🇺🇸🇺🇦 Yesterday, POLITICO broke that the Pentagon paused some shipments of ammo to Ukraine. The decision, driven by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is claimed by DoD to be in response to concerns about their own stockpiles.
Is that true?
No. It is not.
🧵 ⬇️ 1/19
Department of Defense stocks of a wide variety of munitions are undoubtedly depleted due to the War in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, but the devil is always in the details. POLITICO reports that the pause has impacted both deliveries under PDA & USAI.
2/19
PDA (Presidential Drawdown Authority) is the mechanism for delivery of defense articles to Ukraine from DoD stocks. USAI (Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative) allows for the procurement of defense articles from industry or partner countries.
3/19
Deliveries from past Drawdowns authorized by the Biden Admin have long been expected to conclude this summer. Sec Def Hegseth recently stated that they are currently executing on PDAs #71-74, implying that previous PDA execute orders have been completed.
Deliveries from USAI, if allowed to proceed unmolested, would continue for years to come. As of December, there was still $10 billion in committed funding that was still not obligated (put on contract). I'd be surprised if this has substantially changed since then.
5/19
We now come to what specific munitions have been held up due to these supposed concerns about the DoD's own depleted inventory levels. The weapons are sitting in Poland, and NPR has acquired an exact list of whats being held back.
This is a very modest list of ammunition; nothing that is going to compromise the DoD's own readiness. AIM-7 in particular is scarcely used by US fighter aircraft, if at all. MSE was not included in PDAs 71-74, meaning it is coming via USAI and not US stocks.
8/19
Hellfire, which was not previously known to be provided to Ukraine by the US, has not been procured since 2023/2024 due to inventory requirements being met. The only item on the list that is likely having an impact on inventory requirements are the 252 GMLRS.
9/19
GMLRS is interesting because there have been anecdotes from Ukraine observing a recent increase in GMLRS fire missions. This is likely due to the first lot of contracted GMLRS via USAI being delivered this year. That first lot (FY23) is scheduled to conclude next month.
10/19
With Lockheed Martin producing 14,000 GMLRS per year, the US Army can afford to give up 250 more from their inventory now; assuming that all of them are from inventory, and not a mix of both PDA & new production from USAI.
11/19
This decision is just another example of Trump Admin officials actively working against the President's own agenda. At the NATO summit he pledged to work on sourcing additional PATRIOT assets for Ukraine, and scored a big win with the Alliance adopting the 5% target.
12/19
Any delay to the delivery of what has previously been promised to Ukraine is going to impact confidence in the United States as a supplier of arms to allies & partners. With the OMB sabotaging Trump's desire to see a strong military, the US needs those arms sales badly.
13/19
This is all beyond Hegseth's comprehension though. Whereas Bridge and Vought are malicious actors, deliberately sabotaging both Ukraine and the entire Department of Defense under false pretenses. This isn't about the US' own readiness, its about harming Ukraine.
14/19
One important detail in POLITICO's piece that has gone overlooked is this:
"The drawdowns from current stockpiles have continued under the Trump administration, which has been using up the last of the $61 billion in funding to replenish U.S. stocks of weapons"
15/19
There is no evidence that the Trump Admin has committed any of the $5.2 billion in PDA replacement funding that remained as of December. The Pentagon Comptroller has only published 1 technical correction to previous reprogramming actions since January 20.
16/19
If there is such concern about the Department giving too much ammo to Ukraine, why are they not using the $5 billion sitting on the shelf to fix that problem? Moreover, why haven't they asked for more money?
17/19
The DoD is still actually tens of billions of dollars in the hole on Ukraine replacement requirements. The Biden Admin never requested enough money for that purpose, so even if the Trump Admin doesn't send 1 new bullet, they need to ask Congress for more money.
18/19
But again, the civilian leadership at the DoD doesn't care about this. They aren't interested in fixing the actual problems. They are only making things worse for themselves, Ukraine, and all of the US' other allies. We can only hope that Bridge and Hegseth are overruled.
19/19
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🇺🇸 In Dec 2025, the US revealed the new Government-to-Government Only List: all their most sensitive military systems only available for export via the Foreign Military Sales Program. Reforming this list has long been desired by US customers. Here it is, from A to Z:
1/24 🧵⬇️
The old "Foreign Military Sales Only List" consisted of broad and duplicate categories, and has long been a point of frustration for US customers; with a desire for more systems to be eligible for the Direct Commercial Sales Program. These changes do just that.
2/24
A/R/UGM-84 Harpoon/Standoff Land Attack Missile - Expanded Response AURs and Select Command and Launch-Control System Components
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System - Guidance Section Components
Operationally, Epic Fury has been a success, but not without fault. Losses incurred by US & partner forces could have been minimized had the Trump Admin been more open to Ukrainian support; and the US Army more nimble in reforms.
Here are the receipts to prove it. 🧵 ⬇️
1/25
Last August the Ukrainians pitched the White House on a defense industrial cooperation deal focused on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (cUAS). Ukraine has immense technical and operational expertise in this area. They made this presentation, obtained by Axios.
2/25
Ukraine even emphasized the threat Iran posed to US forces in CENTCOM. After meeting with Zelensky, Trump told his team to work on it, but they did not follow through. US officials have told Axios that this was a big mistake on the Administration's part.
After ignoring Ukraine's Aug 2025 pitch to bolster US cUAS capabilities in CENTCOM, US officials are quietly admitting they made a big mistake. Now Ukraine is deploying teams to assist US forces, and the Gulf States in countering the drone threat. Even Bibi is calling now.
2/10
Ukraine has much to share. It goes beyond any one particular system, its all the tactics, techniques and procedures that Ukraine has. It's how they integrate everything together. It's valuable knowledge born of experience, and they know what its worth.
🇮🇱 I keep seeing a lot of incorrect information about Iron Beam, so here's a short explanation. It isn't just one system, it's a family of systems, some of which are operational, and some not, including:
▶️ Iron Beam
▶️ Iron Beam-Mobile
▶️ Lite Beam
▶️ Naval Iron Beam
1/7 🧵
Iron Beam is a 100-120 Kilowatt High Energy Laser, deployed via a 20ft container, with *advertised* capability vs UAS, mortars, rockets, artillery, and cruise missiles. It is not ballistic missile defense capable.
It is possibly in "Early Operational Capability".
2/7
Iron Beam-M(obile) is a 50-60 kW High Energy Laser (HEL), transportable via a Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT). Its reference threats are UAS & loitering munitions.
I would describe Iron Beam-M as being in Initial Operational Capability (more on this later).
What is the actual purpose of theater missile defense (TMD)?
I keep seeing people who work in defense policy get this question completely wrong.
It isn't "cost effective" interception of 100% of enemy threats.
So what is it?
An explanatory thread. 🧵⬇️
1/17
A fundamental challenge in TMD is that interceptors are generally more expensive than their targets. This is compounded by the fact that most air defense doctrine calls for 2 interceptors to be expended per target to help ensure a probable kill.
2/17
At face value, this isn't cost effective, but we need to consider the cost of *not* intercepting the incoming threat, rather than just the cost of the engagement. Those who detract from or don't understand TMD seldom seem to consider this question of opportunity cost.
Should the United States launch offensive operations against Iran?
A brief munitions analysis.
The purpose of this thread is to provide context that I find currently lacking in the discourse on this question. I'm not going to address legality or broader strategy.
🧵⬇️
1/17
Over the last 2 and a half years, considerable numbers of munitions have been expended by CENTCOM against Iran & its proxies. This has included both missile defense interceptors, air to air missiles and strike weapons, including standoff missiles like Tomahawk.
2/17
Operation Midnight Hammer saw 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators employed, which was a significant portion of a limited inventory. While this was a major setback to Iran's nuclear program, they retain considerable conventionally armed missile capabilities.