๐บ๐ธ๐บ๐ฆ Yesterday, POLITICO broke that the Pentagon paused some shipments of ammo to Ukraine. The decision, driven by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is claimed by DoD to be in response to concerns about their own stockpiles.
Is that true?
No. It is not.
๐งต โฌ๏ธ 1/19
Department of Defense stocks of a wide variety of munitions are undoubtedly depleted due to the War in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, but the devil is always in the details. POLITICO reports that the pause has impacted both deliveries under PDA & USAI.
2/19
PDA (Presidential Drawdown Authority) is the mechanism for delivery of defense articles to Ukraine from DoD stocks. USAI (Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative) allows for the procurement of defense articles from industry or partner countries.
3/19
Deliveries from past Drawdowns authorized by the Biden Admin have long been expected to conclude this summer. Sec Def Hegseth recently stated that they are currently executing on PDAs #71-74, implying that previous PDA execute orders have been completed.
Deliveries from USAI, if allowed to proceed unmolested, would continue for years to come. As of December, there was still $10 billion in committed funding that was still not obligated (put on contract). I'd be surprised if this has substantially changed since then.
5/19
We now come to what specific munitions have been held up due to these supposed concerns about the DoD's own depleted inventory levels. The weapons are sitting in Poland, and NPR has acquired an exact list of whats being held back.
This is a very modest list of ammunition; nothing that is going to compromise the DoD's own readiness. AIM-7 in particular is scarcely used by US fighter aircraft, if at all. MSE was not included in PDAs 71-74, meaning it is coming via USAI and not US stocks.
8/19
Hellfire, which was not previously known to be provided to Ukraine by the US, has not been procured since 2023/2024 due to inventory requirements being met. The only item on the list that is likely having an impact on inventory requirements are the 252 GMLRS.
9/19
GMLRS is interesting because there have been anecdotes from Ukraine observing a recent increase in GMLRS fire missions. This is likely due to the first lot of contracted GMLRS via USAI being delivered this year. That first lot (FY23) is scheduled to conclude next month.
10/19
With Lockheed Martin producing 14,000 GMLRS per year, the US Army can afford to give up 250 more from their inventory now; assuming that all of them are from inventory, and not a mix of both PDA & new production from USAI.
11/19
This decision is just another example of Trump Admin officials actively working against the President's own agenda. At the NATO summit he pledged to work on sourcing additional PATRIOT assets for Ukraine, and scored a big win with the Alliance adopting the 5% target.
12/19
Any delay to the delivery of what has previously been promised to Ukraine is going to impact confidence in the United States as a supplier of arms to allies & partners. With the OMB sabotaging Trump's desire to see a strong military, the US needs those arms sales badly.
13/19
This is all beyond Hegseth's comprehension though. Whereas Bridge and Vought are malicious actors, deliberately sabotaging both Ukraine and the entire Department of Defense under false pretenses. This isn't about the US' own readiness, its about harming Ukraine.
14/19
One important detail in POLITICO's piece that has gone overlooked is this:
"The drawdowns from current stockpiles have continued under the Trump administration, which has been using up the last of the $61 billion in funding to replenish U.S. stocks of weapons"
15/19
There is no evidence that the Trump Admin has committed any of the $5.2 billion in PDA replacement funding that remained as of December. The Pentagon Comptroller has only published 1 technical correction to previous reprogramming actions since January 20.
16/19
If there is such concern about the Department giving too much ammo to Ukraine, why are they not using the $5 billion sitting on the shelf to fix that problem? Moreover, why haven't they asked for more money?
17/19
The DoD is still actually tens of billions of dollars in the hole on Ukraine replacement requirements. The Biden Admin never requested enough money for that purpose, so even if the Trump Admin doesn't send 1 new bullet, they need to ask Congress for more money.
18/19
But again, the civilian leadership at the DoD doesn't care about this. They aren't interested in fixing the actual problems. They are only making things worse for themselves, Ukraine, and all of the US' other allies. We can only hope that Bridge and Hegseth are overruled.
19/19
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๐ฎ๐ฑ I keep seeing a lot of incorrect information about Iron Beam, so here's a short explanation. It isn't just one system, it's a family of systems, some of which are operational, and some not, including:
โถ๏ธ Iron Beam
โถ๏ธ Iron Beam-Mobile
โถ๏ธ Lite Beam
โถ๏ธ Naval Iron Beam
1/7 ๐งต
Iron Beam is a 100-120 Kilowatt High Energy Laser, deployed via a 20ft container, with *advertised* capability vs UAS, mortars, rockets, artillery, and cruise missiles. It is not ballistic missile defense capable.
It is possibly in "Early Operational Capability".
2/7
Iron Beam-M(obile) is a 50-60 kW High Energy Laser (HEL), transportable via a Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT). Its reference threats are UAS & loitering munitions.
I would describe Iron Beam-M as being in Initial Operational Capability (more on this later).
What is the actual purpose of theater missile defense (TMD)?
I keep seeing people who work in defense policy get this question completely wrong.
It isn't "cost effective" interception of 100% of enemy threats.
So what is it?
An explanatory thread. ๐งตโฌ๏ธ
1/17
A fundamental challenge in TMD is that interceptors are generally more expensive than their targets. This is compounded by the fact that most air defense doctrine calls for 2 interceptors to be expended per target to help ensure a probable kill.
2/17
At face value, this isn't cost effective, but we need to consider the cost of *not* intercepting the incoming threat, rather than just the cost of the engagement. Those who detract from or don't understand TMD seldom seem to consider this question of opportunity cost.
Should the United States launch offensive operations against Iran?
A brief munitions analysis.
The purpose of this thread is to provide context that I find currently lacking in the discourse on this question. I'm not going to address legality or broader strategy.
๐งตโฌ๏ธ
1/17
Over the last 2 and a half years, considerable numbers of munitions have been expended by CENTCOM against Iran & its proxies. This has included both missile defense interceptors, air to air missiles and strike weapons, including standoff missiles like Tomahawk.
2/17
Operation Midnight Hammer saw 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators employed, which was a significant portion of a limited inventory. While this was a major setback to Iran's nuclear program, they retain considerable conventionally armed missile capabilities.
๐จ๐บ๐ธ BREAKING: The Pentagon has finally released their spending plan for the $153.3 billion in additional defense spending that was included in the reconciliation package. Highlights include:
๐ข $29.2 billion for shipbuilding
๐ $24.4 billion for air & missile defense
๐ญ $24.8 billion for munitions procurement/industrial base
๐ $15.4 billion for scaling production of low cost weapons
โ๏ธ $8.5 billion for air superiority
โข๏ธ $10.8 billion for nuclear forces
๐ $12.3 billion for INDOPACOM
๐ ๏ธ $16.2 billion for readiness
Will add additional details below in a thread ๐งต โฌ๏ธ
1/xx
Shipbuilding section. Big ticket items are 2 additional Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and an additional Virginia-class submarine.
2/xx
Homeland Missile Defense/Golden Dome. Big ticket items are AMTI satellites ($2bn), space-based and boost phase interceptors ($5.6bn), space-based sensors ($7.2bn), missile defense integration ($2.55bn), acceleration of hypersonic defense ($2.2bn), & GMD radars ($1.98bn).
๐บ๐ธ๐บ๐ฆ The Russians have published photos of ATACMS debris from the Ukrainian strikes on Voronezh.
Here's what I gather from these images.
๐งต โฌ๏ธ
1/8
This intact motor assembly is consistent with most of the previous instances of ATACMS debris being photographed after Ukrainian fire missions. The missing warhead suggests a successful dispersal of the APAM submunitions.
2/8
This picture, of a warhead section, is clearly from a different debris field. The manufacture date, Sept 2001, indicates a Block IA missile from the FY00 order lot.
๐บ๐ธ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ฆ Notable Europe & Ukraine policy provisions in the Senate's draft FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act, including an authorized increase in military aid funding:
๐งตโฌ๏ธ
1/6
The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative is extended through 2028 and an increased amount of $500 million is authorized, compared to $300 million annually in the past several years. HASC authorized $300 million and the budget request was for $0.
2/6
DoD is directed to establish a depot-level maintenance plan for all of Ukraine's western supplied equipment, and Sec Def is required to continue intelligence cooperation with Ukraine. Security cooperation with Ukraine is reaffirmed as US policy.
3/6