moscow and her younger brother is avoiding mobilization.
2/23
Since the beginning of her creator career, Sasha has been adamant about one thing: that she’s “never had to be paid” to speak of her “love” for Russia. But, as always with Russia, this turned out to be nothing but vranyo — a Russian “tactical lie.”
In today’s Vatnik Soup REBREW, I’ll reintroduce an American political commentator and pro-Kremlin propagandist, Tucker Carlson (@TuckerCarlson). He’s best known for his promotion of crazy conspiracy theories and for his support of authoritarian regimes around the world.
1/24
Tucker’s career spans decades, but he’s also been very active in recent years, so a lot has happened since our previous soup on him, which can be found here:
Once described as “the most powerful conservative in America”, Tucker has now fully transformed into a grifting conspiracy theorist and propagandist willing to work for whoever pays him the most. It’s unclear whether Tucker truly believes his endless conspiracy theories or…
3/24
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll cover the agenda-setting and flood of disinformation that spread on X and other platforms right after Charlie Kirk’s assassination. It’s far from the first or last time a tragedy has been weaponized for political purposes.
1/18
Every major political event, especially those involving violence, attracts massive attention. In the immediate aftermath, reliable information is scarce, making it highly vulnerable to both coordinated and improvised disinformation campaigns.
2/18
As I’ve mentioned in my previous soups and lectures, in disinformation campaigns, being first with a narrative is crucial, as people often remember the first version best — psychology studies show it sets the mental schema, and later updates rarely overwrite it.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce American social media personality David Freeman, AKA Gunther Eagleman™ (@GuntherEagleman). He’s best known for spreading political disinformation on X and shamelessly sucking up to Trump, Putin, and other authoritarian leaders.
1/22
David is a textbook example of someone profiting from MAGA grievance politics. He uses extreme, provocative language to farm engagement on X and never hesitates to flatter anyone who might give him more exposure — or money.
2/22
But David wasn’t always like this. At some point, in his mid-40s, he even tried a real job: he trained to become a cop. He spent three years with the Metro Transit PD, but after that he either got fired or quit, and never looked back.