In light of recent photos and videos drawing public attention to Shahed drone production, a common question has emerged: Why can’t Ukraine simply strike the facility? Hit the archer, not the arrow! The answer, however, is more complicated than it seems. Here are a few key points:
2/ The drone production site is located more than 1,200 kilometers from Ukrainian territory. It's not a modest workshop - the facility occupies roughly 160,000 square meters, with additional ongoing expansion.
3/ Any drone capable of reaching that distance must carry a significant fuel load, which in turn limits its payload capacity. In short, drones that can fly that far typically can't deliver the kind of payload needed to inflict serious or lasting damage to a facility that big
4/ Ideally, targets like this should be neutralized through carpet bombing or multiple missile strikes aimed at production bottlenecks. At present, Ukraine lacks the capacity to conduct such operations, though that may change as its missile capabilities evolve.
5/ An internal sabotage or “spiderweb-style” operation targeting key components of the facility is theoretically possible. However, such attacks alone are unlikely to halt production permanently. At best, they would cause temporary disruption and are difficult to replicate again
6/ The phrase “kill the archer, not the arrow” may sound compelling when used for bombers, but not so much for the production facility. In addition to the production, Russia has dispersed launch sites - rudimentary setups often consist of dirt roads long enough to launch a drone.
7/ Striking launch areas would have little effect unless Ukraine could hit multiple sites consistently, day after day. Storage sites near the launch areas could be targeted, but even a successful strike would likely destroy only a portion of the drones stockpiled for a single day
8/ The task isn’t impossible, and Ukraine may yet find a way to destroy the facility, but its difficulty is often underestimated, especially by those who believe a single successful strike would be enough to “fix it.” Unfortunately, the reality is far more complicated
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Ukrainian drone strikes continue to be persistent and frequent, yet verified information and detailed BDA assessments remain scarce. Our team conducted a brief review of several known strikes, drawing on recent satellite imagery to make a few preliminary observations:
2/ As with earlier research conducted jointly with RFEL this past winter, we found that when Ukrainian drones have successfully reached and hit their targets, the actual damage to facilities appears limited. The relatively small payloads prevent from chasing lasting disruptions
3/ With years, the frequency of strikes is increasing, in line with Ukraine’s expanded domestic drone production. However, the overall impact remains limited. To meaningfully shift battlefield momentum, Ukraine needs larger payloads and a better delivery means.
Fundamentally, both Russia and Ukraine face organizational challenges, though of different kinds. Ukraine suffers from delayed mobilization and delayed structural adaptations, while Russia struggles to translate its vast resource advantage into a combined and coordinated force:
2/ For example, Russia continues to rely on small tactical group not only due to Ukrainian drones, but also because it struggles to effectively organize combined-arms operations above the battalion. Reverting to smaller units is forced choice - they remain possible to coordinate.
3/ Even when Russia concentrates large forces in a relatively small area, it struggles to fully exploit that advantage. Lacking the ability to generate overwhelming force at once, it instead resorts to gradually deploying small units in an attempt to wear down Ukrainian defenses
Lately, Russia’s slow progress in the Sumy region is being explained away by some as a diversion, an attempt to pull Ukrainian forces from Donbas, with no serious objectives in Sumy itself. That idea might seem reasonable for some - until you look closer. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the start of the full-scale war, Russia has usually concentrated what it sees as elite assault units in directions it considers valuable, strategic or otherwise important. The current makeup of Russian forces in Sumy direction speaks volumes:
3/ The 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, now one of Putin’s favorite assault units, the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, the units from 76th and 106th Air Assault Divisions; the 83rd and 11th Separate Air Assault Brigades, and the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment.
The Russian offensive in Sumy so far resembles the late spring 2024 attempt to expand their presence in Kharkiv Oblast, which was ultimately contained and never developed into the larger incursion they had intended. Despite some progress, there is no threat to Sumy at this time:
2/ The situation around small village - Kindrativka was especially precarious for Russian forces, who were forced to retreat after their initial advances.
3/ The situation near Oleksiivka, which is not far from Kindrativka, is also difficult for Russian forces. The entire area is currently held by a few motorized rifle regiments, a separate brigade, and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade
The "I Want to Live" project, operating under the umbrella of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence, has published documents detailing losses within Russia's 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the Central Military District. 🧵Brief thread with details and numbers:
2/ As of June 2025, at least 8,645 personnel have been officially declared dead and buried. Among all units, the 74th and 35th Separate Motor Rifle Brigades appear to have suffered the highest number of casualties - 2479 and 1975.
3/ As for those missing in action, 10,491 personnel from the 41st Combined Arms Army are unaccounted for as of June 2025. The 35th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade has suffered the most in this category, with 3,146 soldiers reported missing.
The seriousness of the situation on the frontlines was recently laid out in detail by Olexandr Solonko, a soldier currently serving in Donetsk Oblast. I strongly recommend reading the translated version closely if you’re trying to understand the situation on the ground. Thread:
2/ We are approaching a moment when we will very likely face another major crisis on the front. While the world's powerful play their games of "two weeks" and "50 days" and try in every way to demonstrate resolve where there is none, we will have to withstand the desperate pressure of the Russians. Both on the front and in the rear
3/ Where we are now: The Russians believe that if they press with all their might now, they can finally break us. This belief is based, among other things, on the long, attrition war, the escalation of regular attacks on military targets, the defense industry, and the terrorizing of civilians in the rear