1/ If Trump forces Powell out, markets could no longer assume Fed will hit 2% inflation no matter what. Inflation would be subordinated to White House's larger agenda. No longer the brakes, the Fed would be part of the engine. My column: wsj.com/economy/centra…
2/ It's remarkable that through pandemic, stimulus, tariffs, deportations & soaring debt, inflation expectations stayed anchored around 2%. A victory for post-93 regime of political noninterference & inflation targeting.
3/ If Powell is removed, markets would assume the next chair could also be removed if president isn't happy with him. (Removal "for cause" when president gets to define "cause" is tantamount to removal without cause.) Independence would, de facto, be gone.
4/ The repercussions would unfold slowly. I'm skeptical of predictions the market will crash; such predictions have been frequent & wrong about Trump (and Brexit) and seem to embolden Trump
5/ And lags from Fed policy (incl. change of chair) to inflation are long and variable. Near term direction of inflation is down w/inertial service, wage inflation falling (red: wages, yellow: core CPI svcs). Tariffs both add to inflation pressure & subtract (reduce real income).
6/ Independence matters when pressures on inflation are upward and Fed has to decide how forcefully to pre-empt them. By the time Fed got out from under Treasury's thumb in '51, inflation was already rising rapidly (Korean War disruptions).
7/ Trump's threats against Powell have started to affect medium-term inflation expectations. The one-year TIPS inflation rate three years forward (after tariffs wash out) is up 21 bp this month (via JPMorgan)
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Whatever your probability of recession three weeks ago, it should be lower today. Five reasons why: 1. April employment was first "hard" data since 4/2 tariff announcement, with March tariffs already in place, and tariffs left no imprint on hiring, even at the industry level.
2. Policy is endogenous. Trump's tariff announcements tanked the market a month ago, so he walked them back (pauses, exemptions, plea for talks w/China). Businesses updating their assumptions will logically assume further Trump capitulation and act accordingly.
3. The S&P 500 has recovered all of its post 4/2 losses. Investors have not notably reduced future earnings growth, and the uncertainty premium has now been priced in.
Where did all those imports go in Q1? An update. The gap between surging imports and subdued inventories was even larger based on Census Bureau's March wholesale inventories. Bureau of Economic Analysis made an adjustment boosting March inventories, eliminating part of the discrepancy. Without that adjustment, GDP would have shrunk even more, by 1.5% instead of 0.3%, according to Ben Herzon of S&P Global.
So we are still left with a mystery. Why didn't inventories rise more? Why is the source data for inventories so weak? Where the heck are all those imports going?
.@Brad_Setser thinks he's solved the mystery of the missing inventories that caused q1 GDP to go negative: Pharma shipments
1/ This 7-year old interview w/Apple CEO Tim Cook is getting attention now as proof of why tariffs don't work. Some context is in order. Here, Cook claims companies don't go to China for low labor costs but for skills that aren't available in the U.S. HOWEVER:
2/ That may be true now, but not when Apple went to China 25 years ago. Apple had factories (& skills) in U.S. at the time. Cook came to Apple in 1998 to run operations, closed those factories and, imitating Dell & Compaq, offshored production to Asia. wsj.com/articles/tim-c…
3/ Asia's main appeal was low labor costs. Foxconn & other Chinese contract manufacturers, by serving Apple, "learning by doing," acquired essential process knowledge and skills. China owes its central role in the electronics supply chain to Cook's original outsourcing decsion.
Trump wants a lower trade deficit, but his tax cuts and pro-investment policies would make it bigger. Here's how to reconcile them: austerity. Steep spending cuts will lower inflation, interest rates and the dollar. I explain how here. /1 wsj.com/economy/trade/…
2/ The link between the fiscal and external balance is well established; thus the nickname "twin deficits." IMF study found that $1 in fiscal consolidation improves the current account by 30-50 cents for a low-trade dependency country like U.S.
3/ So reducing budget deficit from 6.4% of GDP last year to 3% in 2029 (Bessent proposal) could reduce trade gap by $300-$500B/ year. (It was $900 B last year). The time is right: inflation is above target and austerity would hasten return to target, Fed rate cuts, lower dollar.
Houses are places to live, but they're also assets, and the components of asset valuation - price, interest rates, and rents - show them overvalued now, near bubble-level peaks. While a bust isn't imminent, I explain here why real returns could be poor for a while. wsj.com/finance/invest…
2/ Real home prices and price/income ratios aren't good valuation measures when real cost & quality of shelter is rising. Price to rent ratios are superior because owning and renting are close substitutes. So rents up 24% v. prices up 51% since 2019 is a big red flag.
3/ Which rents? BLS's "owner equivalent rent" matches owner occupied homes to similar rental units - but may understate rent growth b/c of stock of existing leases that will renew at higher rates. Single-family market rents are up 31%, still way below price increase.
1/ The 2021-23 inflation in a nutshell. A policy-induced expansion in demand coincided with pandemic-induced sectoral demand disclocations and supply constraints. Lower immigration, virus, and early retirements shrank labor force. Supply curves are short-run vertical...
2/ ... so this caused a large price level increase. The transitory hypothesis said with time supply curves would flatten out. With inflation expectations anchored, the price level would stabilize/fall and inflation drop back.
3/ The persistent hypothesis was that the demand expansion and supply restrictions would last long enough for expectations to come unanchored and a wage-price spiral to occur. Ex ante both the transitory and persistent hypothesis were plausible.