This is the debate in Washington right now after Trump's pivot against Russia
In this thread, I break down what economic measures will work and won't work against Russia /THREAD
Trump's secondary tariffs against Russia are unlikely to be enforceable without escalating a trade war with China, torpedoing UAE investments and derailing a trade deal with India
Its not a viable approach even though if implemented to max, they would be devastating /1
Instead, the focus needs to be on closing key loopholes in the sanctions regime
While significant progress has been made against banks like Sberbank and Gazprombank, they are not the only front against Russia's SWIFT access
Nuclear energy giant Rosatom is a key actor /2
Rosatom has occupied the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, engaged in deals with Sahel juntas and aided Iran's civilian nuclear energy program
Yet it remains unsanctioned due to fears about disrupting uranium price and supply chains /3
This has allowed it to operate defense and other front companies that feed Russia's war machine
Its mastery of "greenwashing" with solar and renewable energy offers is a deflection, and its small modular reactors are gaining traction /4
There are also shadow fleet tankers that are left on the table
Estonian officials commonly estimate there are 600 shadow fleet tankers but the numbers change rapidly
The big problem is that EU sanctions packages are staggered and US ones are often reactive not preemptive /5
The oil refinery loophole is another one
Estimates of $750 million in immediate cash losses have circulated if this was closed and Russia's oil exports to Global South partners would be complicated further /6
Secondary sanctions have created some impediments between yuan and rouble transactions especially involving Chinese banks
These delays are problematic for Russia but yuan trade is more resilient than it looks, especially as Trump's BRICS tariffs alarm the Global South /7
Given the commitment of key actors to multipolarity in the Global South, it will be hard to corral these countries to isolate Russia
But there is a lot that the West can do immediately to restrict the scope of Putin's war financing /END
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The Russia-China-Iran-North Korea authoritarian axis has been widely discussed since 2022
It has functioned effectively in Ukraine but flopped spectacularly in the Israel-Iran war
Some more details on what this means /THREAD
This authoritarian axis has often been framed as a bloc that is presenting a normative/geopolitical challenge to US hegemony and the Western liberal order
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine crystallized as the West isolated Russia, these powers backed Russian aggression /1
This framing is problematic for several reasons
First, these bilateral relationships were not created due to a changing world order
They formed during the Cold War, 1980s and 1990s /2
The US has launched major military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities
Here are some thoughts on what might come next /THREAD
The US escalation reflects a middle ground between the two camps within the Trump orbit
It is an escalation that goes beyond what the voices of de-escalation (Carlson, Bannon, Gabbard) wanted but is short of the regime change war that the hawks (Graham, Cotton) likely want /1
The Trump admin views the US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities as a bargaining chip to facilitate new negotiations with Iran being in a position of grave weakness
A delayed Iranian retaliation that targets Israel only and not US bases in a major way supports this /2
Russia is increasingly concerned by the threat of Chinese espionage
Here's some more context on this trend /THREAD
This trend has got three key dynamics
The first is age-old mistrusts bubbling to the surface, concerns that Russia's military vulnerabilities in Ukraine are being studied by China so it can assert influence over the Far East /1
The second is concern about strategic overdependence on China
Russian intellectuals especially at HSE framed China as the Ukraine War's winner in 2022. There is a divide between the pro-China siloviki and more Sino-sceptic RDIF and business community /2
Ukraine's seismic attack on Russia's strategic bomber arsenal is still causing ripples
Here are some thoughts on its implications /THREAD
Ukraine has a stronger case for the expansion of permissions to use NATO class weaponry inside Russia
Ukraine can argue that these attacks have limited escalation risk potential and can enhance strategic stability by weakening Russia's nuclear deterrent /1
Expect Ukraine to push for the harmonization of F-16 use inside Russian territory and the removal of residual range restrictions on ATACMs, Storm Shadows, SCALPs that exist by decree or informally
Friedrich Merz's proposal seemed daring but now its got much more teeth /2
Russian Telegram channels are presenting a wide range of narratives about Ukraine's drone attack
Here are some of the key narratives to watch /THREAD
The key narrative is that Ukraine did this before Istanbul to sabotage the peace talks
Basically, it is aimed at provoking Putin into a harsh response and Ukraine rallying the US to firmly support the anti-Russian agenda /1
This argument is being paired with uncharacteristic calls for restraint even from hardline ultranationalists
Sergey Markov for instance is warning against tactical nuclear weapons use, as destroying Russian populations in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa would benefit Zelensky /2
Russia's security threat to the Baltic States remains an issue of critical importance
Based on my recent engagements with Baltic officials, here are some key findings /THREAD
The overarching mood in the Baltic States is one of vindication
Due to Russia's efforts to reverse their sovereignty from the 1990s and early acts of aggression (2007 cyberattack on Estonia), the Baltic States issued dire warnings to the West about Russian expansionism /1
These warnings were often ignored by Western countries at their peril and the West only really began to see the light about Putin's Russia with the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine
This historical mistake shapes the Baltic States's thinking about European security /2