The Decline of the Royal Navy – 1998 to May 2026

Views my own, corrections and comments welcome

Draft in haste - I’m at New Statesman event, listening to the great and the good talk “defence”

For those attending - I was the guy in the corner typing away 🕵️‍♂️

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The Royal Navy enters 2026 as a shadow of its former self. Once a global force with dozens of escorts, it now struggles with historic lows in hull numbers and availability. The discreet withdrawal of HMS Iron Duke – a Type 23 frigate that received over £100m in refit spending – leaves just five available frigates. This is not an isolated incident but the result of decades of mismanagement. This thread tries to give some context. Historical Context: The Long Retreat

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The decline accelerated with the 1998 Strategic Defence Review under Tony Blair’s government. The post-Cold War “peace dividend” saw the escort fleet shrink from around 35 vessels in the early 1990s. Subsequent SDSRs in 2010 and 2015 imposed further cuts, including premature retirement of Type 22 and Type 42 ships and capping Type 45 destroyers at six instead of twelve. No new frigates were ordered for over two decades, creating a procurement “valley of death”.

Deception Gambits: Analysing Political Deflection in the Mandelson DV Scandal

Views my own, corrections and comments welcome. For those who read my threads you’ll know I like to pull out the gambits.

1/25 This thread attempts to demonstrate a detailed examination of the “Deception Gambits” framework – a structured taxonomy of psychological and strategic techniques drawn from cognitive psychology, influence research and strategic communication.

Organised into six categories (Attention, Perception, Sensemaking, Expectations, Emotion and Behaviour), each containing five specific gambits, the model reveals how information can be shaped, obscured or redirected. I am applying it directly to the current controversy surrounding Lord Peter Mandelson’s appointment as the British Ambassador to the United States and the Developed Vetting (DV) failure that has engulfed No 10 and current Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer. The Deception Gambits Framework – An Overview

2/25 The framework treats deception not as crude lying but as a sophisticated orchestration of human cognition and behaviour. It draws on decades of research into how the mind processes information under pressure. Each gambit operates independently or in concert, allowing communicators to manage scrutiny without overt falsehoods.

In high-stakes political environments such as the Mandelson affair, these tactics appear with striking coherence, turning potential accountability into managed narrative control. This thread will attempt to examine each category in depth before turning to their observable application (I may have a background in this subject).

The United Kingdom’s Defence Dilemma: Rhetoric versus Reality

Views my own, comments and corrections welcome.

1/25 The UK wants to punch above its weight on the world stage – carrier strike groups, AUKUS, NATO leadership – yet its armed forces are hollowed out by uncertain funding, no published Defence Investment Plan, persistent Treasury resistance, and ministers who prioritise welfare, Net Zero and European integration. Today (14th April 2026) the picture is stark. This thread attempts to describe it, service by service, using the latest fleet data (@TBrit90 @ArmchairAdml ) and various public statements. 2/25 At the heart of the problem is money. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review promised a pathway to 3 % of GDP by 2035, yet the ten-year Defence Investment Plan is still missing seven months later. Industry is “bleeding cash”. Parliamentary committees have been promised publication dates that never arrive.

Rumours of in-year cuts swirl.
The Treasury’s reluctance is not new, but it is now sharpened by open ministerial choices.

The Ajax Armoured Vehicle Scandal: Accepted Deficiencies, Blame-Shifting, and Why the MoD Still Won’t Let Go

Views my own, corrections and comments welcome

AJAX Update

1/25 The Ajax armoured fighting vehicle was meant to transform the British Army’s reconnaissance capability. Instead, it has delivered delays, billions in costs, and documented harm to soldiers.
These problems are not speculation (as some still try and state) they have been officially accepted by the UK Government, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the British Army itself. Yet elements within General Dynamics, DE&S, and the Army continue to push the vehicle forward. Even after Luke Pollard withdrew Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in January 2026, support contracts remain live. This 25-post thread attempts to lay out the facts, using all publicly available sources I can find.

For the troops who must crew these vehicles (the user) and for the British taxpayer, the truth matters (or it should). Background: What Ajax Was Supposed to Deliver

2/25 Awarded in 2010 to General Dynamics Land Systems UK (GDLS-UK) under a £5.5 billion firm-price contract, Ajax was to provide 589 vehicles in six variants. It promised a modern, digitised, medium-weight platform to replace the ageing CVR(T) fleet — complete with a 40 mm cannon, advanced sensors, and networked warfare capability. The British Army was told it would be world-leading. Fifteen years later, the programme is a textbook case of procurement failure. But the most serious issue is not delay or cost — it is the harm caused to soldiers. And that harm has been formally acknowledged at the highest levels.

The Challenges Facing the UK Government in Implementing the Strategic Defence Review and Defence Industrial Plan

Comments and corrections welcome, views my own.

1/25 The United Kingdom’s defence policy has long been characterised by a tension between ambitious strategic goals and the practical constraints of funding and implementation. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2025, published in June of that year, represented a significant attempt to address emerging threats in an era of heightened geopolitical instability. Led externally by Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, General Sir Richard Barrons, and Dr Fiona Hill, the SDR outlined 62 recommendations, all of which were accepted by the government, aiming to enhance warfighting readiness and position the UK as a leading NATO contributor. Complementing this was the anticipated Defence Industrial Plan (DIP), intended to translate these strategic ambitions into concrete procurement and investment frameworks. However, as of this month (February 2026), the UK government continues to grapple with substantial challenges in realising these initiatives. These include funding shortfalls, internal military discord, delays in policy execution, and broader political repercussions. This thread attempts to examine these issues, drawing on recent analyses and events—including insights from the Munich Security Conference 2026 and Tim Shipman’s latest article in @spectator —to highlight the political fallout from the SDR, the persistent funding gaps, inter-service rivalries, the ongoing DIP delays, and the enduring gap between ambition and reality in UK defence policy. Ultimately, I try and argue that these challenges not only undermine domestic credibility but also strain alliances with Europe and the United States. Background on the SDR

2/25 The SDR emerged amid a backdrop of escalating global threats, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and tensions in the Indo-Pacific. It called for a “new era for UK Defence,” emphasising urgent modernisation, increased spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, and an ambition for 3% thereafter, subject to economic conditions.

gov.uk/government/pub…

The Troubled Odyssey of the GDLS AJAX Programme: A Chronicle of Procurement Failures

Views my own, corrections welcome.

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In the annals of British defence procurement, few sagas rival the protracted and scandal-ridden journey of the AJAX armoured vehicle programme (but E-7 seems to be giving it a good run for its money). Conceived as a cornerstone of the British Army’s modernisation efforts, AJAX promised to deliver a family of cutting-edge platforms capable of revolutionising reconnaissance and combat operations in an era of networked warfare. Rooted in the late 1990s’ Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) initiative, it evolved into a £5.5 billion contract awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems UK (GDLS-UK) in 2010 for 589 vehicles across six variants: the reconnaissance-focused AJAX, the ARES personnel carrier, the ATHENA command vehicle, the ARGUS engineer reconnaissance variant, the ATLAS recovery vehicle, and the APOLLO repair platform.
These vehicles were envisioned as digitally integrated marvels, boasting superior mobility, sensor fusion, and data-sharing capabilities to align with the Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine. Yet, what began as a beacon of innovation has devolved into a quagmire of missed milestones, manufacturing blunders, health and safety catastrophes, and institutional intransigence. Drawing on exhaustive reports like the Sheldon Review (2023), the Ajax Noise and Vibration Review (2021), parliamentary evidence sessions, whistleblower testimonies, and the latest update from Defence Secretary Luke Pollard on the 22nd January 2026, this thread attempts to unravel the programme’s timeline. It exposes how commercial pressures from GDLS-UK and the Army’s unyielding push for capability have consistently trumped the welfare of service personnel. Special emphasis is placed on the pivotal role of the Institute of Naval Medicine (INM) report, which laid bare the severe noise and vibration risks, with direct quotes (just to remind everyone) underscoring the gravity of these failures. As I go deeper into this narrative, the evidence paints a damning picture of systemic failures that have allowed AJAX to limp forward, at great human and financial cost. Origins and Contract Award: Seeds of Controversy (Late 1990s–2010)

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The AJAX story traces its roots to the post-Cold War era, when the British Army sought to replace its ageing Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) fleet with something more agile and technologically advanced. Initiatives like the Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) and FRES laid the groundwork, but by 2010, the MoD opted for GDLS-UK’s ASCOD-based design over rivals such as BAE Systems’ CV90. This choice was not without debate: critics argued that selecting an unproven adaptation of the ASCOD—primarily to diversify suppliers and avoid a BAE monopoly—introduced unnecessary risks. The contract emphasised assembly in Merthyr Tydfil, Wales, touting economic benefits like job creation, but it also locked in a firm-priced structure where GDLS-UK shouldered cost overruns, potentially incentivising shortcuts.

Initial projections were optimistic: an in-service date around 2017, with vehicles enhancing NATO interoperability and addressing capability gaps exposed in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the bespoke modifications—over 1,200 unique requirements—transformed ASCOD into a complex, heavy, custom beast, setting the stage for future woes.

Introduction to the Challenger 3 Challenges

Views my own, corrections and comments welcome - it’s about the debate.

1/25 The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has long prided itself on maintaining a capable armoured force, with the Challenger series of main battle tanks (MBTs) serving as the backbone of its heavy armour since the 1980s. The transition from the Challenger 2 to the Challenger 3 represents a critical upgrade programme aimed at extending the life of these vehicles into the 2040s. However, this endeavour has been beset by a myriad of challenges, ranging from technical hurdles such as weight management and turret integration to logistical issues like component shortages and the reactivation of stored vehicles. These problems are not isolated; they reflect broader systemic difficulties within the British Army’s armoured vehicle procurement, as evidenced by the troubled Ajax programme. In this thread, I’ll attempt to examine these challenges in detail, drawing on official reports, defence analyses, and comparative insights from other nations such as Germany and Poland. I’ll argue that while the decision to upgrade existing Challenger 2 hulls rather than procure new platforms may have seemed cost-effective, it risks leaving the UK with an outdated and insufficiently modernised fleet, potentially compromising its strategic posture in an era of renewed great-power competition.
By comparing the UK’s approach to those of its NATO allies, this analysis highlights why the upgrade path may have been a suboptimal choice, perpetuating vulnerabilities in an increasingly contested global security environment. Background on the Challenger 2

2/25 The Challenger 2, introduced in 1998, has been a stalwart of the British Army, renowned for its robust Dorchester armour and combat-proven reliability, including in operations in Iraq. By the 2010s, obsolescence concerns prompted the MoD to initiate the Life Extension Programme, which evolved into the Challenger 3 upgrade.

The Challenges Facing the British Army: Strategic Drift, Procurement Failures, and Operational Shortcomings in the Post-Afghanistan Era

Views and thoughts my one, corrections and comments welcome.

1/25 A Christmas Day thread on the British Army’s struggles over the past 15 years. From identity crisis post-Afghanistan to procurement woes like AJAX and Challenger 3. Critical, factual analysis with NATO comparisons. Introduction

2/25 The British Army, once a cornerstone of global military power, has grappled with profound challenges over the past 15 years, particularly since the final withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. This period marks a transition from prolonged counter-insurgency operations to an era of strategic uncertainty, exacerbated by geopolitical shifts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.

Canada’s Fighter Jet Crisis: Why Replacing the CF-18 Is So Much More Than Buying Planes

Views my own, comments and corrections welcome.

1/25 The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is flying 40-year-old CF-18 Hornets on borrowed time. Structural cracks, obsolete avionics, and readiness rates hovering below 50 % mean the clock is ticking louder than ever. The Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) — meant to deliver 88 new jets — has become one of the most politically charged, industrially complex, and strategically fraught procurements in Canadian history. This thread attempts to explain why, from post-war history to the November 2025 standoff with the United States. Post-War RCAF: From Empire Air Training to Cold War Interceptor

2/25 1945–1960: Canada demobilised from a 215,000-strong wartime air force to a small peacetime RCAF focused on continental defence. First jet: the Canadair-licensed F-86 Sabre (1,200 built in Montreal). Role: high-altitude interception of Soviet Tu-95 Bears over the Arctic. Industry: massive licensed production. Lesson: Canada could be a serious aerospace player when offsets were generous.

The E-7 Wedgetail Programme: A Case Study in Strategic Procurement Failure

Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. References in post 25.

1/25 The Royal Air Force’s (RAF) acquisition of the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail was intended to restore sovereign airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability post-E-3D retirement. Instead, it has become emblematic of systemic deficiencies in Ministry of Defence (MoD) major project delivery. This thread attempts to examine the requirement, procurement strategy, risk management, and international ramifications using official reporting and parliamentary evidence. Original Requirement and Operational Concept

2/25 The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) mandated a successor to the E-3D Sentry capable of persistent, multi-domain surveillance and command and control (C2). The E-7’s Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) provides 360° coverage, simultaneous air/maritime tracking of 2,000 contacts, and range exceeding 370 km. The Initial Gate business case specified five airframes to sustain a continuous two-aircraft orbit with appropriate maintenance float.

The British Army, November 2025: A Force Asked to Do Too Much with Too Little

Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. All information comes from open source.

1/25 Five months after the June Strategic Defence Review promised a “NATO-first” land power capable of deploying a full division to Europe within ten days, the British Army is smaller, lighter, and more fragile than at any time since the Napoleonic Wars. This thread attempts to examine one straightforward question: can the Army actually deliver the tasks the government has set for it, both at home and within NATO? I will try and walk through the commitments, expose the critical gaps in capability, and contrast the polished rhetoric of senior officers and politicians with the harder reality on the ground. National Tasks – What the Government Expects at Home

2/25 The SDR 2025 and its predecessors expect the Army to defend the United Kingdom against hybrid threats such as sabotage, cyber strikes, and disinformation campaigns. It must also be able to mount rapid counter-terrorist operations anywhere in the world and evacuate British citizens from crisis zones, whether in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. All of these missions demand an agile, resilient, and rapidly deployable force. With only (circa) 73,800 regular soldiers—the smallest regular Army since 1714—true agility is in increasingly short supply.

F-35 - The continuing Saga

The F-35 programme remains a focal point of lively debate within the MilTwit community and beyond, eliciting a wide spectrum of perspectives, including my own.

This thread seeks to offer a balanced overview, tracing the aircraft’s brief history and the path that has led to the present (cluster) situation.

Accountability is essential: the challenges reflect a collective cultural shortfall, evident even in the most recent parliamentary correspondence and announcements, which continue to defer costs for short-term fiscal relief while imposing burdens on future generations. Savings in the capital delivery expenditure line (CDEL) will inevitably inflate whole-life costs (WLC), as the UK forgoes revenue from manufacturing and sustaining the F-35A variant, including associated weapons systems. The RAF will doubtless pursue expedient interim measures, such as procuring US-sourced armaments to maintain operational availability (witness the P-8 Poseidon and AH-64E Apache as pertinent precedents), with the United States eager to supply them.

1/25 The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II stands as a cornerstone of modern aerial warfare, embodying the pinnacle of fifth-generation stealth technology with its advanced sensor fusion, network-centric capabilities, and multi-role versatility. For the United Kingdom, the F-35 programme has been both a symbol of technological ambition and a source of enduring controversy. 2/25 Initially envisioned in the late 1990s as a Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) to revive carrier strike capabilities and supplant ageing platforms like the Harrier and Tornado, the UK’s pledge to acquire 138 aircraft all initially the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant has undergone significant evolution amidst fiscal constraints, technological setbacks, and inter-service tensions.

The Troubled Saga of the UK’s New Medium Helicopter Programme

Views my own, corrections and comments welcome.

I have previous threads on this subject.

1/25 The procurement of military equipment by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has often been marked by ambitious goals that exceed both financial and strategic practicality, leading to programmes that escalate in cost, diminish in scope, and fail to provide timely capabilities to frontline users. The New Medium Helicopter (NMH) programme, initiated in 2021, stands as a prime example of this recurring issue. Originally conceived as a comprehensive effort to modernise the British Armed Forces’ rotary-wing fleet with a single versatile platform, it promised greater operational efficiency and flexibility. However, her we are in October and it has narrowed into a beleaguered competition fraught with bidder withdrawals, reduced ambitions, and severe funding challenges. This thread attempts to explore the programme’s flawed origins, its challenging progression as stakeholders and suppliers have exited, and its current status as essentially a sole-source procurement aimed solely at replacing the now-retired Puma HC2 fleet. Drawing on official documents, defence analyses, and recent reports, it contends that NMH illustrates a persistent MoD failure to procure equipment that effectively meets user requirements, transforming a basic tactical lift need into an overly complicated and precarious venture. Ultimately, simpler alternatives—like the US Marine Corps’ (USMC) UH-1Y Venom ‘Huey’—could offer a more cost-effective resolution, yet again exposing institutional shortcomings in defence acquisition. Flawed Conception: Overambition from the Start

2/25 From its launch in the 2021 Defence in a Competitive Age command paper, the NMH programme was envisioned as a mid-2020s investment to procure 36–44 medium-lift helicopters, consolidating up to five legacy types across the Royal Air Force (RAF), British Army, and UK Strategic Command. These included the RAF’s 23 Puma HC2 support helicopters, three Bell 212 utility helicopters in Brunei, three Bell 412 in Cyprus, and six Airbus AS365 Dauphin liaison helicopters for Army special forces. With a budget of £900 million to £1.2 billion over seven years, the contract was to cover aircraft, simulators, training, and sustainment, featuring an open systems architecture for quick mission adaptations. This ‘one-size-fits-most’ strategy sought to promote fleet commonality, lower logistics costs, and support operations in varied environments, from desert bases to high-threat zones.

Introduction to the Westland Lynx

Views my own, facts as always can be corrected.

(Yes I am a fan of the worlds fastest helicopter - more in depth threads to follow)

1/25 The Westland Lynx stands as a testament to British ingenuity in rotary-wing aviation, emerging in the late 20th century as a multi-role helicopter capable of adapting to the demanding environments of both sea and land. Conceived amid Cold War imperatives for agile, shipborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and battlefield reconnaissance assets, the Lynx fulfilled a dual-service requirement for the Royal Navy (RN) and British Army (including the Royal Marines). Over its five-decade service life, it evolved through numerous variants, influencing export designs and paving the way for its successor, the AW159 Wildcat. This thread attempts to trace the Lynx’s journey from conceptual origins to operational deployment, emphasising its technical attributes, service-specific adaptations, combat record, international adoption, and transition to the Wildcat. It further compares the Lynx to American counterparts like the Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk and UH-60 Black Hawk, evaluates its strengths and limitations, and assesses its enduring relevance in an era dominated by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Conceptual Origins – The Anglo-French Agreement

2/25 The Lynx’s development stemmed from a 1968 Anglo-French agreement to produce a family of next-generation military helicopters, addressing the obsolescence of earlier types like the Westland Wasp (naval) and Scout (army). This collaboration aimed to create versatile platforms that could meet diverse operational needs across NATO forces. The agreement reflected the geopolitical tensions of the era, where rapid advancements in submarine technology and armoured warfare necessitated innovative aerial solutions. Westland Helicopters, based in Yeovil, took a leading role, drawing on prior experience with scout and light attack helicopters. The French ALAT (Aviation Légère de l’Armée de Terre) contributed initially, bringing expertise in rotor dynamics, but withdrew in 1969 due to shifting national priorities towards other projects like the Gazelle. This left Britain to forge ahead alone, shaping the Lynx into a uniquely adaptable machine.

Introduction to the Tomahawk Cruise Missile

Views my own, facts can be corrected.

Following President Trump’s hint on TLAM for Ukraine I’ve put this together.

1/25 The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) stands as one of the most enduring and versatile weapons in modern military arsenals. Developed by the United States Navy in the 1970s, it represents a paradigm shift in precision-guided munitions, enabling long-range strikes against land-based targets with remarkable accuracy. This thread tries to trace the TLAM’s evolution from its initial requirements through to concept, development, and deployment across land, sea, and air platforms. It examines its post-deployment advancements, its role within the US military and allied forces—particularly the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy (RN) submarine-launched variant—and its classification as a strategic weapon. Furthermore, it explores future capability roadmaps, including ground-launched options, and considers its potential impact on the Ukraine-Russia conflict, especially in light of comments by President Trump. Finally, it concludes by analysing how such systems reshape battlefields by targeting adversaries’ centres of gravity with precision at extended ranges. Origins: The Genesis of the Tomahawk

2/25 The genesis of the Tomahawk can be traced to the early 1970s, when the US Navy identified a need for a sea-launched cruise missile capable of evading enemy radar while delivering precise strikes. This requirement emerged amid Cold War tensions, where the ability to counter Soviet naval and land threats without risking pilots or ships was paramount. The missile had to be subsonic, fly at low altitudes to hug the terrain, and carry a significant payload over long distances.

Thread Update: The China Spy Scandal - 24-Hour Developments and Government Misdirection Tactics

As always views my own, facts can and should be checked and corrected if wrong.

Drafted whilst travelling so apologies for spelling, grammar and brevity.

1/25 Here is a (hopefully) detailed update on the UK China spy case involving Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry. Over the last 24 hours (13-14 October 2025), fresh revelations have emerged, including ministerial statements in Parliament, accusations of scapegoating career civil servants, and renewed opposition pressure. I’ll try and break it down step by step, highlighting how the government is employing tactics to mislead and misdirect public attention, such as blaming deputies, denying key roles, and potentially leveraging lobby groups to shift narratives onto unrelated issues. This comes amid ongoing efforts to downplay National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell’s membership in the 48 Group Club, a pro-China network accused of grooming UK elites. Remember, these tactics persist despite potential short-term damage to Labour, as the priority seems to be containing the fallout. Recap of the Core Case: From Arrests to Collapse

2/25 To try and set the scene, Cash (former researcher for Alicia Kearns MP) and Berry (Oxford academic with Chinese ties) were arrested in March 2023 and charged in April 2024 under the Official Secrets Act for allegedly passing sensitive info to China’s United Front Work Department, reaching Politburo member Cai Qi. MI5 called the evidence robust. But on 15 September 2025, charges were dropped due to lack of a government statement confirming China as a “threat” post a 2025 court precedent. In the last 24 hours, no new arrests or revivals, but the debate intensified in Commons, with ministers sticking to “procedural failure” lines while opposition calls it a cover-up.

The Imperative of Data Control in the Digital Age: From Raw Inputs to Strategic Intelligence

Introduction (Part 1)

As always views are my own, facts can and should be corrected.

1/25 In an era where data flows as ceaselessly as the digital currents of the internet, the modern world operates on information derived from vast repositories of human activity. From social media interactions to financial transactions, data underpins economies, governments, and societies. Yet, the true power lies not in the accumulation of data itself, but in its control—specifically, the mastery over structured and unstructured forms. This thread explores the utilisation of data in contemporary contexts, delineating the distinctions between structured and unstructured data, and elucidating why artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) rely on these sources to convert raw data into actionable information and intelligence. Introduction (Part 2)

2/25 It further examines the strategic importance of data hosting, processing, and ownership, including the economic incentives driving corporate investments. Drawing on recent developments involving Oracle, Palantir, and BlackRock’s ties to the World Economic Forum (WEF), the discussion attempt’s to highlight sovereignty challenges and the risks posed by third-party dependencies under frameworks like the U.S. Patriot Act and FISA Section 702. In particular, it scrutinises deals in the UK and Western Europe that ostensibly safeguard data while potentially undermining autonomy, including the newly announced mandatory digital ID schemes.

Very Low Frequency Radio: Enabling Submerged Submarine Communication in the Modern Era

Views my own, facts can be corrected.

Sunday Essay

Posted because TACAMO (E-6B) has been reported operating in the North Atlantic

1/25 Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio constitutes a pivotal technology in military communications, particularly for maintaining contact with submerged submarines without compromising their stealth. This thread attempts to examine the principles of VLF, its operational mechanisms, and its strategic importance for select nations. It addresses the technical specifications, including antenna dimensions, power requirements, and data transmission capacities, alongside implementations by the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States. Further, it discusses global utilisation, interception by amateur radio operators, transmission metrics, and resilience in nuclear scenarios, concluding with an overview of the technology’s challenges and robustness. Defining Very Low Frequency Radio

2/25 Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio waves occupy the electromagnetic spectrum between 3 and 30 kilohertz (kHz). In contrast to higher-frequency signals, which are rapidly attenuated in seawater, VLF waves can penetrate to depths of approximately 40 metres. This property enables the transmission of essential directives to submarines, such as those carrying ballistic missiles (SSBNs), allowing them to remain submerged and undetected during extended patrols.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Status and UK Implications

Part of my wider series on F-35. As always, views my own - facts can and should be corrected if wrong.

This follows the GAO report.

1/25 The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter remains a critical asset in modern military aviation, blending stealth, advanced sensors, and networked systems to bolster combat prowess for the United States and its allies. As outlined in the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report just released (and getting lots of attention), the programme has delivered over 1,100 aircraft since production commenced in 2006. However, it continues to face substantial cost overruns and schedule delays. Total acquisition costs now surpass $485 billion, an $89.5 billion rise from the 2012 baseline, primarily due to modernisation efforts. Sustainment costs over the aircraft’s 77-year lifecycle are projected at $1.58 trillion, pushing the overall expense beyond $2 trillion.

For us (United Kingdom), a key (tier 1) partner contributing to development, production, and sustainment, these issues manifest as operational shortfalls and strategic risks. This thread tries to explore the F-35’s status, emphasising UK effects, drawing on the GAO report and other recent developments. Programme Challenges: Cost Escalations and Delays

2/25 The GAO highlights modernisation as the chief culprit for inefficiencies. The Block 4 effort, a $16.5 billion initiative to enhance hardware and software for capabilities like new weapons and radar improvements, is over $6 billion above original estimates and at least five years delayed, with completion now eyed beyond 2031.
The programme is trimming Block 4 scope to prioritise deliverable elements by 2031.
A critical enabler, Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3)—a $1.9 billion hardware-software suite—has been a major bottleneck, but recent updates indicate completion of software upgrades in June 2025, rendering aircraft combat-capable. Despite this, TR-3 delays contributed to 72 aircraft deliveries in 2025 facing holdbacks.
Production woes persist: Contractors Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney delivered all 110 aircraft and engines late in 2024, averaging 238 days behind schedule.

Introduction to the AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor

Following the recent Red Sea “interception” of a P-8 and my thread on the system (the airframe is just the platform that gets the sensor where it needs to be) I thought it would be useful to describe what the “sensor” was clipped to the fuselage.

As always, views my own and facts can be corrected. @Raytheon_UK

1/25 The AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS) is a state-of-the-art multifunction radar developed by Raytheon (now RTX Corporation) for the United States Navy’s P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Designed for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T), the AAS represents a significant advancement in airborne radar technology. This thread attempts to follow its development from conceptualisation to operational deployment, elucidates its functionality, and examines its integration with the P-8A.
Furthermore, it explores opportunities for the United Kingdom and NATO allies—Canada, Norway, and Germany—to enhance their P-8 fleets, addressing capability gaps such as those left by the we retired Sentinel R1 and soon the Shadow R1, and concludes by highlighting its role as a force multiplier. Conceptual Origins of the AAS

2/25 The AAS was conceived in the late 2000s to counter evolving threats in littoral and maritime environments, where traditional radars struggled to detect low radar cross-section (RCS) targets, such as stealthy vessels, low-flying drones, or submerged submarines. Building on the classified AN/APS-149 Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS), deployed on select P-3C Orion aircraft, the AAS aimed to enhance multi-function capabilities like moving target indication (MTI) and high-resolution mapping, adapting them for modern asymmetric warfare.

The Boeing P-8 Poseidon: An Essential Pillar of Contemporary Maritime Patrol and Anti-Submarine Warfare

1/25 In this quickly put together long thread, I shall attempt examine the Boeing P-8 Poseidon. The thread will attempt traverse its developmental trajectory from initial requirements to full operational service, with a particular emphasis on its integration and utilisation within the Royal Air Force (RAF).
Given the resurgence of underwater threats in the North Atlantic, the RAF’s (and others) recent and ongoing deployment of the P-8 underscores its strategic relevance. This thread is tailored for a predominantly British audience, highlighting RAF-specific applications, whilst attempting to remain relevant for other readers. It will follow my standard format and address the aircraft’s concept of operations, its synergies with complementary assets, the geopolitical significance of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, specifically including recent multinational activities—and detailed analyses of its sensors, armaments, configurations, and comparisons to predecessors and contemporaries. It will explore the RAF’s infrastructure adaptations, procurement decisions, and the platform’s pivotal role in supporting the United Kingdom’s Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD).

As always, all views my own and facts can be challenged. This has been written (at pace) to give some context to the recent events other contributors (@TBrit90 @NavyLookout @pegge49 @auonsson)

For additional context I have worked on the RAF P-8 (not as an aviator) Nimrod MR2 and Nimrod MRA4 (the world’s best ASW long range fixed wing aircraft).

Apologies for grammar and any repetition.

The Boeing P-8 Poseidon demonstrates an uplift in maritime patrol capabilities, evolving from the United States Navy’s (USN) need to modernise its fleet in the face of evolving submarine technologies. For the RAF, the P-8 has restored a critical capability absent since the retirement of the Nimrod fleet, enabling robust surveillance over vast oceanic expanses. Its adoption by NATO allies, including the UK , reflects a collective commitment to countering asymmetric threats posed by advanced submarines from potential adversaries (specially Russian). In recent months, the RAF has markedly heightened its operational tempo with the P-8, deploying aircraft for extended missions in contested waters, thereby reinforcing the UK’s maritime security posture and contributing to alliance-wide deterrence efforts but also (in the RAf’s case) if nine aircraft was enough. Historical Origins and Initial Requirements

2/25 The genesis of the P-8 Poseidon can be traced to the late 1980s, when the USN identified significant operational constraints in its ageing Lockheed P-3 Orion fleet. Issues such as airframe fatigue, escalating maintenance demands, and diminished range and endurance necessitated a successor capable of sustaining prolonged missions in increasingly contested maritime environments. This led to the initiation of the Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) programme in 2000, which aimed to procure a platform excelling in ASW, anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), all whilst achieving substantial reductions in lifecycle costs through innovative design and manufacturing efficiencies.
Prospective designs included Lockheed Martin’s Orion 21, an evolutionary upgrade of the P-3; Boeing’s innovative proposal predicated on the commercial Boeing 737-800ERX airliner; and briefly, BAE Systems’ Nimrod MRA4, which withdrew from contention in 2002 due to the absence of a viable American industrial partner (sound familiar?)
Boeing’s selection on 14 May 2004, underpinned by a $3.89 billion system development and demonstration contract for at least 108 airframes, was predicated on the platform’s modularity, leveraging mature commercial technologies to expedite development and mitigate risks. This decision not only addressed the USN’s immediate needs but also laid the groundwork for international variants, including those adopted by the RAF to bridge a decade-long gap in long-range maritime patrol capabilities following the contentious cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.