The Russian offensive in Sumy so far resembles the late spring 2024 attempt to expand their presence in Kharkiv Oblast, which was ultimately contained and never developed into the larger incursion they had intended. Despite some progress, there is no threat to Sumy at this time:
2/ The situation around small village - Kindrativka was especially precarious for Russian forces, who were forced to retreat after their initial advances.
3/ The situation near Oleksiivka, which is not far from Kindrativka, is also difficult for Russian forces. The entire area is currently held by a few motorized rifle regiments, a separate brigade, and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade
4/ At the same time, Russian forces have recently occupied Yablunivka and made some progress in thr nearby Yunakivka. The main effort is being carried out by units of the 76th and 106th Airborne Divisions. Despite these gains, their overall advance remains very slow
5/ While the dynamics of the situation may change over time, it is currently safe to say that, despite the deployment of air assault and naval infantry units to push this axis, the Kremlin's political ambitions do not align with the realities on the ground in Sumy
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Fundamentally, both Russia and Ukraine face organizational challenges, though of different kinds. Ukraine suffers from delayed mobilization and delayed structural adaptations, while Russia struggles to translate its vast resource advantage into a combined and coordinated force:
2/ For example, Russia continues to rely on small tactical group not only due to Ukrainian drones, but also because it struggles to effectively organize combined-arms operations above the battalion. Reverting to smaller units is forced choice - they remain possible to coordinate.
3/ Even when Russia concentrates large forces in a relatively small area, it struggles to fully exploit that advantage. Lacking the ability to generate overwhelming force at once, it instead resorts to gradually deploying small units in an attempt to wear down Ukrainian defenses
Lately, Russia’s slow progress in the Sumy region is being explained away by some as a diversion, an attempt to pull Ukrainian forces from Donbas, with no serious objectives in Sumy itself. That idea might seem reasonable for some - until you look closer. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the start of the full-scale war, Russia has usually concentrated what it sees as elite assault units in directions it considers valuable, strategic or otherwise important. The current makeup of Russian forces in Sumy direction speaks volumes:
3/ The 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, now one of Putin’s favorite assault units, the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, the units from 76th and 106th Air Assault Divisions; the 83rd and 11th Separate Air Assault Brigades, and the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment.
The "I Want to Live" project, operating under the umbrella of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence, has published documents detailing losses within Russia's 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the Central Military District. 🧵Brief thread with details and numbers:
2/ As of June 2025, at least 8,645 personnel have been officially declared dead and buried. Among all units, the 74th and 35th Separate Motor Rifle Brigades appear to have suffered the highest number of casualties - 2479 and 1975.
3/ As for those missing in action, 10,491 personnel from the 41st Combined Arms Army are unaccounted for as of June 2025. The 35th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade has suffered the most in this category, with 3,146 soldiers reported missing.
The seriousness of the situation on the frontlines was recently laid out in detail by Olexandr Solonko, a soldier currently serving in Donetsk Oblast. I strongly recommend reading the translated version closely if you’re trying to understand the situation on the ground. Thread:
2/ We are approaching a moment when we will very likely face another major crisis on the front. While the world's powerful play their games of "two weeks" and "50 days" and try in every way to demonstrate resolve where there is none, we will have to withstand the desperate pressure of the Russians. Both on the front and in the rear
3/ Where we are now: The Russians believe that if they press with all their might now, they can finally break us. This belief is based, among other things, on the long, attrition war, the escalation of regular attacks on military targets, the defense industry, and the terrorizing of civilians in the rear
According to the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, in early 2025, the Russian occupation authorities intensified forced passportization in the temporarily occupied territories.
Starting September, those refusing Russian passports will be treated as illegal immigrants:
2/ The occupied territories are seeing a surge in paramilitary programs across schools and colleges. Educational institutions are forming Yunarmiya units, cadet classes, and “military-patriotic clubs” that focus on military drills, airgun shooting, grenade throwing, survival etc
3/ According to the same report by the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, from January to June 2025, occupation authorities took at least 2,300 Ukrainian children from occupied territories to various regions of the Russian Federation.
With increasing frequency, I hear directly from soldiers, sergeants, and officers on the ground: despite proclamations from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, little has changed for them in the ground, compared with 2024. 🧵Thread:
2/ In the coming days, I intend to elaborate further. But I can already point to systemic resistance, where a clique of generals and colonels pushes back against reforms that could dilute their entrenched power - power rooted in seniority earned during the 1990s and 2000s.
3/ The organization of fortifications, defense, as well as operational command and coordination, remains weak. Efforts to build a capable corps of noncommissioned officers, critical to any modern military, have yet to materialize.