In today’s Wumao Soup, I’ll introduce how and where the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) online propaganda and influence operations work. Due to China’s massive population and advances in AI, CCP-aligned online content has become increasingly visible.
1/20
Like Russia’s troll farms, China has its own troll army: the “50 Cent Party” or “Wumao” refers to state-linked online commentators who are reportedly paid ¥0.50 per post to steer discussions away from criticism and amplify CCP narratives on social media.
2/20
Back in 2017, a research paper estimated that the Wumao produced almost 500 million fabricated comments annually to distract readers and shift topics. In that sense, Wumao operates very similarly to the Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” model:
Today, online propaganda is deeply embedded in Chinese society. The Ministry of Culture holds regular training sessions, and participants must pass an exam before becoming certified “Internet commentators.” Their mission: to provide “public opinion guidance.”
4/20
Like Russia, the CCP also conducts aggressive influence operations outside China. A leaked propaganda directive outlined their key objectives: 1) Criticize the US 2) Downplay Taiwan’s existence 3) Frame communism as a “better democracy” — without directly attacking democracy
5/20
4) Cherry-pick violent events and social unrest to claim capitalism and democracy are incompatible 5) Portray US foreign policy as “forcing Western values” and equate it with invasion 6) Promote positive developments in China
6/20
Russian troll farms share many of the same goals, but studies show they rarely coordinate with their Chinese counterparts. China mainly targets the US, while Russia focuses on Ukraine and the EU. For years, Russia’s influence operations were also far more advanced.
7/20
The CCP’s main propaganda weapon in the West is TikTok. It’s hugely popular with ~170 million users in the US, and over 130 million in Europe. In Finland, 50% of 13-18-year-olds get their news from TikTok, highlighting its massive influence among younger audiences.
8/20
A 2024 study by Finkelstein et al. investigated whether TikTok downplays CCP-critical content and amplifies pro-CCP messaging. They found that TikTok showed much less anti-CCP content than other platforms.
9/20
The study also compared the reach of pro- vs. anti-CCP content. Even though users engaged more (likes/comments) with anti-CCP posts, TikTok disproportionately amplified pro-CCP ones, pointing to algorithmic bias, not user preference.
10/20
A survey of over 1200 Americans revealed that those who spent more time on TikTok had significantly more positive views of China’s human rights record and were more likely to consider China a good travel destination. Usage was linked to real-world attitude shifts.
11/20
For years, we’ve mostly focused on Russian online influence operations. But we shouldn’t overlook China, which can mobilize massive “online armies” through internal policy. Unlike Russia, China also has a huge edge in generative AI.
12/20
China can — and likely already does — use automated accounts to flood social media with anti-Western and pro-CCP narratives. Combined with algorithm manipulation, this enables the CCP to dominate online discourse and subtly shift public opinion in their favor.
13/20
Recently, I’ve been reviewing pro-CCP content on TikTok, and it’s exactly what you’d expect. Here are some examples:
Disciplined Chinese kids doing synchronized or “productive” performances in kindergartens:
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Drone shows, often thinly veiled demonstrations of military strength. One recent stunt featured “drone firefighters”:
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“Futuristic” cities, often highlighted by Western influencers. China actively recruits social media influencers to travel there and produce positive content.
16/20
Massive construction projects filmed by drones are also a common form of propaganda:
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One of the most effective forms of manipulation is the “comparison video,” which contrasts China’s infrastructure or society with negative aspects or events in the US or Europe. Their favorite targets seems to be the US public transportation system.
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Of course, it’s not just the videos; the comment sections are flooded with Chinese bots and trolls. The most upvoted comments usually praise China and criticize the US. Comments pointing out Chinese oppression are typically suppressed and downvoted.
19/20
In conclusion, China’s online propaganda model blends Russia’s “Firehose of Falsehood” with its own “Wolf Warrior diplomacy.” It promotes China’s achievements while highlighting and exaggerating the West’s issues.
20/20
The 2nd edition of “Vatnik Soup — The Ultimate Guide to Russian Disinformation” is officially out!
In today’s Vatnik Soup and the “Degenerate Russia” series, I’ll show you the brutal reality of Russian war crimes, in particular the horrific tortures and sexual abuses of children, women and men.
Buckle up, this one is not for the faint-hearted.
1/24
For over a decade now and as part of their “firehose of falsehood” propaganda strategy, Russia has been spreading false narratives targeted at right-wing/conservative audiences, portraying russia as a bastion of Christian, traditional,family values.
In the previous “degenerate Russia” series we discussed Russia’s insanely high divorce rates, rampant domestic violence, high murder rates, thriving neo-Nazi culture, corruption of the Orthodox Church, and their massive demographic problem:
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll explore how Russia is working with Iran, and how the recent Israel–US strikes on Iran could affect the war in Ukraine. Iran has been one of Russia’s key allies in their genocidal war, but in reality the partnership is deeply one-sided.
1/21
Historically, Russia/USSR has been involved in numerous wars in the Middle East, invading Afghanistan for nearly a decade and desperately trying to keep Syria’s authoritarian leader, al-Assad, in power before his eventual downfall.
2/21
While initially supportive of Israel, the Soviet Union quickly pivoted to backing its enemies, fueling antisemitism, terrorism, and chaos in an already tense region. At times, this meant near-open war, like when Soviet Air Force MiG-21s were shot down by Israel over Egypt.
In today’s Vatnik Soup REBREW, I’ll re-introduce a Latvian politician and former MEP, Tatjana Ždanoka. She’s best-known for her history in the Communist Party of Latvia, for her pro-Russian politics in the country, and her connections to Russian intelligence.
1/22
Based on Ždanoka’s speeches and social media posts, she has a deep hatred towards the people of Latvia. The reason for this can only be speculated, but part of it could be due to her paternal family being killed by the Latvian Auxiliary Police,…
2/22
…a paramilitary force supported by the Nazis, during the early 1940s. Ždanoka became politically active in the late 80s. She was one of the leaders of Interfront, a political party that supported Latvia remaining part of the USSR.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce the main themes of Russian disinformation on TikTok. Each day, there are thousands of new videos promoting pro-Kremlin narratives and propaganda.
It’s worth noting that Russians can only access European TikTok via VPN.
1/10
There is currently a massive TikTok campaign aimed at promoting a positive image of Russia. The videos typically feature relatively attractive young women and focus on themes of nationalism and cultural heritage.
2/10
Ironically, many of these videos from Moscow or St. Petersburg are deceptively edited to portray Ukraine in a false light — claiming there is no war and that international aid is being funneled to corrupt elites.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll talk about Finland and how pro-Kremlin propagandists have become more active in the Finnish political space since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For the first time since 2022, they’ve gained some political power in Finland.
1/16
Russia’s political strategy in countries with Russian-speaking minorities (such as Finland and the Baltics) is typically quite similar: it seeks to rally these minorities around issues like language and minority rights, and then frames the situation as oppression.
2/16
At the same time, Russian speakers are extremely wary and skeptical of local media, and instead tend to follow Russian domestic outlets like Russia-1 and NTV, thereby reinforcing an almost impenetrable information bubble.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll discuss the Ukrainian SBU’s “Spiderweb” operation and the main disinformation narrative vatniks have been spreading during the afterfall. While domestic Russian media stays silent, the vatniks and Russian milbloggers have been extremely loud.
1/20
This operation was probably the most impactful strike since the drowning of the Moskva, massively reducing Russia’s capability to bomb Ukrainian cities (or anyone else’s). It involved smuggling 117 FPV drones hidden in trucks into Russia. Once near airbases,…
2/20
…the roofs opened remotely, launching drones in synchronized waves to strike targets up to 4,000 km away. The mission took 18 months to plan. The unsuspecting Russian truck drivers who transported them had no idea they were delivering weapons deep behind their own lines.