1/ On July 14, Xi Jinping chaired the Central Urban Work Conference—a once-in-a-decade meeting that sets China’s urbanization agenda.
Unlike the 2018–2020 shantytown boom that unleashed credit and drove growth, this meeting signals something different:
➡️ No "bazooka" stimulus.
➡️ Focus on absorbing excess capacity via urban renewal.
Bottom line: Xi's "urban renewal" is not stimulus in the old sense. It’s a managed capacity absorption strategy - channeling overbuilt sectors into controlled public works.
#China #Macro #UrbanPolicy
2/ Xi's message: urbanization has entered a quality upgrade phase e.g. transformation of existing stock and aging urban piping & other systems.
Translation: redirect idle steel, cement, solar, EV, and construction capacity into controlled, rolling retrofit projects - not into speculative housing booms.
#China #Infrastructure #Investment
3/ Likely sectors that benefit:
📌Utilities and upstream suppliers
📌Green property developers
📌EV charging & transport
📌Smart city & digital governance
BUT: most of these already suffer from overcapacity and margin squeeze.
4/ The exception? Data infrastructure and urban digital services, which still enjoy policy tailwinds and less price compression.
But for steel, cement, EVs, even green tech?
This is about survival, not profit.
Primary value lies in absorbing surplus - not creating new engines of growth.
#China #Overcapacity #SmartCity
5/
Why it still matters: channeling surplus capacity into public upgrades can buffer employment, reduce safety risks, improve energy efficiency, and slow deflationary downdrafts. In a weak-demand economy, absorbing slack is value.
#ChinaEconomy
6/ But there are serious trade-offs.
Near term effect: demand backstop, social goods, industrial utilization.
Long term risk: slow returns, diminishing macro impact, local debt strain, crowd-out of private firms, deflation if capacity persists.
#China #PolicyRisk
7/
Long-term implications:
Using infrastructure re novation to absorb overcapacity is a tactical workaround, not a structural fix.
➡️ Buys time, but doesn't change the system’s fundamentals.
➡️Offers a non-reflationary form of stimulus, but at the cost of deeper imbalances.
➡️May eventually require fiscal centralization or debt write-downs, as the return on these projects likely underwhelms.
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1/ Analysts are misreading Beijing’s latest move on rare earths as some kind of olive branch. Xi and Trump may have agreed to talks, and MOFCOM dangled the possibility of export licenses. But there’s a bigger game here. 🧵
2/ On June 6, MOFCOM stated it would approve rare earth export applications “that meet the regulations,” while noting these materials have “dual-use attributes.” The message was framed as technical, not punitive—but it came after days of pointed trade warnings.
3/ In other words, MOFCOM doubled down, framing rare earth controls as standard global practice. This is a calculated flex: anything they label dual-use can be choked off at their whim, with full strategic and legal cover.
1/ Despite headlines, China is not trying to use consumers to drive growth. Let’s put this myth to rest. The Q1 2025 data makes one thing brutally clear: what’s driving performance is a system built around industrial policy, not household demand. 🧵
2/ What’s actually powering China’s economy? A state-built tech-fiscal engine. Fixed asset investment grew just 4.0% YoY—but high-tech investment surged 21%. This isn’t cyclical recovery. It’s a command system redirecting capital into strategic sectors.
3/ Behind it? A fiscal deluge. China issued a record ¥3.28T in bonds in Q1—nearly 3x last year’s level. Local gov debt has ballooned to ¥50T. This isn’t a short-term stimulus play. It’s structured mobilization for industrial self-reliance and system survival.