The British Army, November 2025: A Force Asked to Do Too Much with Too Little

Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. All information comes from open source.

1/25 Five months after the June Strategic Defence Review promised a “NATO-first” land power capable of deploying a full division to Europe within ten days, the British Army is smaller, lighter, and more fragile than at any time since the Napoleonic Wars. This thread attempts to examine one straightforward question: can the Army actually deliver the tasks the government has set for it, both at home and within NATO? I will try and walk through the commitments, expose the critical gaps in capability, and contrast the polished rhetoric of senior officers and politicians with the harder reality on the ground. National Tasks – What the Government Expects at Home

2/25 The SDR 2025 and its predecessors expect the Army to defend the United Kingdom against hybrid threats such as sabotage, cyber strikes, and disinformation campaigns. It must also be able to mount rapid counter-terrorist operations anywhere in the world and evacuate British citizens from crisis zones, whether in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. All of these missions demand an agile, resilient, and rapidly deployable force. With only (circa) 73,800 regular soldiers—the smallest regular Army since 1714—true agility is in increasingly short supply.

F-35 - The continuing Saga

The F-35 programme remains a focal point of lively debate within the MilTwit community and beyond, eliciting a wide spectrum of perspectives, including my own.

This thread seeks to offer a balanced overview, tracing the aircraft’s brief history and the path that has led to the present (cluster) situation.

Accountability is essential: the challenges reflect a collective cultural shortfall, evident even in the most recent parliamentary correspondence and announcements, which continue to defer costs for short-term fiscal relief while imposing burdens on future generations. Savings in the capital delivery expenditure line (CDEL) will inevitably inflate whole-life costs (WLC), as the UK forgoes revenue from manufacturing and sustaining the F-35A variant, including associated weapons systems. The RAF will doubtless pursue expedient interim measures, such as procuring US-sourced armaments to maintain operational availability (witness the P-8 Poseidon and AH-64E Apache as pertinent precedents), with the United States eager to supply them.

1/25 The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II stands as a cornerstone of modern aerial warfare, embodying the pinnacle of fifth-generation stealth technology with its advanced sensor fusion, network-centric capabilities, and multi-role versatility. For the United Kingdom, the F-35 programme has been both a symbol of technological ambition and a source of enduring controversy. 2/25 Initially envisioned in the late 1990s as a Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) to revive carrier strike capabilities and supplant ageing platforms like the Harrier and Tornado, the UK’s pledge to acquire 138 aircraft all initially the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant has undergone significant evolution amidst fiscal constraints, technological setbacks, and inter-service tensions.

The Troubled Saga of the UK’s New Medium Helicopter Programme

Views my own, corrections and comments welcome.

I have previous threads on this subject.

1/25 The procurement of military equipment by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has often been marked by ambitious goals that exceed both financial and strategic practicality, leading to programmes that escalate in cost, diminish in scope, and fail to provide timely capabilities to frontline users. The New Medium Helicopter (NMH) programme, initiated in 2021, stands as a prime example of this recurring issue. Originally conceived as a comprehensive effort to modernise the British Armed Forces’ rotary-wing fleet with a single versatile platform, it promised greater operational efficiency and flexibility. However, her we are in October and it has narrowed into a beleaguered competition fraught with bidder withdrawals, reduced ambitions, and severe funding challenges. This thread attempts to explore the programme’s flawed origins, its challenging progression as stakeholders and suppliers have exited, and its current status as essentially a sole-source procurement aimed solely at replacing the now-retired Puma HC2 fleet. Drawing on official documents, defence analyses, and recent reports, it contends that NMH illustrates a persistent MoD failure to procure equipment that effectively meets user requirements, transforming a basic tactical lift need into an overly complicated and precarious venture. Ultimately, simpler alternatives—like the US Marine Corps’ (USMC) UH-1Y Venom ‘Huey’—could offer a more cost-effective resolution, yet again exposing institutional shortcomings in defence acquisition. Flawed Conception: Overambition from the Start

2/25 From its launch in the 2021 Defence in a Competitive Age command paper, the NMH programme was envisioned as a mid-2020s investment to procure 36–44 medium-lift helicopters, consolidating up to five legacy types across the Royal Air Force (RAF), British Army, and UK Strategic Command. These included the RAF’s 23 Puma HC2 support helicopters, three Bell 212 utility helicopters in Brunei, three Bell 412 in Cyprus, and six Airbus AS365 Dauphin liaison helicopters for Army special forces. With a budget of £900 million to £1.2 billion over seven years, the contract was to cover aircraft, simulators, training, and sustainment, featuring an open systems architecture for quick mission adaptations. This ‘one-size-fits-most’ strategy sought to promote fleet commonality, lower logistics costs, and support operations in varied environments, from desert bases to high-threat zones.

Introduction to the Westland Lynx

Views my own, facts as always can be corrected.

(Yes I am a fan of the worlds fastest helicopter - more in depth threads to follow)

1/25 The Westland Lynx stands as a testament to British ingenuity in rotary-wing aviation, emerging in the late 20th century as a multi-role helicopter capable of adapting to the demanding environments of both sea and land. Conceived amid Cold War imperatives for agile, shipborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and battlefield reconnaissance assets, the Lynx fulfilled a dual-service requirement for the Royal Navy (RN) and British Army (including the Royal Marines). Over its five-decade service life, it evolved through numerous variants, influencing export designs and paving the way for its successor, the AW159 Wildcat. This thread attempts to trace the Lynx’s journey from conceptual origins to operational deployment, emphasising its technical attributes, service-specific adaptations, combat record, international adoption, and transition to the Wildcat. It further compares the Lynx to American counterparts like the Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk and UH-60 Black Hawk, evaluates its strengths and limitations, and assesses its enduring relevance in an era dominated by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Conceptual Origins – The Anglo-French Agreement

2/25 The Lynx’s development stemmed from a 1968 Anglo-French agreement to produce a family of next-generation military helicopters, addressing the obsolescence of earlier types like the Westland Wasp (naval) and Scout (army). This collaboration aimed to create versatile platforms that could meet diverse operational needs across NATO forces. The agreement reflected the geopolitical tensions of the era, where rapid advancements in submarine technology and armoured warfare necessitated innovative aerial solutions. Westland Helicopters, based in Yeovil, took a leading role, drawing on prior experience with scout and light attack helicopters. The French ALAT (Aviation Légère de l’Armée de Terre) contributed initially, bringing expertise in rotor dynamics, but withdrew in 1969 due to shifting national priorities towards other projects like the Gazelle. This left Britain to forge ahead alone, shaping the Lynx into a uniquely adaptable machine.

Introduction to the Tomahawk Cruise Missile

Views my own, facts can be corrected.

Following President Trump’s hint on TLAM for Ukraine I’ve put this together.

1/25 The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) stands as one of the most enduring and versatile weapons in modern military arsenals. Developed by the United States Navy in the 1970s, it represents a paradigm shift in precision-guided munitions, enabling long-range strikes against land-based targets with remarkable accuracy. This thread tries to trace the TLAM’s evolution from its initial requirements through to concept, development, and deployment across land, sea, and air platforms. It examines its post-deployment advancements, its role within the US military and allied forces—particularly the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy (RN) submarine-launched variant—and its classification as a strategic weapon. Furthermore, it explores future capability roadmaps, including ground-launched options, and considers its potential impact on the Ukraine-Russia conflict, especially in light of comments by President Trump. Finally, it concludes by analysing how such systems reshape battlefields by targeting adversaries’ centres of gravity with precision at extended ranges. Origins: The Genesis of the Tomahawk

2/25 The genesis of the Tomahawk can be traced to the early 1970s, when the US Navy identified a need for a sea-launched cruise missile capable of evading enemy radar while delivering precise strikes. This requirement emerged amid Cold War tensions, where the ability to counter Soviet naval and land threats without risking pilots or ships was paramount. The missile had to be subsonic, fly at low altitudes to hug the terrain, and carry a significant payload over long distances.

Thread Update: The China Spy Scandal - 24-Hour Developments and Government Misdirection Tactics

As always views my own, facts can and should be checked and corrected if wrong.

Drafted whilst travelling so apologies for spelling, grammar and brevity.

1/25 Here is a (hopefully) detailed update on the UK China spy case involving Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry. Over the last 24 hours (13-14 October 2025), fresh revelations have emerged, including ministerial statements in Parliament, accusations of scapegoating career civil servants, and renewed opposition pressure. I’ll try and break it down step by step, highlighting how the government is employing tactics to mislead and misdirect public attention, such as blaming deputies, denying key roles, and potentially leveraging lobby groups to shift narratives onto unrelated issues. This comes amid ongoing efforts to downplay National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell’s membership in the 48 Group Club, a pro-China network accused of grooming UK elites. Remember, these tactics persist despite potential short-term damage to Labour, as the priority seems to be containing the fallout. Recap of the Core Case: From Arrests to Collapse

2/25 To try and set the scene, Cash (former researcher for Alicia Kearns MP) and Berry (Oxford academic with Chinese ties) were arrested in March 2023 and charged in April 2024 under the Official Secrets Act for allegedly passing sensitive info to China’s United Front Work Department, reaching Politburo member Cai Qi. MI5 called the evidence robust. But on 15 September 2025, charges were dropped due to lack of a government statement confirming China as a “threat” post a 2025 court precedent. In the last 24 hours, no new arrests or revivals, but the debate intensified in Commons, with ministers sticking to “procedural failure” lines while opposition calls it a cover-up.

The Imperative of Data Control in the Digital Age: From Raw Inputs to Strategic Intelligence

Introduction (Part 1)

As always views are my own, facts can and should be corrected.

1/25 In an era where data flows as ceaselessly as the digital currents of the internet, the modern world operates on information derived from vast repositories of human activity. From social media interactions to financial transactions, data underpins economies, governments, and societies. Yet, the true power lies not in the accumulation of data itself, but in its control—specifically, the mastery over structured and unstructured forms. This thread explores the utilisation of data in contemporary contexts, delineating the distinctions between structured and unstructured data, and elucidating why artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) rely on these sources to convert raw data into actionable information and intelligence. Introduction (Part 2)

2/25 It further examines the strategic importance of data hosting, processing, and ownership, including the economic incentives driving corporate investments. Drawing on recent developments involving Oracle, Palantir, and BlackRock’s ties to the World Economic Forum (WEF), the discussion attempt’s to highlight sovereignty challenges and the risks posed by third-party dependencies under frameworks like the U.S. Patriot Act and FISA Section 702. In particular, it scrutinises deals in the UK and Western Europe that ostensibly safeguard data while potentially undermining autonomy, including the newly announced mandatory digital ID schemes.

Very Low Frequency Radio: Enabling Submerged Submarine Communication in the Modern Era

Views my own, facts can be corrected.

Sunday Essay

Posted because TACAMO (E-6B) has been reported operating in the North Atlantic

1/25 Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio constitutes a pivotal technology in military communications, particularly for maintaining contact with submerged submarines without compromising their stealth. This thread attempts to examine the principles of VLF, its operational mechanisms, and its strategic importance for select nations. It addresses the technical specifications, including antenna dimensions, power requirements, and data transmission capacities, alongside implementations by the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States. Further, it discusses global utilisation, interception by amateur radio operators, transmission metrics, and resilience in nuclear scenarios, concluding with an overview of the technology’s challenges and robustness. Defining Very Low Frequency Radio

2/25 Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio waves occupy the electromagnetic spectrum between 3 and 30 kilohertz (kHz). In contrast to higher-frequency signals, which are rapidly attenuated in seawater, VLF waves can penetrate to depths of approximately 40 metres. This property enables the transmission of essential directives to submarines, such as those carrying ballistic missiles (SSBNs), allowing them to remain submerged and undetected during extended patrols.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Status and UK Implications

Part of my wider series on F-35. As always, views my own - facts can and should be corrected if wrong.

This follows the GAO report.

1/25 The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter remains a critical asset in modern military aviation, blending stealth, advanced sensors, and networked systems to bolster combat prowess for the United States and its allies. As outlined in the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report just released (and getting lots of attention), the programme has delivered over 1,100 aircraft since production commenced in 2006. However, it continues to face substantial cost overruns and schedule delays. Total acquisition costs now surpass $485 billion, an $89.5 billion rise from the 2012 baseline, primarily due to modernisation efforts. Sustainment costs over the aircraft’s 77-year lifecycle are projected at $1.58 trillion, pushing the overall expense beyond $2 trillion.

For us (United Kingdom), a key (tier 1) partner contributing to development, production, and sustainment, these issues manifest as operational shortfalls and strategic risks. This thread tries to explore the F-35’s status, emphasising UK effects, drawing on the GAO report and other recent developments. Programme Challenges: Cost Escalations and Delays

2/25 The GAO highlights modernisation as the chief culprit for inefficiencies. The Block 4 effort, a $16.5 billion initiative to enhance hardware and software for capabilities like new weapons and radar improvements, is over $6 billion above original estimates and at least five years delayed, with completion now eyed beyond 2031.
The programme is trimming Block 4 scope to prioritise deliverable elements by 2031.
A critical enabler, Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3)—a $1.9 billion hardware-software suite—has been a major bottleneck, but recent updates indicate completion of software upgrades in June 2025, rendering aircraft combat-capable. Despite this, TR-3 delays contributed to 72 aircraft deliveries in 2025 facing holdbacks.
Production woes persist: Contractors Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney delivered all 110 aircraft and engines late in 2024, averaging 238 days behind schedule.

Introduction to the AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor

Following the recent Red Sea “interception” of a P-8 and my thread on the system (the airframe is just the platform that gets the sensor where it needs to be) I thought it would be useful to describe what the “sensor” was clipped to the fuselage.

As always, views my own and facts can be corrected. @Raytheon_UK

1/25 The AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS) is a state-of-the-art multifunction radar developed by Raytheon (now RTX Corporation) for the United States Navy’s P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Designed for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T), the AAS represents a significant advancement in airborne radar technology. This thread attempts to follow its development from conceptualisation to operational deployment, elucidates its functionality, and examines its integration with the P-8A.
Furthermore, it explores opportunities for the United Kingdom and NATO allies—Canada, Norway, and Germany—to enhance their P-8 fleets, addressing capability gaps such as those left by the we retired Sentinel R1 and soon the Shadow R1, and concludes by highlighting its role as a force multiplier. Conceptual Origins of the AAS

2/25 The AAS was conceived in the late 2000s to counter evolving threats in littoral and maritime environments, where traditional radars struggled to detect low radar cross-section (RCS) targets, such as stealthy vessels, low-flying drones, or submerged submarines. Building on the classified AN/APS-149 Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS), deployed on select P-3C Orion aircraft, the AAS aimed to enhance multi-function capabilities like moving target indication (MTI) and high-resolution mapping, adapting them for modern asymmetric warfare.

The Boeing P-8 Poseidon: An Essential Pillar of Contemporary Maritime Patrol and Anti-Submarine Warfare

1/25 In this quickly put together long thread, I shall attempt examine the Boeing P-8 Poseidon. The thread will attempt traverse its developmental trajectory from initial requirements to full operational service, with a particular emphasis on its integration and utilisation within the Royal Air Force (RAF).
Given the resurgence of underwater threats in the North Atlantic, the RAF’s (and others) recent and ongoing deployment of the P-8 underscores its strategic relevance. This thread is tailored for a predominantly British audience, highlighting RAF-specific applications, whilst attempting to remain relevant for other readers. It will follow my standard format and address the aircraft’s concept of operations, its synergies with complementary assets, the geopolitical significance of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, specifically including recent multinational activities—and detailed analyses of its sensors, armaments, configurations, and comparisons to predecessors and contemporaries. It will explore the RAF’s infrastructure adaptations, procurement decisions, and the platform’s pivotal role in supporting the United Kingdom’s Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD).

As always, all views my own and facts can be challenged. This has been written (at pace) to give some context to the recent events other contributors (@TBrit90 @NavyLookout @pegge49 @auonsson)

For additional context I have worked on the RAF P-8 (not as an aviator) Nimrod MR2 and Nimrod MRA4 (the world’s best ASW long range fixed wing aircraft).

Apologies for grammar and any repetition.

The Boeing P-8 Poseidon demonstrates an uplift in maritime patrol capabilities, evolving from the United States Navy’s (USN) need to modernise its fleet in the face of evolving submarine technologies. For the RAF, the P-8 has restored a critical capability absent since the retirement of the Nimrod fleet, enabling robust surveillance over vast oceanic expanses. Its adoption by NATO allies, including the UK , reflects a collective commitment to countering asymmetric threats posed by advanced submarines from potential adversaries (specially Russian). In recent months, the RAF has markedly heightened its operational tempo with the P-8, deploying aircraft for extended missions in contested waters, thereby reinforcing the UK’s maritime security posture and contributing to alliance-wide deterrence efforts but also (in the RAf’s case) if nine aircraft was enough. Historical Origins and Initial Requirements

2/25 The genesis of the P-8 Poseidon can be traced to the late 1980s, when the USN identified significant operational constraints in its ageing Lockheed P-3 Orion fleet. Issues such as airframe fatigue, escalating maintenance demands, and diminished range and endurance necessitated a successor capable of sustaining prolonged missions in increasingly contested maritime environments. This led to the initiation of the Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) programme in 2000, which aimed to procure a platform excelling in ASW, anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), all whilst achieving substantial reductions in lifecycle costs through innovative design and manufacturing efficiencies.
Prospective designs included Lockheed Martin’s Orion 21, an evolutionary upgrade of the P-3; Boeing’s innovative proposal predicated on the commercial Boeing 737-800ERX airliner; and briefly, BAE Systems’ Nimrod MRA4, which withdrew from contention in 2002 due to the absence of a viable American industrial partner (sound familiar?)
Boeing’s selection on 14 May 2004, underpinned by a $3.89 billion system development and demonstration contract for at least 108 airframes, was predicated on the platform’s modularity, leveraging mature commercial technologies to expedite development and mitigate risks. This decision not only addressed the USN’s immediate needs but also laid the groundwork for international variants, including those adopted by the RAF to bridge a decade-long gap in long-range maritime patrol capabilities following the contentious cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.

The UK SPEAR Weapons Programme: From Conception to Contemporary Challenges

As always views are my own and facts can be corrected.

Introduction

1/25 The Selective Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) programme represents the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s efforts to modernise out air-launched munitions, ensuring the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy (RN) can deliver precise, standoff strikes in an increasingly contested battlespace. Initiated in the early 2000s, SPEAR emerged as a response to evolving threats and operational lessons from conflicts such as the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, where the limitations of existing weapons in engaging time-sensitive targets became evident. The programme is structured around incremental capabilities, each addressing specific requirements for precision, range, and adaptability. Managed under the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Complex Weapons Portfolio, SPEAR collaborates with industry primes like MBDA and BAE Systems (BAES), aiming to provide scalable effects from low-collateral damage to high-impact strikes. 2/25 This thread tries to examine the SPEAR programme from its conceptual origins through development and production phases. It details each capability increment—SPEAR 1, 2, 3, and beyond—assessing their conception, requirements, successes, and lessons learned. Particular attention is given to SPEAR 3’s ongoing challenges, including integration issues with the UK’s F-35B Lightning II aircraft, programme slips, and financial implications. The discussion extends to the removal of Brimstone from the AH-64E Apache requirement, the programme’s impact on Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP), multinational complexities in future increments, and the roles of key stakeholders. Finally, it evaluates value for money and concludes with a balanced appraisal, emphasising SPEAR 3’s critical role in preventing the F-35B from becoming an underutilised asset.

Introduction to the UK’s Immigration Protest Crisis

Every now and again I like to focus on different parts of Defence and National Security. Views are my own, I’ve tried to stay apolitical.

1/25 The United Kingdom is grappling with a wave of protests centered on immigration, particularly the Home Office’s use of hotels to house asylum seekers. Demonstrations in Epping, Canary Wharf, and other regions have exposed deep community divisions, fueled by specific incidents and broader policy frustrations.

The recent announcement of “online monitoring units” to track social media has intensified concerns about free speech, further complicating an already volatile situation. This thread tries to examine the protests, their management, the role of agitators, and the risks of escalation if unaddressed. The Epping Protests – A Catalyst for Unrest

2/25 In July 2025, protests erupted outside the Bell Hotel in Epping, Essex, which has housed single male asylum seekers for years. The spark was the arrest of HGK , a 38-year-old Ethiopian asylum seeker, charged with sexual assault after allegedly attempting to kiss a 14-year-old girl. This incident inflamed local tensions, leading to demonstrations that escalated into violence, with significant implications for community cohesion and public safety.

The Ajax Ares Platform: A Comprehensive Analysis of British Army Modernisation, Peer Comparison, Procurement Challenges, and Strategic Missteps

This is a long read (a shorter version will also be published). Views as always my own and facts or statements can be challenged. Source references are available on request. All sources are open. (I have background in this subject, I drafted some of the questions for the Defence Select Committee during their inquiry into AJAX.

For more in-depth information on this, FRES and other land systems check out @thinkdefence and for Army strategic direction and organisation check out @nicholadrummond

Forward

1/20 The Ajax Ares platform, a key component of the British Army’s Ajax family of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), is designed to provide protected mobility and overwatch, replacing the ageing Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) (CVR(T)) Spartan. Developed under the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) programme, the Ajax family has faced significant delays, technical issues, and controversies, collectively termed the “Ajax scandal.” This essay provides an in-depth examination of the Ajax programme’s original requirements, its historical context, and the technical specifications of the Ares variant, including its power plant, transmission, armour, C2 systems (with a focus on the delayed ZODIAC system’s role in intelligence dissemination), and limited weapon systems. It incorporates a recent statement by Defence Procurement Minister (Min DP) Maria Eagle, confirming Ares’ expanded role in infantry formations alongside Boxer, assessing its suitability, number of dismounts, and whether this reflects original requirements or poor strategic planning. The essay compares Ares with peer platforms—the Swedish CV90 and American M2 Bradley—to highlight its capabilities and shortcomings. It explores the MoD’s challenges, including noise and vibration issues, Parliamentary scrutiny, and the cancellation of the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP). It critiques the platform-for-platform approach, contrasts it with the Royal Navy’s Crowsnest programme, and evaluates the implications of emerging threats like First-Person View (FPV) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Finally, it assesses the MoD’s damaged credibility and its impact on securing Treasury funding, arguing that systemic procurement failures threaten the British Army’s readiness. Table of Contents

2/20

1. Introduction

2. Historical Context: The Road to Ajax 2.1 Early Requirements and Predecessor Programmes 2.2 The Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) Programme

3. The Ajax Family: Overview and Variants 3.1 Ajax: The Reconnaissance Variant 3.2 Ares: Protected Mobility and Overwatch 3.3 Other Variants: Athena, Argus, Apollo, and Atlas

4. The Ares Platform: Technical Specifications 4.1 Power Plant and Transmission System 4.2 Armour and Protection 4.3 Command and Control (C2) and the ZODIAC System’s Role in Intelligence Dissemination 4.4 Weapon Systems and Limitations

5. Maria Eagle’s Statement and Ares’ Expanded Role 5.1 Ares in Infantry Formations: Statement and Context 5.2 Suitability for the Infantry Role 5.3 Number of Dismounts and Replacement of CVR(T) Spartan 5.4 Original Requirement or Poor Strategic Planning?

6. Comparison with Peer Platforms: CV90 and M2 Bradley 6.1 CV90: Design and Capabilities 6.2 M2 Bradley: Design and Capabilities 6.3 Comparative Analysis: Ares, CV90, and M2 Bradley

7. The Ajax Scandal: Challenges and Controversies 7.1 Noise and Vibration Issues 7.2 Parliamentary Defence Committee Scrutiny 7.3 The Sheldon Review and Lessons Learned

8. The Platform-for-Platform Approach 8.1 Comparison with the Royal Navy’s Crowsnest Programme 8.2 Implications for Capability Development

9. The Warrior IFV: Background, Upgrades, and Cancellation 9.1 Warrior’s Role and Legacy 9.2 The Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP) 9.3 The Recce Variant and Strategic Missteps

10. Emerging Threats: FPV UAVs and Ares’ Vulnerabilities 10.1 The Rise of FPV UAVs and Loitering Munitions 10.2 Ares’ Vulnerabilities and Required Upgrades

11. The MoD’s Procurement Challenges and Treasury Relations 11.1 Systemic Issues in UK Defence Procurement 11.2 Impact on MoD and Army Credibility 11.3 Financial Implications and Treasury Scepticism

12. Conclusion

Introduction to the CAPTOR Radar

1/25 The CAPTOR radar is the beating heart of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s sensor suite, enabling its air superiority and multi-role capabilities. Developed through a multinational effort, it has evolved from a Cold War-era concept to a cutting-edge system. This thread traces its journey from requirement to operational use, its technology, variants, and relevance today, with a focus on the UK’s investment in the ECRS Mk2. As always views are my own and posts can be corrected if errors are found. This is third in series of UK airborne radars (Blue Fox/Vixen, Fox Hunter and now CAPTOR). Larger radars will be covered soon (Search Water etc). Origins of the CAPTOR Radar

2/25 The CAPTOR, originally the ECR-90, was born in the 1980s under the Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) programme, aimed at countering Soviet aircraft like the MiG-29. Led by the EuroRadar consortium (UK, Germany, Italy, Spain), it built on the Ferranti Blue Vixen radar from the Sea Harrier FA2, leveraging pulse Doppler technology for superior target detection in cluttered environments.

Introduction to MoD Information Security

Further update - part 3

I’m not a lawyer but I do have some knowledge of information security.

1/25 The Ministry of Defence (MoD) operates in a high-stakes environment where safeguarding sensitive information is critical to national security and public trust. This thread explores the MoD’s information security processes, their alignment with UK laws and standards, and the fallout from the 2022 Afghan data breach, revealed after a superinjunction was lifted on 15 July 2025. Here is how the MoD manages data and where (I believe) it went wrong.

Views my own. The MoD’s Information Security Framework

2/25 The MoD’s information security is governed by the Government Security Classifications Policy (GSCP), which uses three tiers: OFFICIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. Each tier has specific security controls to protect data based on its sensitivity and potential impact if compromised. This ensures proportionate safeguards for everything from routine admin to critical intelligence.

BLUF – A Two-Division Model for the British Army

1/25 The British Army should restructure into two divisions—one tracked, one wheeled—each with three brigades of three all-arms battle groups, to meet Strategic Defence Review (SDR) requirements. This suggestion aims to spark debate on sustaining NATO commitments in the High North and Baltics while enabling operations in the Middle East and Africa. The Heavy Division would sustain armoured battle groups, with brigades and divisions as resource providers, supported by modern equipment like Challenger 3 and Boxer. Cultural and structural challenges, including resistance to change and logistical constraints, must be addressed. A phased timeline from 2025 to 2032 aligns with equipment deliveries. Without significant reform, the Army risks irrelevance in a volatile strategic environment.

This thread has been put together following discussions with @thinkdefence and @MrSnaplegs last year (TD followed with a long read).

@nicholadrummond @509298 @BO3673 @PhilipIngMBE @BenWallace70 thoughts welcome on this Why Restructure the British Army?

2/25 The British Army faces evolving threats that demand a modern, agile force to remain relevant. The SDR, published in spring 2025, prioritises NATO deterrence and global deployability. A two-division model—one Heavy (tracked) for high-intensity conflict and one Expeditionary (wheeled) for rapid deployment—offers a solution. By focusing on all-arms battle groups, the Army can deploy flexible units while sustaining commitments. Reform is critical to avoid obsolescence amidst budget and personnel constraints.

CSG25 and Fleet Air Defence in CEPP

1/25 The UK’s Carrier Strike Group 2025 (CSG25), led by HMS Prince of Wales, embodies Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP). This thread clarifies fleet air defence as a core CEPP KUR, countering doubts, and covers CSG25 assets, RN limitations, and challenges like no AAR or MADL. CEPP Overview

2/25 CEPP enables global power projection via CSG25, integrating naval, air, and land forces for combat, deterrence, and aid missions. Fleet air defence is a KUR, protecting the carrier to ensure CSG25’s effectiveness in contested Indo-Pacific regions, despite claims it is not central to CEPP.

Introduction to the NMH Programme

1/25 The UK’s New Medium Helicopter (NMH) programme, launched in 2021, aims to replace aging rotary-wing platforms but is mired in financial necessity and poor decisions by the MoD, DG Helicopters, and DE&S. The Puma HC2’s withdrawal has left a capability gap, with RAF Benson now without aircraft. Historical Context

2/25 Announced in the 2021 Defence Command Paper, NMH sought to replace four platforms: RAF Puma HC2, AAC Bell 212, RAF Bell 412 Griffin, and AAC AS365 Dauphin. Aging airframes and high maintenance costs drove the need, but financial constraints, not user needs, shaped the programme’s scope.

The UK’s F-35A and F-35B Procurement: Strategic Shifts and Challenges

1/25 The UK’s recent decision to purchase 12 F-35A jets alongside its F-35B fleet marks a significant shift in defence policy. This thread explores the rationale, sacrifices, and challenges, focusing on the nuclear role, NATO, and impacts on Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP).
It follows my F-35B post from yesterday - talk about “timing” 😎 Rationale for F-35B

2/25 The F-35B was chosen in the 1998 SDR for its STOVL capability, essential for HMS Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales. This prioritised CEPP to project power globally, especially in the Indo-Pacific and reflected the expeditionary outlook of the UK at that time. F-35B was a fudge as it was neither the RAF or RN’s choice of F-35 (politics and industrial lobbying).

UK’s F-35B Ambitions (updated)

1/25 The UK’s adoption of the F-35B Lightning II aims to deliver cutting-edge, fifth-generation capabilities for the RAF and RN. However, integrating this platform faces challenges in weapon systems, logistics, operational concepts, and sovereignty, raising questions about value for money and strategic fit. Weapon System Integration Issues

2/25 Integrating UK-specific weapons like Meteor and SPEAR 3 is delayed to the 2030s due to F-35 Block 4 upgrade and other issues. The F-35B’s current fit, limited to Paveway IV and AAMs, restricts its versatility, especially for SEAD/DEAD missions critical in modern conflicts like Israel-Iran.