On the morning of 20 July 2025, a AFGSC airman at Minot AFB took his M18, still inside it's issued holster; and placed it on a desk.
It then went off, struck him in chest, and killed him
AFGSC issued a halt order on 21 July 2025 for use of M17/18 Modular Handgun System.
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As an ex-DoD procurement official, that letter is a procurement killing hammer.
This is going to hit SIG Sauer like a moderate sized asteroid in terms of DCMA corrective actions requests or "CAR."
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This AFGSC halt use order letter will be grounds for a level three corrective action request (CAR).
A DCMA level III CAR is defined as follows:
"A Level III Corrective Action Request (CAR) issued by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is a serious action taken when there are significant contractual nonconformities.
It is directed to the supplier's top management and is just one step below the possibility of contract suspension or termination.
This type of CAR serves as a management tool to address critical issues that need immediate attention."
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Getting someone killed in the way the M18 pistol was described as doing is usually treated as a "significant contractual nonconformity requiring root cause corrective action" by DCMA.
I expect an immediate level II DCMA CAR was issued.
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Additional data from AFGSC will be needed, but I think a draft of a level III CAR is now sitting inside a DCMA computer.
If SIG Sauer plays games in replying to the root cause deficiency investigation, a Level IV CAR becomes a possibility.
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DCMA defines a Level IV as follows:
"Level 4 Corrective Action Request is provided when a Level 3 request has not resolved the situation.
The Defense Department may now suggest that progress payments will be stopped or that products or services may no longer be accepted."
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The M17/18 Modular Handgun System (MHS) is a US Army weapon system being produced by Sig Sauer that is to replace the Beretta M9/11 pistol.
It has had a troubled bureaucratic history highlighted by the Congression Research Service in 2018 & has become a "joint" procurement.
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Then Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley reportedly stated in a March 10, 2015, address,
“We're not figuring out the next lunar landing. This is a pistol. Two years to test? At $17 million?
You give me $17 million on a credit card, and I'll call Cabela's tonight, and I'll outfit every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine with a pistol for $17 million.
And I'll get a discount on a bulk buy.”
8/
A report from the late Senator John McCain, titled
"America’s Most Wasted: Army’s Costly Misfire," highlighted a number of MHS issues, including
- length of procurement effort,
-length of time the Beretta had been in service,
- lack of clarity within the request for proposal (RFP) regarding weapon caliber, and
- concerns over having a single vendor for both the weapon and ammunition.
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However, the AFGSC investigation turns out.
You can expect another round of the usual "failed $500 million procurement" stories from the usual suspects w/o context on the DoD processes involved in identifying & fixing the nonconformances involved in this airman's death.
10/10
P.S.
This is a link to the Congressional research Service report mentioned up thread.
The snail like pace of Western military procurement versus the Ukrainian fielding of an all-aspect stealth shaped OWA drone in less than a couple of years is very noticeable.
During WW2's combined bomber offensive, unitary incendiary bombs were found to be five times as effective as high explosive, mass for mass, at destroying buildings & structures.
But the bomber barons were hung up on the tonnage delivered, not their effects.
A single 100lb M47 bomb (left) was as effective as a M65 500lb general purpose HE bomb.
The Bomber Mafia in ETO fought incendiaries, as their bombers lacked the bomb station multiple release modifications for most of WW2, as the mass of bombs dropped was a 'success metric.'
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After the bomber barons -finally- surrendered to the realty of incendiaries operational effectiveness.
Avoiding any USAAF responsibility for the horror that was Dresden cemented the burying of the effectiveness of USAAF firebombs used in the ETO.
"Russian aircraft manufacturers have failed to create analogues of foreign bearings and electronic components for aircraft, said Anatoly Gaydansky, CEO of Aerocomposite."
Also applies to railway cassette bearings for Russian wagons and locomotives.
Russian Railway🧵 1/
Low friction roller bearings are a major technological strength of the West.
They are the difference between Rolls Royce jet engines lasting thousands of hours and Russian or Chinese jet engines lasting half as long.
Rail roller bearings are different in their application
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...but the computer control software for SKF & Amsted co-production machine tooling that Russia used is proprietary. That software left Russia in April/May 2022.
Russian rail system has been doing the whole 'just in time' inventory game
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The following is a serialized post from Strategypage -dot- com on the disastrously bad US Navy leadership decisions on fleet maintenance & where they have left US National Security.
"Surface Forces: USN Maintenance Mess
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July 11, 2025: The U.S. Navy is no longer able to maintain or repair its ships. In an earlier economy move, all the navy ship repair and maintenance facilities were sold off. The worst aspect of this was the loss of skilled shipyard workers. ...
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... The older ones were retiring and the navy did little to recruit and train replacements. Now, as the United States strives to expand its navy and repair and upgrade current ships, it finds that the resources are lacking. There are no easy solutions.
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This Ukrainian fiber optic FPV drone attack underlines that 20th century style tactical truck based logistics are obsolete in the age of mass, cheap, 50 km FPV drones.
Drones costing less than $2,000 are killing trucks costing over $150,000.
The issue of Western truck production versus drone production is stark
Ukraine in 2025 is making ~12,000 FPV and grenade dropping class small drones a month.
The peak annual US Army FMTV production was in 2005 for a total of 8,168 trucks.
Those trucks are 20 years old.
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21st Century truck logistics in the age of 50 km unjammable fiber optic guided FPV drones requires systematic combat service support engineering to build vehicle "net tunnels" to protect from powered and persistent drones.