Building attacks from own third - build up, as we call it - has been one of the worst aspects of Amorim’s United tenure so far.
Most criticism is focused on inverting the CB into the midfield during goal kicks, a frustrating gimmick, executed poorly, that has become the poster child for all woes.
And while it contribute greatly to bad structure since it eliminates a player from the equation, it’s far from being the only issue with United’s build up:
- reluctance to use central progression, with midfield pivot often marked out of games
- CBs too passive, not carrying enough to invite pressure and distrupt blocks
- both WBs too static and deep, not arriving dynamically into space nor pinning players down
- GKs trying to go long and direct too often, leading to turnovers & defensive gaps
- inability to progress into desirable half-space channels, with WBs and AMs often occupying the same wide zones
Why has the build up been so bad? Why do we struggle to attract presure, manipulate blocks, create space & progress into good zones?
Why are teams, not just top ones, able to stop United’s progression so easily?
My theory is that it has to do with fundamental differences in level of OOP play in the PL versus most other leagues 🧵👇
Firstly, what is Amorim trying to do? The macro idea is to lure opposition to press centrally, which opens up wide areas for progression.
Here, you can see Maguire acting as a decoy to attract pressure, allowing Onana to go short to WCBs or long to WBs.
📷 credit: @EBL2017
Alternatively, the GK might launch it directly to the CF, to bypass the front press and keeps teams guessing.
We’ve seen plenty of that, with Onana’s recording career-highs in goal kick avg. length and % of kicks launched long.
Look at the difference vs Ajax & Inter years!
Either way, the intention is not to build directly through the CCB. Rather, it is to go around or over the block.
The CCB might receive and play a bounce pass - but his primary aim is to give an extra target for the opposition to mark in central midfield areas.
It has been a tremendous failure.
As many analysts on here have noted, right from Amorim’s start at United, you simply can’t afford to sacrifice one player during build up in the PL.
There are other ways Amorim is trying to execute on his macro idea of luring the opposition centrally to play around or over the block.
But it’s not working at all. Why?
My theory is simple: there are vast, fundamental differences between quality of OOP play in the PL and most other leagues, Portugese Primeira Liga included.
And nowhere is this more apparent than in pressing quality & intent, as observed through the so-called PPDA stat.
Here is the average PPDA (pass per defensive action) in the PL last season. Remember, lower is better:
And here the PPDA in the Primeira Liga, in 23/24, Amorim’s last full season:
The average for PL is 9.8, while the average for Primeira is 12.1, indicating a 23% jump in pressing effectiveness and aggressiveness.
But it’s even more interesting to take a deeper look at top teams here.
The best pressing team in Portugal was Porto, with a PPDA of 8.7.
Well… there were 9 teams better than that the PL last season!
So if Amorim had to face an excellent pressing team twice per season, now he has to do it 16 -18 times per year (one of the teams was United).
In other words: 5% of league games in Portugal came against teams with a PPDA lower than 9. In the PL, it’s 47%!
There are vast, material differences in how opposition teams approach your build up - and what you are able to do against them.
I think it was @Jon_Mackenzie who said that the general level of OOP play was the thing that coaches from other leagues struggle with the most.
This seems to the happening here, as well. Amorim has to adjust his intent in order to build attacks against PL teams.
As I wrote back in May, the crux of the matter with Amorim is: are ideas good enough while the execution failed, or do his ideas need improving as well?
Rasmus Hojlund was excellent at Atalanta and had a very solid 1st season at United. Last season he struggled, was not used to his strengths & by the season’s end was shattered and lacking confidence.
But United failed him, too 🧵👇
Hojlund is clearly not a facilitator nor a deep carrier; he lacks skills to provide hold-up play; he leans into defenders too much, often neglecting the ball in favor of contact.
He doesn’t have the technical ability to dominate small spaces nor win 1v1s from a static position. What he is great at is running from channel into box, usually from the LHS, into space and behind the lines.
The problem is that United never really needed him to do that; we needed him to do the stuff he can’t do well.
His usage & tactical role changed completely from his Atalanta days.
Only shortsighted online hyenas could spend their time deriving perverted pleasure from a promising U2’s struggles - struggles that he cannot be entirely blamed for.
Let’s look at the context of what happened instead ⬇️
First, at Atalanta, Hojlund was constantly receiving passes into space that he obviously needs to flourish:
He was receiving 11 progressive passes per 90 mins - and by his 2nd season at United, that dropped to 4.53 passes ‼️
A staggering 59% drop, clearly showing his lifeline was cut. A forward who needs passes onto space will clearly struggle without them.
Most of Manchester United’s gameplay issues come from not using the wingback role well. A thread 🧵👇
In possession:
• building in a 2-3-5, the WBs should be up the pitch, pinning the opposing FBs back
• alternatively, one of them might drop & rotate to distrupt press & create space
• instead, United’s WBs are taking up FB positions and congesting the 1st phase
• they are too deep and static, making it easy for opposition to press & deny space
• issue is made worse by CCB pushing up and getting marked out of the game
• this + lack of rotations makes us very vulnerable against good M2M presses
This setup gives an illusion of control in our own half, at the expense of progression and 2nd phase possession.
Furthermore, it means United’s WBs are often arriving late to final third, resorting to hopeful crosses against settled defenses.
Out of possession:
• WBs dropping back or pinned back to form a flat 5
• often dropping way too deep and narrow, to defend the box instead of stopping entries and crosses
• not supporting the press, negating the fact there is an extra CB in the back
• all of this leads to passive rather than proactive defending, moving our line deep
All in all, suboptimal use of two crucial players in a 3-4-3 system.
WBs should be providing fluidity and flexibility in all phases - at a level that FBs sometimes cannot provide due to their defensive duties.
Instead, we basically added an extra CB without managing to truly integrate the WB role into our system.
Wrote about this problem back in January and I think this still stands:
Has there been any improvements in recent months? Much less than I would like.
You can see a positive change in Europa League games, with Dalot and Dorgu managing to run behind defenses and pin opposition back.
In fact, I would argue that key difference between PL and EL games has been our ability to force the WB as a much more proactive role.
This is due to:
• different physical levels: As Amorim said, we are able to dominate physically
• lower tactical levels: opposition not as quick to adapt & read our intention
• lower press intensity & organization
Even in EL games, though, it’s far from ideal, especially out of possession.
Is United’s winback problem primarily a personnel problem?
I would say there’s 3 things at play:
• personnel
• our tactical intent
• opposition intent
The problem for United is that they have simultaneously undertaken 2 major tactical transitions.
One is the move away from ETH’s direct model, which usually resulted in chaos-ball all over the pitch. In broad strokes, this means:
🔴 going long & direct from our half -> 🟢 controlled build-up with short passing, baiting and building with numbers
🔴 rushing or skipping 2nd stage progression -> 🟢 strategic progression through wide and central areas, using vertical rotations, switches & carries
🔴 direct and quick attacks, through high pressing, counters or winning 2nd balls -> 🟢 sustained final 3rd play & chance creation
🔴 relying on player’s decision-making -> 🟢 setting patterns to help players make decisions
🔴 high press as a chance-creation tool, mixed with quick retreat to box defending -> 🟢 more compact block with a high defensive line
These are broad principles that make sense for most teams looking to establish dominance; unfortunately for United, they were ignored for years.
The 2nd tactical transition is the way Amorim wants to achieve this control, which is very specific and includes positions, roles & traits we currently either don’t have, or are not elite at.
Examples include lack of natural WB options; limited passing & carrying range in the pivot, which increases the onus on WB progression; scarcity of #10 options, etc.
I might be wrong, but I’m beginning to think that the 1st, more fundamental transition, is not helped by starting the 2nd transition right away.
There are more players in the squad capable of 1st transition than there are players necessary for the 2nd.
And the 1st transition, the one of key principles, is much broader and more vital than the 2nd, which is more akin to application of said principles.
The 2nd cannot succeed without the 1st; the 1st is a prerequisite for the 2nd.
By starting both at the same time - which is to say, mid-season, without preparation, without specific personnel - we might be impeding both.
A better plan might have been to use this season to develop building blocks and install fundamental principles of a control-based model, while maximizing assets in the squad.
And then use the summer to start the upgrade towards Amorim’a desired model.
The compromise wouldn’t have been one of vision, but one of timeline.
We would’t be sacrificing fundamental principles, like we constantly did under the previous manager.
Rather, we would be pacing ourselves as we correct many wrongs & build towards the manager’s game model.
There are 3 main sources of gameplay issues at United. Understanding which is which is crucial to solving them in the next few seasons. Short 🧵
1. Execution / coaching:
Amorim has had limited with the squad and is trying to introduce lots of change and more control. Biggest one is moving from player-driven to pattern-driven play.
- more time to learn patterns & triggers: they need to become second nature rather than substantial cognitive effort
- confusion and insecurity in build up: players seem uncertain when to recycle and when to progress, esp. when pressed. previous setup demanded going direct a lot
- final 3rd frenzy / box attacking: as noted in many previous posts, moving away from hero ball to structured attacks will be a long process
- pivot passivity: central midfield players often stay covered during build up, not moving enough to offer viable progression options or pressing baits
2. Personnel gaps
United lack many profiles & traits in the squad, which was constructed for ETH’s direct model and personal preference.
- DM / CM: we’ve lacked a central playmaker for years, esp. a press-resistant one who could help with with deep build up, progression & play orchestration
- LWB / LB: between Shaw’s issues and Malacia’s rawness, pretty clear we need a starter here, a top physical profile
- CB: Yoro is the only one with elite channel defending potential & he is 18. Need to replace Lindelof and Evans
- AM: my suspicion is that we’ll need another Amad-like profile here, more of a playmaker than a runner into spaces
3. Tactics & structure
Even with enough time and perfect personnel, which parts of Amorim’s model might be suboptimal in the PL?
- relatively passive out of possession play: a concern when Amorim was announced
- demands on WBs: as @Silvakn0ws noted, they need to be both wingers & FBs now. tactical adjustments might be necessary
- set pieces: both due to personnel but also structural issues ⚠️
- commitment to building attacks: we still rush forward & fail to commit enough bodies to build up & 2nd phase
Of course, many of there are interlinked and execution levels will ultimately depend on player quality and compatibility.
But it’s important to understand what the intent is, where the issues are coming from and how to tackle them.
Unforunately, a lot of fans were deluded by our good cup runs under the previous regime, failing to grasp what was happening to our tactical integrity and squad composition.
Under the hood, though, the team was literally disintegrating. It was everything but the kitchen sink.
THE RETENTION DEFENSE: Amorim tried something new against Arsenal
Amorim went for something new, fresh and progressive against Arsenal; he should be applauded for trying and mostly getting it right in the 1st half.
In that half, Arsenal had:
- 0 xG from open play (‼️)
- 0.23 total xG
- 3 shots on goal, 0 on target
Instead of our usual low block / counter tactics in big derbies, Amorim decided to mix his long-term principles with a pragmatic, low-risk approach.
The key element he used was United’s defending through retention, on a more proactive and ambitious scale than I assumed before the game.
The idea is simple, effective and employed by many top teams = when we have the ball, we don’t have to chase the ball.
While transitional teams love the ball-chasing chaos in order to generate more chaos, possession-first teams prefer the safer option of retaining.
Even if your attacking aspirations are limited - as ours against Arsenal clearly were - you can defend well by retaining well, greatly improving the risk-reward ratio.
There are numerous positive consequences:
🟢 when ball is lost, gaps betweeen players are smaller => structure intact
🟢 players executing fewer horizontal sprints, both to attack and defend => fresh when sprints are really needed
🟢 opposition starts losing patience & rushing => gaps appear in their block
🟢 more time on the ball => more strategic & less chaotic block manipulation.
The model is especially good when paired with vertical threats, meaning that you keep the ball and then release your runners when it makes sense to.
Granted, our execution was not ideal.
The risk-reward ratio was too much on the cautious side, so while we managed to stop Arsenal for ~50 mins, we barely created anything noteworthy.
We especially struggled to keep possession in their half, as Arsenal were exceptional at stopping our transitions.
Still, United rarely went for retention-as-defense in recent years; it is not a subtle change and deserves to be recognized as a good step forward.
And most importantly, it’s completely in line with our long-term vision👇
Since the Mou era, our approach in big games has mostly been to give up possession, move to a low or mid block and try to counter.
Sometimes, the block was higher, with more aggressive pressing to try and force mistakes.
Under Ole, this usually worked well:
It was all about a deep line, quick retreats & box defending, which is why players such as Varane often dropped monster performances.
Survival usually depended on last-ditch tackling, heroic blocking, GK saves and clearances.