From the Barents Sea to China’s southern coast, Russia’s tanker fleet has been quietly tracked by Ukrainians. Thanks to an investigation by the analytical group Dallas Park, we now know more. With their permission, I analyzed the report and put together a thread of key takeaways:
2/ Built in 2011 and flagged in the Marshall Islands as SUEZ VASILIS, the oil tanker was reflagged to Liberia in 2021 and renamed NAUTILUS I. In November 2022, after Russia’s invasion, it changed owners, managers, flag, and name again, becoming SABLE under the Panama
3/ In November 2023, Mikhail Gushchin became the ship’s master, according to a signed contract in Primorsk, Russia. At the time, the vessel was managed by Prominent Shipmanagement Limited.
4/ Thanks to screenshots taken by Gushchin himself, it’s confirmed that SABLE made at least two trips to China during his command. One screenshot, dated November 20, 2023, shows the vessel en route from Primorsk to Zhoushan, China, with an expected arrival around December 20.
5/ On December 19, Gushchin received new routing instructions. Gazpromneft, the Russian oil giant, told him to sail to the Suez Canal after delivery and await further orders. According to logs, the vessel left Murmansk in early February 2024, carrying 140,000 tonnes of Arctic oil
6/ On February 2, Gushchin received additional orders: he was to load 140,000 tonnes of another Arctic crude (ARCO grade) in Kola Bay, near Murmansk. He photographed the loading between February 4 and 5 -- notably, it took place via ship-to-ship transfer.
7/ The tanker then continued through the Suez Canal en route to China. On February 13, Gushchin sent a report to his employers at Gazpromneft revealing the voyage’s final destination: the Chinese port of Shuidong, with an expected arrival on March 18, 2024.
8/ The unloading of Russian oil was scheduled for March 19–21, 2024. Below is an Excel form filled out by Gushchin for the Chinese port, showing the vessel order for cargo unloading - SABLE is listed as number one. Also included: a photo taken near the Chinese coast:
9/ In January 2025, the U.S. tightened sanctions on Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, targeting over 180 vessels - including Sable. However, even if China officially bans sanctioned ships from entering its ports, it can still receive Russian oil through offshore transfers
10/ Another emerging issue is Russia’s use of the Northern Sea Route to bypass restrictions, as shown in this navigation record of the Mikhail Ulyanov tanker en route from Russia to China. Solving this problem will require more sophisticated countermeasures
11/ Thanks for reading this investigation. If you found it valuable, please like and share the first post in the thread - and consider following. I also strongly recommend checking out the full report by Dallas Park, which includes many more details:
The seriousness of the situation on the frontlines was recently laid out in detail by Olexandr Solonko, a soldier currently serving in Donetsk Oblast. I strongly recommend reading the translated version closely if you’re trying to understand the situation on the ground. Thread:
2/ We are approaching a moment when we will very likely face another major crisis on the front. While the world's powerful play their games of "two weeks" and "50 days" and try in every way to demonstrate resolve where there is none, we will have to withstand the desperate pressure of the Russians. Both on the front and in the rear
3/ Where we are now: The Russians believe that if they press with all their might now, they can finally break us. This belief is based, among other things, on the long, attrition war, the escalation of regular attacks on military targets, the defense industry, and the terrorizing of civilians in the rear
According to the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, in early 2025, the Russian occupation authorities intensified forced passportization in the temporarily occupied territories.
Starting September, those refusing Russian passports will be treated as illegal immigrants:
2/ The occupied territories are seeing a surge in paramilitary programs across schools and colleges. Educational institutions are forming Yunarmiya units, cadet classes, and “military-patriotic clubs” that focus on military drills, airgun shooting, grenade throwing, survival etc
3/ According to the same report by the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, from January to June 2025, occupation authorities took at least 2,300 Ukrainian children from occupied territories to various regions of the Russian Federation.
With increasing frequency, I hear directly from soldiers, sergeants, and officers on the ground: despite proclamations from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, little has changed for them in the ground, compared with 2024. 🧵Thread:
2/ In the coming days, I intend to elaborate further. But I can already point to systemic resistance, where a clique of generals and colonels pushes back against reforms that could dilute their entrenched power - power rooted in seniority earned during the 1990s and 2000s.
3/ The organization of fortifications, defense, as well as operational command and coordination, remains weak. Efforts to build a capable corps of noncommissioned officers, critical to any modern military, have yet to materialize.
Kirill Dmitriev, who was involved in earlier talks with Witkoff, is now trying to salvage the situation. Russia always intended to escalate the war while publicly presenting pressure on Ukraine as a path to peace and de-escalation. It worked - until it didn’t. You had six months
2/ What has Russia done in the six months since it “agreed” to negotiate? It announced an offensive in Sumy (so far unsuccessful), allegedly threatened to seize multiple oblasts within 60 days (also not going well), ramped up Shahed drone strikes and presented ultimatums
3/ It’s been clear since day one of the so-called negotiations that Russia’s only goal was to persuade the current US administration to halt support for Ukraine in exchange for a facade of goodwill diplomacy aimed at a truce -- one it never intended to follow through on.
One and a half months after the successful Operation Spiderweb, which targeted and destroyed Russian strategic bombers, our latest satellite imagery shows bomber wreckage still at several airfields, with the largest concentration at Belaya. A thread with updates on airbases:
2/ Additional analysis of bases such as Olenya and Engels-2, where Russian strategic bombers are deployed, shows no visible effort to reinforce the airfields. Olenya appears more cleared from debris than Belaya Airbase, but bomber wreckage remains visible on the apron.
3/ At Khalino Airbase, previously targeted by Ukrainian forces, Russian troops appear to have completed or nearly completed around 10 reinforced shelters with soil cover, 12 concrete shelters without it, and 8 hangar-style structures positioned on the aprons.