On 5 July, Ukrainian forces carried out a strike on the Borysoglebsk airfield in Russia. Reports indicate that a depot with glide bombs, a trainer aircraft, and possibly other aircraft were hit. Our team has conducted a brief analysis of imagery a fire map - here’s what we found:
2/ NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System detected at least three thermal anomalies at the Air Base. While it's not very precise or comprehensive, the heat sources appear to be located in 2 areas: the central part of the airfield and the logistical section
3/ While not conclusive, this serves as a credible independent indicator suggesting a possible strike on the logistical area - where Russian forces may have stored ammo, or fuel. The fire in the central part of the airfield appears to be near the Radar Landing System
4/ Analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery from yesterday, unavailable for publication due to licensing limits, confirms the presence of at least 16 jets and 1 helicopter at the airfield. The actual number is likely higher, but thick fog blocked the observation
5/ The lack of visible fire in the main jet storage area suggests a limited number of affected jets. Nonetheless, one smaller section used by jets appears to have been impacted, indicating a possibility of damage. This closely aligns with the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s report
6/ This preliminary report aims to establish general facts. A more detailed assessment would require post-strike satellite imagery or verified footage of the strike. Based on current evidence, there is a high likelihood that the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s statement is truthful
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Units like K-2, Madyar’s Birds, the Lasar Group, and the 3rd Corps stand out as well-organized formations that, through leadership, organization, media savvy, and initiative, have delivered solid results often to the point where their unit presence can shift battlefield dynamics:
2/ For all their success, these units are just a small part of Ukraine’s forces. They can’t hold the whole frontline or make up for systemic flaws. Nurturing leaders takes time - they can’t be copied. To extrapolate personal skill into institutional strength , you need a system.
3/ The priority remains systemic reform: to build a military where all units, if not matching the elite few, at least operate within reach of their standards. The Ministry of Defense has made progress since late 2024, but Ukraine is still lagging behind where it needs to be
In June, Reuters reported that North Korea could deploy more troops to Russia as early as July or August to support its war in Ukraine, citing South Korea’s National Intelligence Service and lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun. With July coming to an end, it’s worth revisiting this
2/ According to earlier reports in June and July, an additional 25,000 - 30,000 troops could be deployed, a force roughly equivalent to a military corps. As of late July, there has been no confirmation or evidence of additional North Korean troops near the Ukrainian border.
3/ In exchange for supplying Russia with artillery shells and missiles, North Korea is likely receiving technical assistance on satellite launches and missile guidance systems, Lee Seong-kweun reported back in June, citing the NIS briefing.
Another Ukrainian drone strike inside Russia, likely targeting a railway traction substation in the Volgograd region. The strike caused a visible fire. Some reports mentioned a nearby oil refinery, but our analysis points to the substation. More details in the thread:
2/ NASA’s FIRMS system locates the fire in the area where the substation is located, marked by the red rectangle on the map. The governor of Volgograd also stated - due to falling drone debris, power supply to the railway’s network in the Oktyabrsky district has been disrupted
3/ The Zhutovo railway traction substation (110/35/27/10 kV) powers the electrified rail line between Volgograd and Kotelnikovo. Disabling it cuts power to electric trains, disrupting traffic along this important logistical route. But what makes it particularly important?
When it comes to the results of Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia, one of the most asked questions is why Ukrainian drone strikes cause damage that often appears insufficient. The answer lies largely in engineering trade-offs: the balance between range and payload. Thread 🧵:
2/ Drones that fly far have to allocate a lot of their weight and space to fuel/batteries, which leaves less room for explosives. Long range also creates aerodynamic issues - to carry more fuel, drones needs to be bigger, which makes them heavier, slower, easier to intercept
3/ Advanced materials and engineering could help mitigate these limitations, but such solutions often dramatically increase costs and reduce scalability, which are critical factors in a war of attrition. And even high-end drones remain vulnerable to simple and cheap air defense
In the early morning of July 26th, multiple videos surfaced showing a UAV strike on the Russian "Signal" radio plant in Stavropol. Our team has conducted a preliminary BDA assessment and gathered key context on the facility’s role in Russia’s military production. 🧵Thread:
2/ The factory is located roughly 500 km from the area under Ukrainian control. The strike targeted one of its production facilities, around the 2nd and 3rd floor. The building appears to have avoided critical structural damage, though localized fires were reported
3/ The facility serves both military and civilian sectors. In recent decades, Signal has been involved in a range of defense and industrial projects. Notably, it supplied cathodic protection equipment for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran.
Frontelligence Insight estimates that by the end of June 2025, Russian combat fatalities may have reached, or even surpassed, 250,000. The projection is based on a synthetic estimation model that extrapolates from regionally confirmed, by-name casualty records.
🧵Thread:
2/ The team drew on confirmed casualty data compiled by Idel.Realities and Baikal Stories, tallying losses by region of origin and comparing them to each region’s working-age male population (defined as ages 16 to 60). The analysis covered 17 Russian regions.
3/ For example, in Buryatia, as of mid-June 2025, 2,924 service members killed in action had been confirmed by name. Official data puts the region’s male population at around 455,000, with ~284,800 (about 62.6%) aged 16 to 60. That gives a 1.03% KIA rate among working-age men