1/25 The CAPTOR radar is the beating heart of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s sensor suite, enabling its air superiority and multi-role capabilities. Developed through a multinational effort, it has evolved from a Cold War-era concept to a cutting-edge system. This thread traces its journey from requirement to operational use, its technology, variants, and relevance today, with a focus on the UK’s investment in the ECRS Mk2. As always views are my own and posts can be corrected if errors are found. This is third in series of UK airborne radars (Blue Fox/Vixen, Fox Hunter and now CAPTOR). Larger radars will be covered soon (Search Water etc).
Origins of the CAPTOR Radar
2/25 The CAPTOR, originally the ECR-90, was born in the 1980s under the Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) programme, aimed at countering Soviet aircraft like the MiG-29. Led by the EuroRadar consortium (UK, Germany, Italy, Spain), it built on the Ferranti Blue Vixen radar from the Sea Harrier FA2, leveraging pulse Doppler technology for superior target detection in cluttered environments.
Heritage and Technological Roots
3/25 The CAPTOR’s heritage lies in Cold War radar advancements, particularly pulse Doppler systems used in the Tornado’s Foxhunter radar. These provided robust electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) against Soviet jamming. Collaborative expertise from GEC-Marconi (UK), DASA (Germany), FIAR (Italy), and INISEL (Spain) shaped a radar that balanced performance, cost, and NATO interoperability.
Initial User Requirements
4/25 In the mid-1980s, the CAPTOR’s requirements focused on air superiority: long-range detection, tracking multiple targets, and engaging beyond-visual-range (BVR) with missiles like the AIM-120 AMRAAM. Operating in the I/J-band (8-12 GHz), it needed to excel in high-threat environments. The radar’s software, written in Ada, was designed for future upgrades to meet evolving needs.
Evolving Needs with the Typhoon
5/25 The end of the Cold War shifted the Typhoon’s role to multi-role operations, requiring the CAPTOR to add air-to-ground modes like synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and ground moving target indication (GMTI). User feedback from RAF Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) missions emphasised reliability, maintenance ease, and integration with NATO systems like Link 16.
Development Milestones
6/25 Development began in 1989 with a $394.2 million contract. The ECR-90A prototype was tested in 1993 on a BAC-111 aircraft, followed by the ECR-90B and C models, with the latter integrated into the German DA5 Typhoon prototype in 1997. Named CAPTOR in 2000, the first production unit was delivered in March 2001, marking a key milestone.
Production and Build
7/25 Production of the CAPTOR-M, the mechanically scanned variant, started in 1998, led by Leonardo’s Edinburgh site (formerly Selex ES). Weighing 193 kg with liquid and air cooling, it featured three processing channels for search, tracking, and ECCM. Over 10,000 jobs were supported across the EuroRadar consortium’s supply chain, delivering radars for 630 Typhoons.
CAPTOR-M: The Original Variant
8/25 The CAPTOR-M, used in Tranche 1 and early Tranche 2 Typhoons, is a multi-mode pulse Doppler radar optimised for air-to-air combat. It supports BVR engagements and robust ECCM but has limited air-to-ground capabilities compared to later variants. Its self-diagnostic system allows rapid fault detection, minimising downtime.
CAPTOR-E (ECRS Mk0)
9/25 The CAPTOR-E, or ECRS Mk0 (Radar One Plus), introduced active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology for Kuwait and Qatar. Using gallium arsenide (GaAs) high-power amplifiers, it offers improved range, accuracy, and jamming resistance. First delivered in 2019, it enhances multi-role performance for export customers.
ECRS Mk1 for Germany and Spain
10/25 The ECRS Mk1, developed by Hensoldt and Indra, is tailored for Germany’s Quadriga and Spain’s Halcon programmes. Featuring a multi-channel digital receiver and broadband transmit-receive modules (TRMs), it excels in air-to-ground roles with ultra-high-resolution SAR and GMTI, plus electronic warfare functions. Deliveries are expected by the mid-2020s.
ECRS Mk2: The UK’s Advanced Leap
11/25 The ECRS Mk2, or Radar Two, is the RAF’s flagship radar, with a £2.35 billion investment for 40 sets. Featuring both GaAs and gallium nitride (GaN) amplifiers, it includes a swashplate repositioner (derived from the Selex ES-05 Raven) for a 50% wider field of regard. It integrates electronic warfare (EW) and attack (EA) capabilities, with first flight in September 2024.
CAPTOR’s Core Technology
12/25 The CAPTOR-M uses a mechanically scanned antenna in the I/J-band, with three channels for simultaneous search, tracking, and ECCM. Its AESA variants (ECRS Mk0, Mk1, Mk2) use over 1,000 TRMs for near-instantaneous beam steering, improving range and jamming resistance. The ECRS Mk2’s GaN technology enhances power efficiency.
Technological Limitations
13/25 The CAPTOR-M’s mechanical scanning is slower than AESA systems, limiting its multi-domain performance. Early ECRS variants lack advanced AI for target classification or photonic radar technology. While the ECRS Mk2 addresses many gaps, it still trails fifth-generation radars like the F-35’s AN/APG-81 in stealth detection (happy to discuss on this one).
Integration with Typhoon Systems
14/25 The CAPTOR integrates with the Typhoon’s Attack and Identification System (AIS), fusing data with the PIRATE IRST, Defensive Aids Sub-System (DASS), and Link 16. This reduces pilot workload via automatic mode selection. The radar supports weapons like Meteor, Paveway IV, and Storm Shadow for precise targeting.
Role of the DASS and PIRATE
15/25 The DASS, with countermeasures, chaff, flares, and a towed decoy, enhances survivability against radar-guided threats. The PIRATE IRST provides passive detection, complementing the CAPTOR’s active radar in jammed or stealthy environments. Together, they create a robust sensor suite for the Typhoon.
Aerodynamic and Power Integration
16/25 The Typhoon’s large nose accommodates the CAPTOR’s powerful antenna, offering superior range compared to smaller fighters like the Rafale. Liquid and air cooling ensure reliability during high-performance flight, while self-diagnostic systems (hopefully) simplify maintenance, critical for operational readiness.
Operational Use Across Nations
17/25 The CAPTOR-M equips Typhoons in the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, Saudi Arabia, and Oman for air policing and combat operations. The RAF has used it in Operation Ellamy (Libya, 2011) and Operation Shader (Iraq/Syria, 2015 onwards). The ECRS Mk0 serves Kuwait and Qatar for regional security.
ECRS Mk1 and Mk2 in Operations
18/25 The ECRS Mk1 will enhance Germany and Spain’s Typhoons with advanced air-to-ground and EW capabilities. The ECRS Mk2, for the RAF’s Tranche 3 Typhoons, supports electronic attack and SEAD roles (RAF Typhoon just needs a SEAD weapon, absent since the retirement of ALARM), complementing F-35Bs in NATO operations. Its IOC is expected by 2030.
Strengths of the CAPTOR Radar (personal views)
19/25 The CAPTOR’s versatility, reliability, and upgradeability are key strengths. The CAPTOR-M excels in air superiority, while AESA variants like the ECRS Mk2 offer multi-role and EW/EA capabilities. The Mk2’s swashplate provides a wider field of regard, enhancing situational awareness.
Weaknesses of the CAPTOR Radar (personal views)
20/25 The CAPTOR-M’s mechanical scanning limits its speed and multi-domain performance. The £2.35 billion cost for 40 ECRS Mk2 sets has raised concerns, especially compared to the F-35’s AN/APG-81, already in production. Maintenance complexity and the absence of AI-driven features are also drawbacks.
A further question to the readers would be “more Typhoon or more ECRS Mk2 equipped Typhoon above the 40 (36 operational) ordered to date. I would further ask, dedicated SEAD weapon or SPEAR 3?
Comparison with Legacy Systems
21/25 Compared to the Tornado’s Foxhunter radar (100 km detection range for a 10 m² RCS target), the CAPTOR-M (135 km) offers superior range, resolution, and ECCM. Its sensor fusion and three-channel architecture far outstrip legacy systems, enabling effective air-to-air and air-to-ground roles.
Comparison with Peer Systems
22/25 Against peers like the Rafale’s RBE2 (initially mechanically scanned) and Su-27’s Slot Back (120 km range), the CAPTOR-M was competitive in the 2000s. The ECRS Mk0 and Mk1 match modern AESA radars like the F/A-18’s AN/APG-79, but the AN/APG-81 on the F-35 leads in stealth detection and data fusion (happy to be challenged).
The ECRS Mk2’s Unique Edge
23/25 The ECRS Mk2’s swashplate and EW/EA capabilities give it an edge over fixed AESA radars, enabling simultaneous tracking and jamming. Its £2.35 billion cost for 40 sets reflects its advanced GaN technology and integration with the Typhoon’s systems, positioning it as a critical asset for the RAF.
Contemporary Relevance and Challenges
24/25 The CAPTOR-M remains effective for air policing, but its mechanical scanning is outdated. The ECRS Mk0 and Mk1 meet multi-role needs, but stealth and hypersonic threats demand the ECRS Mk2’s capabilities. Its high cost is debated, given the AN/APG-81’s maturity, yet its unique features justify the investment for NATO operations.
Conclusion: The Future with ECRS Mk2
25/25 The CAPTOR radar has evolved from a Cold War air superiority system to a multi-role powerhouse, with the ECRS Mk2 representing its pinnacle. The UK’s £2.35 billion investment in 40 sets underscores its strategic importance, offering unmatched EW/EA and a wide field of regard to complement F-35Bs. While expensive compared to the AN/APG-81, its tailored capabilities ensure the Typhoon’s relevance through 2060, supported by the Long-Term Evolution programme. The ECRS Mk2’s first flight in 2024 and IOC by 2030 mark a bold step, keeping the RAF at the forefront of air combat technology. The challenge for the RAF, is 36 enough?
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The Troubled Odyssey of the GDLS AJAX Programme: A Chronicle of Procurement Failures
Views my own, corrections welcome.
1/25
In the annals of British defence procurement, few sagas rival the protracted and scandal-ridden journey of the AJAX armoured vehicle programme (but E-7 seems to be giving it a good run for its money). Conceived as a cornerstone of the British Army’s modernisation efforts, AJAX promised to deliver a family of cutting-edge platforms capable of revolutionising reconnaissance and combat operations in an era of networked warfare. Rooted in the late 1990s’ Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) initiative, it evolved into a £5.5 billion contract awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems UK (GDLS-UK) in 2010 for 589 vehicles across six variants: the reconnaissance-focused AJAX, the ARES personnel carrier, the ATHENA command vehicle, the ARGUS engineer reconnaissance variant, the ATLAS recovery vehicle, and the APOLLO repair platform.
These vehicles were envisioned as digitally integrated marvels, boasting superior mobility, sensor fusion, and data-sharing capabilities to align with the Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine. Yet, what began as a beacon of innovation has devolved into a quagmire of missed milestones, manufacturing blunders, health and safety catastrophes, and institutional intransigence. Drawing on exhaustive reports like the Sheldon Review (2023), the Ajax Noise and Vibration Review (2021), parliamentary evidence sessions, whistleblower testimonies, and the latest update from Defence Secretary Luke Pollard on the 22nd January 2026, this thread attempts to unravel the programme’s timeline. It exposes how commercial pressures from GDLS-UK and the Army’s unyielding push for capability have consistently trumped the welfare of service personnel. Special emphasis is placed on the pivotal role of the Institute of Naval Medicine (INM) report, which laid bare the severe noise and vibration risks, with direct quotes (just to remind everyone) underscoring the gravity of these failures. As I go deeper into this narrative, the evidence paints a damning picture of systemic failures that have allowed AJAX to limp forward, at great human and financial cost.
Origins and Contract Award: Seeds of Controversy (Late 1990s–2010)
2/25
The AJAX story traces its roots to the post-Cold War era, when the British Army sought to replace its ageing Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) fleet with something more agile and technologically advanced. Initiatives like the Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) and FRES laid the groundwork, but by 2010, the MoD opted for GDLS-UK’s ASCOD-based design over rivals such as BAE Systems’ CV90. This choice was not without debate: critics argued that selecting an unproven adaptation of the ASCOD—primarily to diversify suppliers and avoid a BAE monopoly—introduced unnecessary risks. The contract emphasised assembly in Merthyr Tydfil, Wales, touting economic benefits like job creation, but it also locked in a firm-priced structure where GDLS-UK shouldered cost overruns, potentially incentivising shortcuts.
Initial projections were optimistic: an in-service date around 2017, with vehicles enhancing NATO interoperability and addressing capability gaps exposed in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the bespoke modifications—over 1,200 unique requirements—transformed ASCOD into a complex, heavy, custom beast, setting the stage for future woes.
Early Manufacturing and Timeline Slippages (2010–2014)
3/25 From the outset, production decisions sowed discord. The first 100 hulls were fabricated in Spain by GDLS-UK’s parent company, sparking concerns over quality assurance and supply chain vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in welding and hull tolerances emerged early, issues that would later manifest as debilitating vibrations. By 2014, the MoD formalised the £3.5 billion manufacture phase, aiming for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in July 2020—a squadron deployable with full support.
Yet, the programme’s timeline had already ballooned by three years, a harbinger of deeper problems. The overlap between demonstration and manufacturing phases, intended to be brief, stretched perilously, amplifying risks as prototypes informed production without full validation. These early slippages reflected an underestimation of the engineering challenges in adapting a foreign platform to (1200+ extra) British specifications.
Views my own, corrections and comments welcome - it’s about the debate.
1/25 The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has long prided itself on maintaining a capable armoured force, with the Challenger series of main battle tanks (MBTs) serving as the backbone of its heavy armour since the 1980s. The transition from the Challenger 2 to the Challenger 3 represents a critical upgrade programme aimed at extending the life of these vehicles into the 2040s. However, this endeavour has been beset by a myriad of challenges, ranging from technical hurdles such as weight management and turret integration to logistical issues like component shortages and the reactivation of stored vehicles. These problems are not isolated; they reflect broader systemic difficulties within the British Army’s armoured vehicle procurement, as evidenced by the troubled Ajax programme. In this thread, I’ll attempt to examine these challenges in detail, drawing on official reports, defence analyses, and comparative insights from other nations such as Germany and Poland. I’ll argue that while the decision to upgrade existing Challenger 2 hulls rather than procure new platforms may have seemed cost-effective, it risks leaving the UK with an outdated and insufficiently modernised fleet, potentially compromising its strategic posture in an era of renewed great-power competition.
By comparing the UK’s approach to those of its NATO allies, this analysis highlights why the upgrade path may have been a suboptimal choice, perpetuating vulnerabilities in an increasingly contested global security environment.
Background on the Challenger 2
2/25 The Challenger 2, introduced in 1998, has been a stalwart of the British Army, renowned for its robust Dorchester armour and combat-proven reliability, including in operations in Iraq. By the 2010s, obsolescence concerns prompted the MoD to initiate the Life Extension Programme, which evolved into the Challenger 3 upgrade.
The Challenger 3 Upgrade Contract
3/25 This upgrade is under a £800 million contract awarded to Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) in 2021. It involves refurbishing 148 Challenger 2 hulls with a new turret featuring a smoothbore 120mm L55A1 gun, advanced Trophy active protection system (APS), and enhanced digital systems.
The Challenges Facing the British Army: Strategic Drift, Procurement Failures, and Operational Shortcomings in the Post-Afghanistan Era
Views and thoughts my one, corrections and comments welcome.
1/25 A Christmas Day thread on the British Army’s struggles over the past 15 years. From identity crisis post-Afghanistan to procurement woes like AJAX and Challenger 3. Critical, factual analysis with NATO comparisons.
Introduction
2/25 The British Army, once a cornerstone of global military power, has grappled with profound challenges over the past 15 years, particularly since the final withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. This period marks a transition from prolonged counter-insurgency operations to an era of strategic uncertainty, exacerbated by geopolitical shifts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
3/25 Unlike the Royal Navy, which maintains a clear maritime deterrence role through its carrier strike group and nuclear submarines, or the Royal Air Force (RAF), with its emphasis on air superiority and strategic airlift, the Army has struggled to articulate a coherent post-Afghanistan identity.
Canada’s Fighter Jet Crisis: Why Replacing the CF-18 Is So Much More Than Buying Planes
Views my own, comments and corrections welcome.
1/25 The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is flying 40-year-old CF-18 Hornets on borrowed time. Structural cracks, obsolete avionics, and readiness rates hovering below 50 % mean the clock is ticking louder than ever. The Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) — meant to deliver 88 new jets — has become one of the most politically charged, industrially complex, and strategically fraught procurements in Canadian history. This thread attempts to explain why, from post-war history to the November 2025 standoff with the United States.
Post-War RCAF: From Empire Air Training to Cold War Interceptor
2/25 1945–1960: Canada demobilised from a 215,000-strong wartime air force to a small peacetime RCAF focused on continental defence. First jet: the Canadair-licensed F-86 Sabre (1,200 built in Montreal). Role: high-altitude interception of Soviet Tu-95 Bears over the Arctic. Industry: massive licensed production. Lesson: Canada could be a serious aerospace player when offsets were generous.
The Nuclear Era and the Controversial CF-104 Starfighter
3/25 1961–1986: The RCAF (later CAF) bought 200 CF-104 Starfighters for low-level nuclear strike in Europe under NATO. Accident rate was appalling (“Widowmaker”), and the aircraft hated Canadian winters. Political takeaway: Ottawa accepted a technically suboptimal platform because NATO political solidarity trumped operational fit.
The E-7 Wedgetail Programme: A Case Study in Strategic Procurement Failure
Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. References in post 25.
1/25 The Royal Air Force’s (RAF) acquisition of the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail was intended to restore sovereign airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability post-E-3D retirement. Instead, it has become emblematic of systemic deficiencies in Ministry of Defence (MoD) major project delivery. This thread attempts to examine the requirement, procurement strategy, risk management, and international ramifications using official reporting and parliamentary evidence.
Original Requirement and Operational Concept
2/25 The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) mandated a successor to the E-3D Sentry capable of persistent, multi-domain surveillance and command and control (C2). The E-7’s Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) provides 360° coverage, simultaneous air/maritime tracking of 2,000 contacts, and range exceeding 370 km. The Initial Gate business case specified five airframes to sustain a continuous two-aircraft orbit with appropriate maintenance float.
Role Within RAF Force Structure
3/25 The Wedgetail is designed to function as a high-endurance C2 node, integrating sensor feeds from F-35, Typhoon, P-8, satellites, and ground-based radars via Link 16 and sovereign datalinks. It enables standoff direction of offensive counter-air, strike coordination, and maritime domain awareness. Endurance: 9 hours unrefuelled, >20 hours with AAR. The platform was to be fully interoperable with NATO and Five Eyes partners while preserving UK cryptographic sovereignty (from aircraft 3).
The British Army, November 2025: A Force Asked to Do Too Much with Too Little
Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. All information comes from open source.
1/25 Five months after the June Strategic Defence Review promised a “NATO-first” land power capable of deploying a full division to Europe within ten days, the British Army is smaller, lighter, and more fragile than at any time since the Napoleonic Wars. This thread attempts to examine one straightforward question: can the Army actually deliver the tasks the government has set for it, both at home and within NATO? I will try and walk through the commitments, expose the critical gaps in capability, and contrast the polished rhetoric of senior officers and politicians with the harder reality on the ground.
National Tasks – What the Government Expects at Home
2/25 The SDR 2025 and its predecessors expect the Army to defend the United Kingdom against hybrid threats such as sabotage, cyber strikes, and disinformation campaigns. It must also be able to mount rapid counter-terrorist operations anywhere in the world and evacuate British citizens from crisis zones, whether in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. All of these missions demand an agile, resilient, and rapidly deployable force. With only (circa) 73,800 regular soldiers—the smallest regular Army since 1714—true agility is in increasingly short supply.
NATO Tasks – The Real Heavy Lifting
3/25 NATO commitments are far more demanding. Britain leads the Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Estonia, a formation that must be able to expand seamlessly to a full brigade on demand. In the event of a major Article 5 emergency—Russia crossing a NATO border, for example—the United Kingdom has promised to deploy an entire division, roughly 20,000 troops with armoured brigades at its core, within ten days and to sustain it in combat for months. This is the centrepiece of the government’s “NATO-first” policy, and it is not a paper commitment; allies are counting on it.