THREAD: Why is antifascism fading from Europe's official memory, while anti-communism is rising?
And what does this shift mean for democracy, the far right, and the future of political possibility?
Let's talk about memory politics — and how it shapes power.
After 1989, Europe didn't just “move on” from communism.
It rewrote its memory.
Across parliaments, museums, schools, and courtrooms, a new consensus emerged: Liberal democracy defeated totalitarianism — and the past became a morality play.
This shift was strategic.
Anti-communism became not just a judgment of past regimes but a foundation for post-Cold War identity.
The result?
A memory regime that treats communism and fascism as equally evil.
A framework called the “Double Genocide” thesis.
As Hannes Behr explains, this isn’t neutral history.
It’s ideological statecraft.
By replacing antifascism with anti-communism, liberal Europe made market capitalism appear “natural,” inevitable — the end of history.
This reframing had massive political consequences.
Fascist collaborators in Eastern Europe were rehabilitated.
Monuments to communist partisans were taken down.
New memory laws were passed to criminalize “glorifying” communism.
Laure Neumayer shows how this took legal form.
From the EU Parliament’s 2009 resolution on “European conscience and totalitarianism” to Baltic and Polish memory laws, communism was rebranded as an unforgivable crime — morally equal to Nazism.
This memory regime actively erased histories of communist antifascist resistance.
It made no distinction between Gulag bureaucracy and partisan heroism.
It paved the way for historical revisionism and far-right nationalism.
But why?
Because antifascist memory — tied to solidarity, internationalism, and social justice — left open a space for political alternatives.
Anti-communist memory closed that space.
It said: There Is No Alternative.
Behr:
“Memory laws that once aimed to consolidate liberal democracy have become tools for suppressing leftist critique... turning history into doctrine.”
And this created a dangerous vacuum.
Without antifascism as a shared civic anchor, the far right surged in to reclaim national memory.
As David Broder notes, they used the very framework built by liberals to resurrect exclusionary nationalism.
In Poland, Hungary, Italy, and the Baltics:
The right portrays itself as victim of communist tyranny, while celebrating nationalist collaborators — even fascists — as patriots.
All in the name of “truth and reconciliation.”
But this wasn't just a European phenomenon.
Across the Atlantic, Jeff Schuhrke tells us how U.S. labor, the CIA, and the State Department ran a global anti-communist crusade after WWII.
Schuhrke’s book, Blue-Collar Empire, reveals how American unions — especially the AFL-CIO — sabotaged radical unions in Europe, Latin America, and Asia.
They funded anti-communist unions, purged leftists, and helped export a “safe” model of democracy.
Anti-communism wasn't just defense — it was ideological offense.
It realigned global labor politics toward capitalism and empire, cutting off more radical paths.
All four scholars — Behr, Neumayer, Broder, Schuhrke — show how memory is political terrain.
It determines:
– what’s possible
– who belongs
– what the past teaches
– and how the future can be imagined
So what happens when ex-communist parties themselves abandon their legacy?
The article “How Ex-Communist Left Parties Reformed and Lost” shows how post-socialist left parties turned technocratic, defensive, and centrist — and lost their base.
Instead of defending or renewing socialist principles, these parties internalized anti-communism.
They treated their own past as a stain to be scrubbed clean — leaving voters with no vision beyond neoliberalism.
Result?
Political demobilization.
Historical amnesia.
A left without memory, and a right that knows how to weaponize it.
Together, these trends reveal how anti-communism became the foundation of post-Cold War governance.
It united liberals and conservatives.
It sanitized capitalism.
It demonized alternatives.
It narrowed the horizon of the possible.
And it's not just about statues and museums.
It’s about how people imagine justice, solidarity, and change.
A society that only remembers communism as evil cannot imagine socialism as freedom.
Which is why reclaiming memory matters.
Projects like @ReimaginingG are fighting to restore suppressed histories — not to glorify the past, but to reopen the future.
We believe memory must be repoliticized.
Antifascist memory should not be buried.
It should be reclaimed — as part of a tradition of resistance, dignity, and collective imagination.
To remember is to resist.
To resist is to hope.
And to hope is to act.
History is not over — and memory is not a weapon only for the right.
If you've felt that “something is missing” in how we talk about Europe’s past…
If you’ve wondered why the far right always seems to win the historical argument…
That “something” is the deliberate erasure of the left’s legacy.
Let’s reclaim it.
Reclaim antifascist memory.
Reclaim solidarity.
Reclaim history as a site of struggle — not shame.
Follow @ReimaginingG
In "An Anti-communist consensus: The Black Book of Communism in Pan-European Perspectives," authors argue book was turning point in emergence of a consensual historical narrative across former East-West divide as it enabled formation of revamped European anti-communist movement.
The Black Book of Communism (1997) became a global bestseller by framing communism as morally equal—or worse—than Nazism. Its claim of 100M victims became a cornerstone of anti-communist memory, especially in post-Soviet Europe, shaping laws, discourse, and EU identity.
The book didn’t just narrate history—it performed memory politics. By mimicking Holocaust remembrance (victim counts, “Never again,” etc.), it crafted a transnational anti-communist consensus. Its success turned a contested thesis into Europe’s moral truth.
I was gifted a Soviet Georgian book about Middle East from the 1980s and started reading it.
‘The United States has always viewed the Middle East in two dimensions: its strategic location and its vast oil wealth.
At the junction of three continents, at the crossroads of air, sea and land routes connecting Europe with Africa and Asia, and in close proximity to the socialist states, American imperialism sees the Arab countries as an important strategic springboard. It is no coincidence that 14 of the 19 states under the jurisdiction of the United States Central Command, created in 1983, are Arab countries. This command has at its disposal a 250,000-strong intervention corps of the “rapid deployment forces.”
As for oil, it is known that the world economy depends on oil more than on any other raw material. This has been reflected not only in the development of international economic relations, but also in the development of world politics as a whole. “Politics and oil are inseparable. One is closely related to the other in every part of the world”— emphasized the American scientist I. Edmonds.
The main areas of oil deposits and production are concentrated in the liberated countries. Almost three-quarters of the oil produced in the non-socialist world comes from the liberated countries, while three-quarters of the consumption comes from the developed capitalist countries.
In 1983, the Middle East accounted for 63.2 percent of the oil reserves and 44.2 percent of the gas reserves of capitalist countries. In the same year has given us 30.5 percent of the capitalist world's oil reserves. At the same time, the United States has recently become less and less dependent on Middle Eastern oil. But its interest in these countries is still great - Washington's partners are still very dependent on Middle Eastern oil. At the end of the 1970s, the share of Middle Eastern oil in all oil imported into the United States was 30 percent, while for Western Europe and Japan this figure was 66 and 80 percent, respectively. At the same time, the share of oil from the Persian Gulf countries in American imports of this raw material is constantly decreasing, for example, in 1983 it was already 7%, while for American allies this share remained at a high level.
Posing as a defender of Western oil interests in the Middle East, Washington wants to use the situation to further suppress its European partners and Japan, to prevent them from attempting to independently solve many foreign policy problems, especially since "the relations between the three main centers of imperialism - the United States, Western Europe and Japan - are filled with obvious and hidden contradictions. The economic, financial, and technological advantage that the United States had over its closest competitors until the end of the 1960s was seriously challenged. Western Europe and Japan were able to narrow the gap in some respects with the American master.’
‘The Soviet government has consistently spoken out and continues to speak out against the use of force in relations between states, against the acquisition of territories by force. Therefore, the Soviet government believes that in order to achieve a comprehensive, peaceful, just settlement of the Middle East conflict, Israel’s army must be withdrawn from all Arab territories it occupies.’
"I learned that global North countries were not enthusiastic about the 2018 mass protests and only supported the movement after its success. Within civil society circles, the explicitly anti-oligarch stance of the movement had reportedly been a major worry for Western embassies in Yerevan, which, during meetings with NGO representatives, expressed fears that a government opposed to the free market would come to power. These fears proved unfounded, much to their relief. After the regime change, the protest leadership who replaced the regime included individuals from civil society and NGO backgrounds."
Sona Baldrian
Read this incredible article, "Interweaving Story and Theory: Confronting Anti-Feminism and Anti-Genderism in the NGOized Women’s Movement in Armenia"
"The 2018 regime change shifted this dynamic, as the state welcomed the inpouring development aid and, by extension, work with local NGOs, opening doors for closer cooperation...this article argues that due to their increasingly bureaucratized, professionalized, and institutionalized structures in the post-2018 era, Armenian women’s rights NGOs have become disconnected from grassroots needs and estranged from street-level actors, focusing instead on political agendas shaped by larger geopolitical power structures and shifts"
"I argue that the promotion of liberal democratization and imposition of global gender agendas has shrunk the spaces for the women’s and feminist movements in Armenia, as women’s NGOs have become issue and policy-oriented, fiercely competing over grants and gender expert roles. The regime change and subsequent collaboration with the state have led NGOs toward complacent policy-making, curtailing the anti-state politics of past movements"
Here are some thoughts about Georgian protests as "leaderless", the situation is evolving so these are still sketches.
One of the main messages surrounding the protests in Georgia, which began on November 28th following the government’s statement that it would halt EU accession talks (a move already paused by the EU until 2028), is the notion that it is a leaderless movement, with opposition political parties playing a marginal role. Videos show protesters expressing their discontent with the opposition, and numerous social media posts highlight that the protests transcend support for political parties. While the initial protests were sparked by the government's stance on EU accession, they gained further momentum due to police brutality. This escalation led to political narratives framing the government as a repressive state and a police regime.
Before the protests on November 28th, the sentiment that the 2024 elections were rigged was largely marginal. However, after the protests began, it became commonplace to refer to the elections as rigged. The central demand of this leaderless uprising quickly became the call for new elections. Following the police repression, another key demand emerged: the release of all those who had been arrested. While most of the arrested individuals have been released, some still face criminal charges.
The demand for new elections in the context of protests that are allegedly about a wide range of grievances—rather than a specific push for opposition political power—raises important questions about the coherence and long-term impact of the protests. On the surface, it might seem paradoxical for a movement that is critical of the government and its broader repressive tactics to demand new elections, especially if the protesters, who are not aligned with any political party, are not represented in the political process. If opposition parties were to win these elections, and none of the protesters were directly represented, it’s unclear what tangible gains they would achieve from this outcome. In essence, they are advocating for a process that might benefit the very political entities they do not support or trust.
This paradox becomes more pronounced when we consider the role of opposition parties in the protests. While the opposition has largely refrained from taking an overt leadership role—likely aware that doing so could alienate many protesters who are wary of party politics—they have nonetheless managed to capitalize on the protests’ momentum. Just a month ago, it would have been difficult for opposition parties to garner significant public support for such a demand. Yet, the protests’ growing momentum has shifted public discourse to the point where the call for new elections has become a central, unifying demand. This shift in sentiment can be seen as a strategic win for the opposition, even though the protesters themselves may not feel directly represented by them.
A similar dynamic was visible during the large protests earlier in the year against the controversial "Russian law" concerning foreign funding transparency. While the protests were largely driven by youth and new political actors who did not align with the existing political establishment, opposition parties ultimately stepped in to use the momentum for their own purposes. The youth protesters, who were at the forefront of the demonstrations and faced police violence such as tear gas and water cannons, did not support the old, unpopular political figures within the opposition. However, after the protests, the opposition moved to revive their old politicians, many of whom had been out of favor for years. This led to a disconnection between the aspirations of the protesters and the political benefits reaped by the opposition, who were able to stand in elections without fully addressing the issues raised by the protesters.
The protests thus find themselves locked in a cycle where they are demanding new elections, but in a manner that ultimately does not directly benefit the protesters themselves. The opposition, while staying out of the direct leadership of the protests to avoid alienating the protest base, is nonetheless positioned to gain politically from the unrest. In this way, the protests are not translating into the political power that the protesters may have hoped for, and their demands are being co-opted by political forces that do not fully represent the broader, leaderless movement. For those involved in the protests, as their grievances and calls for change are being absorbed into a political system that they have long rejected.
For many leftists participating in the protests, the geopolitical focus has made it difficult, if not impossible, to organize around social issues. Instead, they are being drawn into narratives framed by a police regime and authoritarianism. When they attempt to introduce social concerns, like targeting banks, it has often been met with resistance, with some protesters even becoming angry. In this sense, the left is peripheral player in these protests. I’m not suggesting that leftists should refrain from participating in these protests. Rather, it’s important to realistically assess their true size and influence within the movement. Understanding their position—whether they choose to participate or not—will offer valuable lessons for future organizing efforts. Regardless of the outcome, this experience will be crucial for shaping the strategies and priorities of leftist groups moving forward.
In contrast to the protests in Georgia, the recent protests in Serbia, largely driven by youth and students, have focused on social issues rather than geopolitics or calls for the government's resignation. The protests were sparked by the tragic deaths of 15 people due to the poor construction of the Novi Sad station. The demands are clear: accountability for those involved in the shoddy construction, and punishment for those responsible. The protests center on social justice and the need for responsible governance, not on political power shifts or new elections.
This focus on social issues is further highlighted by recent events in Serbia, where earlier protests were held against the government's decision to violate the popular will regarding the lithium mining project. In this case, the government’s actions were seen as prioritizing EU interests over the concerns of the people. This contrast emphasizes how Serbia’s protests have remained grounded in social demands, unlike Georgia's protests, which are more tied to geopolitical issues.
In Serbia, students have taken a more autonomous approach, forming strike committees and organizing through democratic means, such as a delegate system for coordination. While some opposition party-affiliated students are involved, the movement’s demands are not geared toward empowering opposition parties wholesale in the way they are in Georgia. The students have blocked faculties and made decisions by vote, ensuring that the movement is not dominated by political activists but driven by the students themselves.
While I can’t speak to the media coverage in Serbia compared to Georgia, it seems that the Serbian protests, which are not focused on re-elections, are better positioned to address issues that could gain wider support across the population. This focus on social and accountability issues allows for more flexibility and potential broad-based support, whereas the protests in Georgia are more locked into a geopolitical narrative around new elections, limiting their ability to address a wider range of concerns.
Germany is about to pass one of the most odious bills criminalizing speaking out against Israel in schools, universities, in organizations, in art and culture- especially by Middle Eastern people
‘In recent months, the alarming extent of antisemitism based on immigration from the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, where antisemitism and hostility
towards Israel are widespread, partly due to Islamist and anti-Israeli state indoctrination, has become clear.’
‘The Bundestag reaffirms the budgetary regulations for the allocation of funds on the
basis of the liberal democratic basic order for all recipients of federal funding. The
Bundestag reaffirms its decision to ensure that no funding is provided to
organizations and projects that spread antisemitism, question Israel's right to
exist, call for a boycott of Israel or actively support the BDS movement’
There must also be no room for antisemitism in the ranks of art, culture and the
media. The causes and backgrounds of the major antisemitism scandals in these areas
in recent years, particularly at 'documenta fifteen' and the Berlinale in February 2024,
must be comprehensively investigated and conclusions drawn. Where the Federal
Government has already tackled this - for example through awareness-raising measures
and codes of conduct for federally funded institutions with regard to antisemitism - the
Bundestag welcomes this
On Saturday, Georgians went to the polls amid a tense atmosphere. A video began circulating of a man attempting to stuff multiple ballots while election observers tried to stop him. Dozens of people and cameras were present, and the footage quickly spread across local, international, and social media platforms.
Additional videos of scuffles outside polling stations also gained wide attention, painting a picture of widespread violence and ballot-stuffing. Additional videos of scuffles outside polling stations also gained wide attention, painting a picture of widespread violence and ballot-stuffing.
As voting ended, three exit polls appeared, each commissioned by different forces. The Edison poll, which favored the opposition, showed the various forces critical of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party total 51 percent of the vote — enough to form a government.