I was thinking recently about the similarities between contemporary NATO and the cloaked imperialism of Athens. It’s not a perfect parallel, obviously, but the similarities are quite strong.
Like NATO, the Delian League was formed as a defensive alliance against a hostile foreign power, with the Persian Empire as a stand in for the USSR.
Polities in Northern Greece, fearing that Sparta’s strategic standoff in the Peloponnese would render them an unreliable protector, formed the Delian League to wage a continuation war against Persia.
Athens was obviously the preeminent naval power within the alliance, but it was nominally governed by an assembly in which each member state had an equal vote. This system became a thin veneer over de facto Athenian hegemony.
The league became a vehicle for a creeping Athenian imperialism through its unique system of military commitments. Member states were obligated to either maintain a requisite number of ships and men, *or* make an equivalent cash contribution.
As time went on, more and more members opted to contribute cash rather than maintain forces, which Athens used to raise the equivalent forces for themselves. Rather than fielding a coalition navy, the league became a revenue stream for the growing Athenian fleet.
This in turn made the lesser members more and more subservient to Athens as the military power disparity grew. Despite the nominal system of equal votes, Athens was more and more able to impose its will. Members who attempted to defect were severely punished.
Within a relatively short period of time, the Delian League became a de facto vehicle of Athenian Empire: a mechanism for extracting resources from tributary states and subjecting them to Athenian political domination.
NATO is very similar, as this week we see European members agreeing to buy more American weapons as part of a shell game to arm Ukraine. Revenue from Europe flows to American companies, and Europe bends to American foreign policy.
Like the Delian League, NATO ostensibly has a consensus-driven governance and nominally consists of a coalition of forces, but in reality Europe is unable to make autonomous foreign policy choices.
NATO has also helped to hollow out European defense manufacturing, and instead funnels money into the US as Euro members scramble to purchase HIMARS, Patriots, aircraft, and more.
As a mechanism for aggrandizing state power, this is a very effective and very ancient model which works for the US just as it worked for Athens. The comity implied by the word “alliance” is a diplomatic narcotic that numbs the tributaries to the reality of empire.
As a coda, the connection is even deeper, because Donald Kagan, who wrote a magisterial history of the Peloponnesian War and was an absolute gem of a historian, was also the Father in Law of Victoria Nuland. So, make of that what you will.
Lmao
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Agincourt is among the most famous medieval battles, immortalized in Shakespeare's Henry V. It's also badly understood and usually gets the cursory treatment that you see in threads like this, where it becomes mainly a story about mud. (1)
The popular story is essentially that the French made a foolish charge across a muddy field, which bogged them down and allowed them to be picked apart by the English. This was played up to comedic proportions in Netflix's "The King". (2)
Agincourt is in fact a very interesting engagement for reasons that having nothing to do with mud, and its doubtful whether the wet ground actually made a decisive impact on the battle. Rather, Agincourt is a highly instructive lesson in battlefield geometry. (3)
This is a slop post, but there's a broader problem with the way people try to score cheap points by pointing out things like the life expectancy issue, the HIV rate, alcoholism, etc. These issues are very telling as to why Russians feel the way they do about Putin and the USSR.
Westerners broadly misunderstand how the collapse of the USSR was experienced in places like Russia and Ukraine. The implosion of the Soviet economy was not a pleasant experience in any way, and the country did not make a clean transition, either politically or economically.
All the generally understood problems with the Soviet planned economy were true. Soviet central planning was more wasteful, less dynamic, less innovative, and created less wealth than western market economies. All that being said, the system largely "worked."
Very blackpilling when you learn that Viking Berserkers didn’t really exist in the sense that people generally think. I wish they did, but they didn’t.
"Berserk" as a word comes from "Serk", which meant shirt, with either "bear" or "bare" attached to it, giving the image of either a warrior with ursine regalia or else unarmored, possibly even naked.
Carl von Clausewitz is among the most widely known and cited (if not widely read) theorists of war. His signature work, "On War" (published in 1832) is the source of many commonplace expressions and terms that permiate the modern lexicon. (1)
Clausewitz was the originator of concepts like "friction", "culmination", "the fog of war", and more. His comment that "war is the continuation of policy with other means" has been endlessly quoted. Like a Shakespeare, he undergirds much of our modern vocabulary of war. (2)
Clausewitz is widely known, but perhaps not so widely read. Despite its influence, "On War" is an opaque and disorderly text. This is largely because Clausewitz died while his writing was still in an unorganized draft. The published volume was edited by his wife, Marie. (3)
This December 18th marks the 108th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Verdun - an infamously bloody episode of the First World War which killed over 700,000 French and German troops over nearly ten months of fighting. (1)
Verdun in many ways was the seminal First World War battle, in that it churned up dozens of divisions fighting for apparently meager gains of just a few kilometers. It appears at first brush to be entirely senseless, but the strategic conception deserves close scrutiny. (2)
By the end of 1915, German hopes for a quick resolution to the war had been firmly dashed. The initial command cadre had been replaced, and General Erich von Falkenhayn had taken command of the German general staff with an unenviable strategic position. (3)
Robert Drews book on the Bronze Age Collapse is one of my absolute favorites, and it's one that I find myself thinking about a lot with the advent of cheap FPV drones as a military expedient, as seen in Ukraine. (1)
Drews basic argument is that the collapse of rich and stable late bronze age societies was due to the advent of new technical and tactical methodologies which made the aristocratic chariot armies of the day obsolete. (2)
Warfare in the bronze age centered on armies comprised principally of chariots deployed as mobile archery platforms, with infantry playing a subordinate role as auxiliaries and security troops. (3)