On the morning of 20 July 2025, a AFGSC airman at Minot AFB took his M18, still inside it's issued holster; and placed it on a desk.
It then went off, struck him in chest, and killed him
AFGSC issued a halt order on 21 July 2025 for use of M17/18 Modular Handgun System.
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As an ex-DoD procurement official, that letter is a procurement killing hammer.
This is going to hit SIG Sauer like a moderate sized asteroid in terms of DCMA corrective actions requests or "CAR."
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This AFGSC halt use order letter will be grounds for a level three corrective action request (CAR).
A DCMA level III CAR is defined as follows:
"A Level III Corrective Action Request (CAR) issued by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is a serious action taken when there are significant contractual nonconformities.
It is directed to the supplier's top management and is just one step below the possibility of contract suspension or termination.
This type of CAR serves as a management tool to address critical issues that need immediate attention."
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Getting someone killed in the way the M18 pistol was described as doing is usually treated as a "significant contractual nonconformity requiring root cause corrective action" by DCMA.
I expect an immediate level II DCMA CAR was issued.
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Additional data from AFGSC will be needed, but I think a draft of a level III CAR is now sitting inside a DCMA computer.
If SIG Sauer plays games in replying to the root cause deficiency investigation, a Level IV CAR becomes a possibility.
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DCMA defines a Level IV as follows:
"Level 4 Corrective Action Request is provided when a Level 3 request has not resolved the situation.
The Defense Department may now suggest that progress payments will be stopped or that products or services may no longer be accepted."
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The M17/18 Modular Handgun System (MHS) is a US Army weapon system being produced by Sig Sauer that is to replace the Beretta M9/11 pistol.
It has had a troubled bureaucratic history highlighted by the Congression Research Service in 2018 & has become a "joint" procurement.
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Then Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley reportedly stated in a March 10, 2015, address,
“We're not figuring out the next lunar landing. This is a pistol. Two years to test? At $17 million?
You give me $17 million on a credit card, and I'll call Cabela's tonight, and I'll outfit every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine with a pistol for $17 million.
And I'll get a discount on a bulk buy.”
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A report from the late Senator John McCain, titled
"America’s Most Wasted: Army’s Costly Misfire," highlighted a number of MHS issues, including
- length of procurement effort,
-length of time the Beretta had been in service,
- lack of clarity within the request for proposal (RFP) regarding weapon caliber, and
- concerns over having a single vendor for both the weapon and ammunition.
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However, the AFGSC investigation turns out.
You can expect another round of the usual "failed $500 million procurement" stories from the usual suspects w/o context on the DoD processes involved in identifying & fixing the nonconformances involved in this airman's death.
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P.S.
This is a link to the Congressional research Service report mentioned up thread.
The statistical comparison in the FBI data from pre-1961 is invalid as the underlying medical systems have so changed as to utterly pollute the "murders per 100,000" data.
Violent crime data pre-1961 and post 1961 are apples to oranges comparisons.
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-Trauma care centers (1961),
-Standardized trauma procedures (1978),
-Adoption of military Korea/Vietnam medical emergency treatment & air transport procedures,
-Improved triage (1986)
-And (since 2011) widespread adoption and use of blood clotting bandages...
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Chairman Xi suffers from the traditional dictator's trap of believing his own sh*t because he has made it too dangerous for his cronies and underlings to tell him the truth.
Thanks to that, Chairman Xi's Regime has pretty much no resilience in adversity because it's so kleptocratic and it's all about what the guy in charge can do for his next set of corrupt cronies today.
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This 1970's comment about the Shah of Iran is so historically on point in 2026 because it shows how Xi's regime is failing "The dictator on the wall test."
This map of 124 Russian railway electric traction stations and the 40K OWA drone fired in 2025 demonstrates the political-military leadership failure of the Zelinskyy government.
Like Stalin's failed winter 1941-1942 counter offensives against Nazi Army Group Center,
...Ukraine is penny packing OWA drones everywhere to no great effect based on which military "Union" faction was last in the room with President Zelenskyy before a decision
Even Ukraine's vaunted oil offensive is a bare plurality of total drone strikes 2/
The latest @RyanO_ChosenCoy thread detailing the bureaucratic issues of Ukraine's military in targeting Russian logistics makes clear Ukraine's military has inter-service and intra-service union/factional disputes that are positively American in scale.
If the target of a US "rapid strike" was either the Kharg Island oil export facility or Iran's banking/financial system with a combination of explosives and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse munitions, the Mullahs will fall.
There are two real courses of action (COA) for an American air campaign if Regime Change is the goal.
The Schwerpunkt - political center of gravity - of the Mullah regime is its ability to pay for the use Regime Security Forces & foreign hired mercenaries.
This is one of the 3 major strategic mistakes of the Zelenskyy Government.⬇️
Putin has shown better, more consistent, and more effective leadership in the strategic bombing of Ukrainian electrical infrastructure than Zelinskyy has in striking Russia's railways.
Russia remains uniquely vulnerable to a focused drone strike campaign on it's electrical railway traction step down transformers.
Zelenskyy's leadership not only ignored hitting that unique Russian vulnerability since Feb. 2022.
See the figure below⬇️
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To give you an idea of the abject political-military failure of the Zelenskyy government in this regard one has to look at the industrial supply chain for those traction substations.
The Soviet Union had two major transformer factories: Tolyatti and Zaporozhye.
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