1/ China's consumption story isn’t just about low confidence or state incentives. Some policy-linked categories are now outperforming on the back of real household demand, especially in services like education, transport, and daily life. The shift may be uneven, but it’s taking root.
Real income rose +5.4% YoY in H1, and rural households outpaced urban (+6.2% vs. +4.7%).
But with property income still soft (+1.4%) and median urban income at just 88% of the average, caution lingers.
Discretionary goods like clothing (+2.1%) and alcohol (+2.5%) remain weak.
2/ Beneath the cautious tone, a quiet shift is underway.
H1 data show outperformance in education/culture/entertainment (+11.8%), daily services (+9.0%), and transport/communications (+8.4%) - areas Beijing has also tipped as 2H consumption engines.
In other words consumption may be rebalancing - not rebounding - as lifestyles and state priorities change.
3/ Implication:
Household demand for home-bound experiences and services aligned with state-led directions is already outpacing traditional categories. Surveys show rising interest in wellness, experiential spending (e.g. “revenge travel,” dining out, entertainment), health, leisure, and digital connectivity - suggesting that the state-backed old‑for‑new --> services shift is moving in parallel with real consumer behavior.
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1/ Analysts are misreading Beijing’s latest move on rare earths as some kind of olive branch. Xi and Trump may have agreed to talks, and MOFCOM dangled the possibility of export licenses. But there’s a bigger game here. 🧵
2/ On June 6, MOFCOM stated it would approve rare earth export applications “that meet the regulations,” while noting these materials have “dual-use attributes.” The message was framed as technical, not punitive—but it came after days of pointed trade warnings.
3/ In other words, MOFCOM doubled down, framing rare earth controls as standard global practice. This is a calculated flex: anything they label dual-use can be choked off at their whim, with full strategic and legal cover.
1/ Despite headlines, China is not trying to use consumers to drive growth. Let’s put this myth to rest. The Q1 2025 data makes one thing brutally clear: what’s driving performance is a system built around industrial policy, not household demand. 🧵
2/ What’s actually powering China’s economy? A state-built tech-fiscal engine. Fixed asset investment grew just 4.0% YoY—but high-tech investment surged 21%. This isn’t cyclical recovery. It’s a command system redirecting capital into strategic sectors.
3/ Behind it? A fiscal deluge. China issued a record ¥3.28T in bonds in Q1—nearly 3x last year’s level. Local gov debt has ballooned to ¥50T. This isn’t a short-term stimulus play. It’s structured mobilization for industrial self-reliance and system survival.