Lately, Russia’s slow progress in the Sumy region is being explained away by some as a diversion, an attempt to pull Ukrainian forces from Donbas, with no serious objectives in Sumy itself. That idea might seem reasonable for some - until you look closer. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the start of the full-scale war, Russia has usually concentrated what it sees as elite assault units in directions it considers valuable, strategic or otherwise important. The current makeup of Russian forces in Sumy direction speaks volumes:
3/ The 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, now one of Putin’s favorite assault units, the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, the units from 76th and 106th Air Assault Divisions; the 83rd and 11th Separate Air Assault Brigades, and the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment.
4/ These are the units Moscow tends to deploy mostly where it expects real gains. These units are usually more combat-ready, and better suited for offensive operations than regular motor rifle troops. In Russian military thinking, these are the formations that matter.
5/ There’s another theory making the rounds: Russia is trying to stretch the front, forcing Ukraine to thin out. But using “elite” units for that purpose doesn’t really add up. And let’s not forget: it was Ukraine that expanded the front in August 2024 with Kursk incursion.
6/ Right now, Ukraine is holding its ground in Sumy, largely thanks to the resources allocated to this area. That probably comes at the expense of other areas - most notably Pokrovsk, where the situation is steadily worsening. Still, I’d argue this tradeoff is the right call
7/ If Sumy area were to fall, or if Russian forces pushed deep enough, it could open the way for an advance into Chernihiv oblast. That would put Kyiv under direct threat and force Ukraine to redeploy troops north, weakening other parts of the front.
8/ And at that point, the conversation, both political and military, would shift. Instead of “We can’t let Russia take Donbas,” it would become, once again, “We can’t let them take Kyiv.” Just like it did in February and March of 2022. This would be disastrous for Ukraine
9/ And while this might sound optimistic, there are still countless ways the situation could deteriorate, especially if North Korea were to cross the line and directly invade Ukraine. To prevent such a scenario, strong consequences must be outlined for North Koreans
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