1/15 REGRESSIVE TAXATION AND THE VASTER PROBLEM THEY REVEAL:
INABILITY TO TAX THE “AMERICASTOCRACY”
- PART 1
Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart , in the book This Time is Different 👇
2/15 In their book Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (and gov debt defaults, repudiation and inflate away), the authors explain the problem of taxation.
3/15 In the chapter on defaults on domestic debt, the authors note that in many historical episodes, governments found it politically easier to default or inflate away their debt than to raise taxes—especially on the wealthy.
4/15 The Authors do touch upon the issue of taxation—particularly the limits of taxing elites and the aristocracy—as part of the broader discussion on fiscal fragility and sovereign default
5/15 While the book does not focus extensively on the aristocracy specifically, it does acknowledge that one recurrent historical problem in fiscal collapses has been the inability or unwillingness of states to tax their wealthy elites, including aristocrats, landlords, or politically connected groups.
6/15 This issue is presented in the context of:
Pre-modern and early modern defaults (e.g., France, Spain, various European monarchies).
The difficulty sovereigns had in raising adequate revenue, especially in wartime or crisis periods.
7/15 Political economy constraints, where elites resisted or blocked tax reforms that would affect their wealth or income.
Key Examples from the Book:
French defaults before the Revolution were, in part, due to the crown’s inability to impose taxes on the nobility and clergy, who were largely exempt.
8/15 In pre-19th century Spain, similar issues arose where the monarchy relied on borrowing and struggled with tax collection due to noble privileges and administrative inefficiency.
9/15 They emphasize the repetition of political obstacles to taxation as a recurring feature in long-term sovereign debt cycles.
-- Necker Cite the Problem before the French revolution
10/15 In his book the Great Wave Mr. Hackett mentions the problem of the inability of taxing the aristocracy as a source of fiscal failure.
Next post we will demonstrate the regressive nature of tariffs.
11/15 Then we will show striking similarity France's situation and the Necker’s prescription unfollowed by France before the revolution.
12/15 Then we will go into the details of Necker’s prescription the problem of taxing the privileged, the problem of too many regressive taxes he wanted to remove while taxing more the “untaxable”
13/15 Finally need for a healthy population with an increase in budget on hospitals with a focus on better lower cost while providing better service.
14/15 Then we will go into the details of the Americastocracy’s exemption from taxes (carried interest, inheritance tax exemptions, share buybacks)
15/15 And we will finish with the institutionalization of an increasing GINI index showcasing various provision that make the “Big Beautiful Bill” a regressive/ insatiable system.
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So in this long post, we are going to divide it into five parts.
I) First, we show that real incomes are not growing, despite what official statistics suggest. We focus on dining out and the substitution to inferior goods. At the very least, this substitution is inconsistent with an increase in real income. It’s a topic we’ve discussed several times, so if you're already familiar with that, feel free to skip to Part II.
II) In Part II, we show that PNC, WFC, and USB are all on the back foot with consumer lending, reducing their exposure. USB is even outright selling portfolios, benefiting from reverse provisioning.
III) In Part III, we explain that PNC, WFC, and USB—by retrenching or selling—are effectively “selling high” because spreads are at record low levels. It’s smart: sell high, buy low. I AM NOT painting a disaster for the banks simply highlighting that those banks are COMPLETELY shunning more consumer lending.
IV) But who is buying high—meaning, buying with tight credit spreads? Well, personal loan growth has far outpaced income growth, and that is not sustainable. If you’re a bank that knows what it’s doing, then you don’t keep lending more.
V) But some entities are booking those loans or securitizing them at record-tight spreads. They are the “buy high” crowd—with the same mindset as the “buy high” crowd from 2005–2007. They’re probably just playing the music while running with the cash register. In the cash register part, we show insider selling by the people providing the unsustainable loans that the banks don’t want.
2/ CONSUMER BEHAVIOR INCONSISTENT WITH HIGHER REAL INCOME
This is the cohort of shoppers at Costco:
Costco Shoppers by Income Cohort
According to 2024 Numerator data, Costco consumer income distribution is:
~46% of members earn between $40,000 and $125,000 (middle income)
~36% earn over $125,000 (high income)
So nearly half the customers fall in the middle-income range, with over one-third coming from higher-income households.
This is what is happening in consumer behavior at Costco, as related by the CFO of Costco:
Shift Toward Food-at-Home
This is what was happening in Q1 FY2025 (reported in November 2024):
In a December 2024 call, CFO Gary Millerchip noted shoppers are avoiding dining out and leaning on Costco for groceries instead. Sales of meat and produce are up, with increased purchases of lower-priced cuts like chicken, beef, and pork.
“This was led by double-digit growth in meat, where we continue to see a shift toward lower-cost proteins such as ground beef and poultry,” he said.
In other words, even Costco’s more affluent customers are trading down.
What happened at Costco in the next quarter:
CFO Gary Millerchip highlighted that shoppers across income levels continue “tightening belts,” opting for lower-cost proteins like ground beef, poultry, and private-label items.
Sources: MarketWatch, The CFO, FinancialContent
Even Higher-Income Members Are Choosing Value
During the Q2 FY2025 call, Millerchip pointed out that not just budget-conscious but also higher-income members are seeking bargains.
There were strong gains in big-ticket items, but also double-digit growth in meat and poultry—specifically lower-cost proteins.
3/ Fiscal Q3 FY2025: Costco Introduces Buy Now, Pay Later
Costco has already reported Fiscal Q3 FY2025 (12 weeks ending May 11, 2025), released in late May. Here's what they said about consumer behavior during that period:
Consumer Behavior in Fiscal Q3 FY2025
Foot traffic and ticket sizes remained healthy, with the value-driven behavior seen in earlier quarters continuing.
Continued Shift Toward Essentials: Fresh categories saw high single- to double-digit growth, led by meat and produce (Investing.com).
Management reiterated the strategy of maintaining low prices on key staples—like eggs, butter, and olive oil—even amid cost pressures. Source: progressivegrocer.com/costco-execs-w…
This indicates consumers are still prioritizing food-at-home and value staples, consistent with previous trends.
Costco introduced a Buy Now, Pay Later option with Affirm for big-ticket items, highlighting how consumers are managing tighter budgets (Progressive Grocer).
SUMMARY:
Staples Spending High growth in fresh; emphasis on low-price staples
Discount & Value Continued price discipline, private-label focus
Shoppers are still favoring essentials and seeking affordability—even while membership growth and store visits remain robust. The addition of BNPL suggests a growing need for payment flexibility.
THE SHIFT TO INFERIOR GOODS IS NOT LIMITED TO COSTCO
NielsenIQ reports that 50% of global shoppers are buying more private-label goods than ever, spurred by inflation and value hunting:
In the U.S., private-label grocery share has risen from ~17% in 2014 to 19% in 2023, with projections to reach 30% by 2033—especially as discount chains like Aldi and Lidl expand (Rabobank).
According to Ipsos, 74% of U.S. consumers now consider private-label products as good as name brands—even among higher-income and younger groups. Source: Ipsos
CONCLUSION:
There is a shift toward dining at home and lower-priced cuts of meat.
The gold-exchange standard of 1922 was in fact a copy of the Fuller Committee prohibition on India in 1898 to redeem their BoE notes for gold. It was the birth of FX as reserves using both USD and GBP on a worldwide basis. Here is how Jacques Rueff described it.
3/13
AS JUGLAR EXPLAINED IN THE 1880s, THERE SHOULD BE A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE DISTRIBUTION OF GOLD AND TRADE
"The distribution of precious metals obeys laws that maintain in each region a sum of cash in relation to (international) commercial operations, especially with the development of credit and the more or less perfected practice of bank clearings which economize on its use."
1/14 DELIGHT IN THE ABSURD
What are TRUMP’s tariffs about?
Trade deficits being felt in the U.S. credit structure—it's as simple as that.
2/14 When a Nixon-Volcker prohibition on G7 countries prevented the sale of excess USD acquired in trade into commodities within the G7, you ended up with a currency that was constantly overvalued in trade—an imbalance characterized by massive overconsumption versus production.
3/14 When Bessent and TRUMP impose very high tariffs, they are essentially cutting the purchasing power of Americans on foreign goods and services—cutting consumption, which also reduces income for exporters. But why?
1/9 Large deficit IS NOT fiscal dominance
Large PRIMARY deficit is fiscal dominance.
So.
The previous central banker of Brazil might have been a traitor indeed.
He was "attending crypto conferences", ... "right".
explanation
2/9 If the deficit is large but the primary deficit is small, if you lower rates the private sector expands but your primary deficit (the non-interest part) might turn into a surplus because more taxes enter.
3/9 So maybe a bit of inflation on the monetary side, but primary surplus are DEFLATIONARY by nature (a bit of compensation)
It’s pretty clear that the US will hit 3% inflation by year-end, especially with oil adding 0.4% for every 10 USD, he says the view from the Fed is that tariffs push prices higher.
COMMENT:
Sure, tariffs are not monetary inflation, but higher prices are higher prices. If Walmart and Amazon tell you that they will raise price, it’s fair to assume they will. Could the tariffs be a one-time hit? Most likely, but it hits nonetheless.
According to Gundlach, the Fed will have to choose between inflation and unemployment—and will throw away the inflation target.
COMMENT:
That’s short-term expediency. In the long term, they will have neither. The fiscal condition will cripple the US.
2% INFLATION TARGET GONE
In an old post from our previously hacked account, we mentioned that the US would eventually move its inflation target and shift toward inflationary financing:
2/7 Back to Gundlach’s unpacking:
If unemployment rises, they give up on inflation.That’s his view
He also mentions the de-inversion of the 2–10 year spread, which is moving above its moving average. He says that when the spread moves above the moving average it means recession historically.
COMMENT:
That’s an interesting point. But under monetary dominance, de-inversion usually occurs with the entire curve falling, not rising. De-inverting with a rising curve signals fiscal dominance—disanchoring the long end and dragging the whole curve up.
Back to Gundlach:
U3 is at 4.2%,
It is above the 36-month moving average, which is typically a trend of deceleration.
But it's not accelerating.
COMMENT:
Gundlach says he's puzzled by the lack of acceleration. The puzzle might be simpler than it seems. When deceleration happens with little government stimulus (primary deficit = gov stimulus), there’s quick contagion and no artificial booster to stop the decline. That booster is uncovered spending (permanent Keynes now in operation).
BUT even with a large government deficit spending, the economy remains tepid. This was visible in our recent Q1 2025 review of Wells Fargo. x.com/GraphCall/stat…
It should be a bit alarming—massive Keynesian boosting under both Biden and now Trump, and yet very little to show for it, coupled with reduced output. (Classic fiscal dominance.)
The reason deterioration is slow is due to a crowding-out situation, or “war regime”: lots of means of circulation (T-bills are quasi-money), little output.
The same thing happened between 1913–1919 (see
Kemmerer: High Prices and Deflation), which created abnormally high inflation and interest rates relative to output—if analyzed through a monetary dominance lens.
3/7 Back to Gundlach again:
Bond market vs. PCE:
The curve continues steepening in the context of high inflation.
The Fed's dual mandate is thrown away.
The entire yield curve is up 11 bps since the last meeting.
GUNDLACH ON CREDIT SPREAD REVERSAL:
Spread went from 250 bps to 450 bps in April—and almost completely reversed.
The CCC bank loan market spreads have come in this year...!
425 bps higher than a few years ago, yet the Fed isn’t lowering rates.
Triple-C+ spreads are coming in, thoser companies are paying 10–11%, despite economic deceleration.
Meanwhile, regular high-yield spreads are only slightly wider.
COMMENT:
Absurdity is where you make money. It also indicates a place where something is likely to blow up.
Gundlach is moving up the ladder in credit quality.
COMMENT:
That’s interesting, because that’s where the FDIC is also warning about tight credit (we’ll come back to the FDIC quarterly report).
0/20 After the BLS data on inflation not adding up with inferior goods consumption trends...
Credit bureau data on delinquencies in unsecured debt does not seem to add up either.... let's review the data...
1/20 This is data gathered from different sources, including credit bureaus:
This data seems highly improbable on the side of improving delinquencies in subprime unsecured debt.