June Retail Sales beat expectations up 0.6% m/m (0.1% consensus), with Control Group (which feeds directly into GDP) also up 0.5% vs expectations for a 0.3% gain.
Very solid figures in nominal terms, but it's important to note that core goods inflation has picked up in recent months.
So, to understand if consumers are really ramping up spending or simply keeping up with higher prices, we need to adjust for inflation.
The trend is clear: consumers have been spending less and less in real (inflation-adjusted) terms over the course of 2025 as goods inflation has accelerated.
Some details in the 🧵 including a simple model for how much inflation has picked up for the Control Group.
Here's a look at the simple model I used to estimate the PCE Control Group price index, which leverages CPI and PPI price indexes that correspond to Control Group spending categories like appliances, furniture / furnishing, construction materials, consumer electronics, recreational goods.
As I've noted in my recent posts regarding the CPI & PPI reports, prices for many of these goods have accelerated notably in recent months and the model picks this up nicely.
Here's what the monthly data looks like with the breakout for control group inflation vs real spending growth.
While the June real implied spending growth turned back slightly positive, it remains very weak.
In nominal terms, the continued rebound in control group spending has come from nonstore retailers (i.e. online sales) along with a bounceback in food & beverage.
An alternative view of the recent 3 months of control group spending growth, to see how each category stacks up (literally)...
Today's retail sales report suggests the consumer is barely keeping up with price increases and certainly not accelerating spending meaningfully in real terms.
Retail sales overrepresents the goods side of consumption and there is evidence consumers are shifting spending to services.
To that point, real restaurant spending has rebounded sharply on an annual basis, despite declining -5.7% on a monthly basis in June.
Overall, the consumer has not thrown in the towel and we'll need to watch what happens on the services side of the economy, but certainly the report wasn't as rosy as the headlines suggest.
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Secondary mortgage spreads are down a massive 20bps+ on the week, with most of that move happening this morning.
What's happening? The mortgage market is undergoing a structural repricing following the directive for Fannie & Freddie to deploy $200B into MBS.
Let's dig in a bit in the 🧵
The $200B figure is massive relative to GSE capital. For context, Fannie and Freddie have a combined accumulated net worth of ~$173B as of late 2025.
By directing a $200B build-up, the administration is effectively deploying the entirety of the capital cushion built up over the last six years to support the secondary market.
Look again at the Current Coupon MBS OAS.
We are seeing a "forced" mean-reversion of spreads toward 2018–2019 levels.
By acting as a price-insensitive buyer, the GSEs will be bypassing the Fed and targeting mortgage spreads directly.
If the spread stays compressed, mortgage rates can fall even if 10y UST yields remain elevated.
Pretty notable upward revisions to 2Q25 real GDP growth this morning: up 50bps to 3.8% from 3.3% prior.
All of the upward revision was due to stronger than previously reported Consumer spending on of Services, Business Investment and a modest bump to Government consumption.
More details in the 🧵
Looking at the revised series, here's contributions to real GDP growth over time, showing all of the slowdown occurred in Q1, with exports and inventories driving most of the swing.
Stripping out those two volatile categories (i.e. inventories & net exports) gives you a good view on the core underlying drivers of the economy: Final Sales to Private Domestic Purchasers.
Again, now we see there was a modest dip in Q1, with Q2 back to the prior trend pace.
After spiking to a new post-pandemic high due to fraudulent claims in Texas, initial jobless claims have plunged back below their 3y average (222k) to 218k.
Meanwhile, continuing claims also ticked down (1,926k vs 1,928k the week before) but remained near post-pandemic highs.
Some details in the 🧵
After one of the highest weekly increases in jobless claims in a while, we now have had outsized back-to-back weekly declines...
What happened?
As mentioned at the top, a massive surge in fraudulent claims in TX is fading after spiking a few weeks ago.
Cumulatively, there have been nearly 40k excess claims above normal for this time of year in TX over the past 3 weeks.
After sitting on the backburner for some time, jobless claims are back in the headlines with the highest weekly print since the pandemic.
Initial jobless claims jumped by 32k to 263k during the week ending Sept 6.
Let's see what's going on in the 🧵
Let's start with how big of a weekly increase this was.
We've only seen a handful of jumps in the 30k range post-pandemic.
Let's next recall that we just had a holiday, Labor Day.
There is generally a lot of volatility in hiring & firing around holidays and the timing of exactly which week the holiday falls in any given year can shift (see below).
The Aug PPI declined -0.1%, softer than expected (0.3%) although PPI excluding food, energy & trade was in-line with expectations at 0.3%.
What does this mean?
Core goods prices are still rising at an above trend pace, while broader price pressures eased.
Details in the 🧵
Let's look at Goods Less Food And Energy, what I was referring to as "Core Goods."
Prices for core goods were up 0.32% in Aug, which is well above trend despite stepping down slightly from July.
Looking specifically at Finished Core Consumer Goods and Private Capital Equipment, it's clearer that there is still upward pressure on goods inflation.