Thread by @sfrantzman

I'm fascinated and saddened every time I see a news story about Hamas in Gaza, such as the recent statements about EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas speaking with her Israelis counterpart and discussing Hamas in Gaza. It always shocks me that after 655 days of war that Hamas continues to control part of Gaza and negotiate to return to control most of it. The existence of Hamas in Gaza shouldn't even be a discussion today. It shouldn't be there. But it is. It is unclear if Hamas will be removed from Gaza. If it is to be removed there doesn't appear to be a clear roadmap for doing so. This lack of a process is part of the wider series of missteps and challenges that plagued the war for 21 months.

It's fascinating that despite murdering more than 1,000 people on October 7 and kidnapping 250; that decisions were made in the early months of the war that would result in keeping Hamas in power. Instead of being laser focused on removing Hamas, so Israelis wouldn't be kidnapped again, so they wouldn't be massacred again; the war was treated as another round in Gaza, another 2006, 2009, 2014. In fact, the plans for the offensive in Gaza were almost identical to past raids. The concept: Go into part of Gaza city or Khan Younis, uproot some tunnels; and then leave. Go into the Philadelphi corridor, clear it out and then negotiate over leaving it.

One of the early examples of a decision that was obviously made to result in Hamas staying in power, was the decision to move civilians in Gaza to be under Hamas rule. The IDF or other officials made decisions early on that under no circumstances would Israel deal with the civilians, and under no circumstances would an alternate authority be created to administer their lives in a non-Hamas zone. As such the result was to move 2 million people to remain under Hamas rule.

A third decision was that there would be no "day after" plan. Various excuses were invented, claiming "you can't plan the day after until Hamas is defeated." Essentially this set up a catch-22, since Hamas would never be removed or defeated, then there wouldn't ever be a plan. There was no clear vision or strategy.

A fourth decision that meant the de-facto inertia of Hamas would remain was the decision that the Palestinian Authority would not rule Gaza. The argument was that the "PA is the same as Hamas" or "even worse"...even though the PA has never kidnapped Israelis, and never massacred 1,000 people in a day; even though Israelis are never held in Ramallah; the view was that the PA is a greater existential threat to Israel than Hamas, because it is a state in the making; whereas the Hamas threat is seen as less bad because it murders and kidnaps; but is apparently not an existential "state" threat. This is kind of the brutal concept that the governments of Mexico probably took to cartels; cartels murder huge numbers of people, but as long as they remain in a few periphery states; it's not an existential threat. Of course, there are governments like in El Salvador where they decided that they wouldn't live like this. One can live without Hamas; but it takes a decision.

A fifth reason that Hamas remained in Gaza is the decision to use "raids" against Hamas in Gaza, sending in infantry and armored units to clear parts of Gaza, and then leaving; and then returning. This tactic was developed by the same commanders who had been in charge on October 7. It is a bit strange that they were left in charge to also come up with a war tactic that didn't work either. It would be like taking the failed officers at the time of Louisiana Maneuvers and putting them in charge of D-Day or something. The big difference is that 1,000 Americans weren't killed in the Maneuvers...and nevertheless Marshall sat there with his black book recording the good and bad at the time; probably saving huge numbers of American lives in the war by appointing men of action warontherocks.com/2021/03/simula…

A sixth reason for Hamas remaining was the bizarre decision to oversell success with rosy statements from the very beginning of the war. I remember being told basically on Oct. 7 that Sinwar was a "dead man walking" when in fact he would survive for a year and when he was killed it was basically by mistake. Within two months there were already rosy assessments about Hamas being defeated in northern Gaza (it wasn't, it hasn't even been defeated today in northern Gaza)...and by March 2024 the public was being sold stories about Hamas being defeated in all of Gaza. This was the same rosy story of the May 2021 war when Israel was told that the "metro" was dismantled (it wasn't).

Case in point:
Hamas ‘dismantled’ but not destroyed, IDF says, as Gaza war enters new phase: washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/…

The rosy assessments deserve to be interrogated. Why was the public told "IDF in Gaza: Israel breaks through 10 out of 24 Hamas battalions." This never happened. These battalions had to be defeated several more times. The IDF is still killing battalion commanders and deputy commanders in Daraj Tuffah, Jabaliya and Beit Hanoun. Gaza city has never been fully taken by the IDF, after 655 days. This reminds us of Westmoreland and the Vietnam-era stories of body counts and various successful raids. One would think that the lessons might be learned.
jpost.com/israel-news/de…

I retrospect the whole of 2024 may reflect a failed fighting "season" like one of those failed campaigns of the Peloponessian war...except the stakes were a bit different then and not that many people died usually when the Spartans and Athenians failed to come to grips during the campaign season. Basically, the suffering usually wasn't that much because the armies couldn't even find eachother. But the war in Gaza is full of suffering, and the stakes are high. A lot of 2024 was spent doing what former IDF Chief Halevi called a Sisyphean task...except for Rafah, a lot of the campaigns of 2024 were problematic from the Gaza pier nonsense, to the various raids into Jabaliya, to the campaign in northern Gaza in Nov-Dec when it seemed everyone was basically out of ideas. .

The hostage talks have also been deeply problematic. First of all, more questions need to be asked about what process led to the release of four hostages in October 2023, but didn't result in freeing several very vulnerable hostages. Second, it's worth asking what the entirety of 2024 was lost on fruitless discussions. In December the theory was that "pressure" would result in more deals; but there seems to have been no connection between the hostage talks and the campaign. For instance, when Sinwar was killed, there was no attempt to exploit this on the battlefield. It was like he had never mattered.

The bizarre medical aid for hostages; a cardboard box sent to Gaza in January 2024 seemed deeply unserious. It was never follow-up on...and it seems odd one would send a cardboard box with black marker saying "for hostages" into Gaza, without detailing the aid and which hostages were to receive it and a way to confirm it.

The public in Israel was treated to endless macabre rumors about the hostages in 2024, from leaked stories about them being possibly moved to Sinai to reports of sexual abuse, to bizarre stories about Sinwar walking around with hostages tied to him...or claims most of the hostages were dead. I was told numerous times in 2024 that "most of the hostages are dead" as a way to apparently get me to not care about them. We were told "don't say bring them home, say let them go"...as if it was up to Hamas, rather than up to us to do something.

In the end it became clear by January 2025 that only the US admin could get things moving on the hostage deal; and in essence the deal has been one that didn't change much since 2024, and has been crafted by the US. Meanwhile in Israel some leading officials said the hostages were not a priority; which leads to questions about what the goal of war is; since it's not to get Hamas out of power apparently, it's to weaken Hamas military and governance abilities. But even that lacks clarity.

Overall the inability to either make hostages a priority, or removing Hamas a priority, meant that the worst of both words has prevailed. Hamas remains, hostages remain in the hands of Hamas. This illustrates the lack of a clear Powell doctrine regarding the war. Instead of clear objectives or a Clausewitz style strategy; there is just tactics.

Even if the war winds down with a deal, there will be looming questions about lessons learned. Have the right or wrong lessons been learned. Why did the IDF enter into a long war in Gaza that didn't have clear aims that could be accomplished. If this happens again, such as hostages taken, will the answer be another 2-year war? Can Israel seriously engage in 21- month wars each time? If the Gaza campaign is judged to be a success, then will the lesson be that keeping five divisions to fight 3,000 Hamas members is an optimal use of resources? Such a huge number of soldiers to fight so few conjures up the Geronimo campaign or the British against the Boers, but one can argue that in those cases the wars had an end. Nay...maybe it conjures up Vietnam-era battles. I've even heard some comparisons to such battles. I've always had to raise my hand and note that the US lost that war, so perhaps it's not a great comparison, unless the goal is to lose. So, what's to be learned from Gaza? Would anyone wage this war again the same way?

Some may argue the real purpose of the war has been partly about destruction and razing areas so that the urban areas are not a "threat"; and making part of Gaza unlivable. If that's the goal, it's not even clear that has worked. Gazans have no emigrated and the various stories over the last year about "plans to move a million Gazans" or "move hundreds of thousands" have always been smoke and mirrors. Theories about how reducing cities to rubble makes them less a "threat" also do not pan out. Stalingrad was fought in rubble.

What would anyone want to take away from Gaza as a positive lesson. And if there isn't a lot there, and it's more about learning what not to do...will this be internalized? Or will the Gaza model become the future blueprint for wars?

Sometimes mass destruction in a war can achieve things. People might point to the bombing of Germany in WWII, or the Russians in Chechnya. Well, in each case one side lost the war and was replaced. The problem in Gaza is that despite all of the war, Hamas hasn't yet been replaced. If the end result was just to have Hamas remain in power, then stock must be taken of what a lot of the fighting accomplished.

Sure, some wars and sieges are long. The siege of Troy. Montevideo in the 19th century. And not sure what military lessons one might draw from those.