AMORIM’S BUILD UP: The fatal flaw 🧵

Building attacks from own third - build up, as we call it - has been one of the worst aspects of Amorim’s United tenure so far.

Most criticism is focused on inverting the CB into the midfield during goal kicks, a frustrating gimmick, executed poorly, that has become the poster child for all woes.

And while it contribute greatly to bad structure since it eliminates a player from the equation, it’s far from being the only issue with United’s build up:

- reluctance to use central progression, with midfield pivot often marked out of games
- CBs too passive, not carrying enough to invite pressure and distrupt blocks
- both WBs too static and deep, not arriving dynamically into space nor pinning players down
- GKs trying to go long and direct too often, leading to turnovers & defensive gaps
- inability to progress into desirable half-space channels, with WBs and AMs often occupying the same wide zones

Why has the build up been so bad? Why do we struggle to attract presure, manipulate blocks, create space & progress into good zones?

Why are teams, not just top ones, able to stop United’s progression so easily?

My theory is that it has to do with fundamental differences in level of OOP play in the PL versus most other leagues 🧵👇 Firstly, what is Amorim trying to do? The macro idea is to lure opposition to press centrally, which opens up wide areas for progression.

Here, you can see Maguire acting as a decoy to attract pressure, allowing Onana to go short to WCBs or long to WBs.

📷 credit: @EBL2017

Rasmus Hojlund was excellent at Atalanta and had a very solid 1st season at United. Last season he struggled, was not used to his strengths & by the season’s end was shattered and lacking confidence.

But United failed him, too 🧵👇

Hojlund is clearly not a facilitator nor a deep carrier; he lacks skills to provide hold-up play; he leans into defenders too much, often neglecting the ball in favor of contact.

He doesn’t have the technical ability to dominate small spaces nor win 1v1s from a static position. What he is great at is running from channel into box, usually from the LHS, into space and behind the lines.

The problem is that United never really needed him to do that; we needed him to do the stuff he can’t do well.

His usage & tactical role changed completely from his Atalanta days.

Only shortsighted online hyenas could spend their time deriving perverted pleasure from a promising U2’s struggles - struggles that he cannot be entirely blamed for.

Let’s look at the context of what happened instead ⬇️ First, at Atalanta, Hojlund was constantly receiving passes into space that he obviously needs to flourish:

Since the beginning of last season, ETH’s second in charge, Manchester United have played a total of 75 matches in the league.

🔴 more losses than wins (32 vs 28)
🔴 37% win rate (28 wins)
🔴 99 points (1.32 per game)
🔴 -14 goal difference
🔴 99 goals scored (16th)

This would cumulatively place us at 10th in the league for these two seasons. With 3rd for most lost games in this period.

The past few weeks have been historically terrible, but let’s bear in mind that things have been bad for a while now.

Not that it’s easy to forget, lol. In fact, ETH’s 1st sesson was the only anomaly in the past 4 years of near-total disaster since Ole left.

It’s the only season in which we managed a positive goal difference & win rate higher than 50%.

THE WINGBACK PREDICAMENT

Most of Manchester United’s gameplay issues come from not using the wingback role well. A thread 🧵👇

In possession:
• building in a 2-3-5, the WBs should be up the pitch, pinning the opposing FBs back
• alternatively, one of them might drop & rotate to distrupt press & create space
• instead, United’s WBs are taking up FB positions and congesting the 1st phase
• they are too deep and static, making it easy for opposition to press & deny space
• issue is made worse by CCB pushing up and getting marked out of the game
• this + lack of rotations makes us very vulnerable against good M2M presses

This setup gives an illusion of control in our own half, at the expense of progression and 2nd phase possession.

Furthermore, it means United’s WBs are often arriving late to final third, resorting to hopeful crosses against settled defenses.

Out of possession:
• WBs dropping back or pinned back to form a flat 5
• often dropping way too deep and narrow, to defend the box instead of stopping entries and crosses
• not supporting the press, negating the fact there is an extra CB in the back
• all of this leads to passive rather than proactive defending, moving our line deep

All in all, suboptimal use of two crucial players in a 3-4-3 system.

WBs should be providing fluidity and flexibility in all phases - at a level that FBs sometimes cannot provide due to their defensive duties.

Instead, we basically added an extra CB without managing to truly integrate the WB role into our system.

Wrote about this problem back in January and I think this still stands: Has there been any improvements in recent months? Much less than I would like.

You can see a positive change in Europa League games, with Dalot and Dorgu managing to run behind defenses and pin opposition back.

In fact, I would argue that key difference between PL and EL games has been our ability to force the WB as a much more proactive role.

This is due to:
• different physical levels: As Amorim said, we are able to dominate physically
• lower tactical levels: opposition not as quick to adapt & read our intention
• lower press intensity & organization

Even in EL games, though, it’s far from ideal, especially out of possession.

THE TWO TRANSITIONS PROBLEM

The problem for United is that they have simultaneously undertaken 2 major tactical transitions.

One is the move away from ETH’s direct model, which usually resulted in chaos-ball all over the pitch. In broad strokes, this means:

🔴 going long & direct from our half -> 🟢 controlled build-up with short passing, baiting and building with numbers

🔴 rushing or skipping 2nd stage progression -> 🟢 strategic progression through wide and central areas, using vertical rotations, switches & carries

🔴 direct and quick attacks, through high pressing, counters or winning 2nd balls -> 🟢 sustained final 3rd play & chance creation

🔴 relying on player’s decision-making -> 🟢 setting patterns to help players make decisions

🔴 high press as a chance-creation tool, mixed with quick retreat to box defending -> 🟢 more compact block with a high defensive line

These are broad principles that make sense for most teams looking to establish dominance; unfortunately for United, they were ignored for years.

The 2nd tactical transition is the way Amorim wants to achieve this control, which is very specific and includes positions, roles & traits we currently either don’t have, or are not elite at.

Examples include lack of natural WB options; limited passing & carrying range in the pivot, which increases the onus on WB progression; scarcity of #10 options, etc.

I might be wrong, but I’m beginning to think that the 1st, more fundamental transition, is not helped by starting the 2nd transition right away.

There are more players in the squad capable of 1st transition than there are players necessary for the 2nd.

And the 1st transition, the one of key principles, is much broader and more vital than the 2nd, which is more akin to application of said principles.

The 2nd cannot succeed without the 1st; the 1st is a prerequisite for the 2nd.

By starting both at the same time - which is to say, mid-season, without preparation, without specific personnel - we might be impeding both. A better plan might have been to use this season to develop building blocks and install fundamental principles of a control-based model, while maximizing assets in the squad.

And then use the summer to start the upgrade towards Amorim’a desired model.

DECAY & REPAIR

There are 3 main sources of gameplay issues at United. Understanding which is which is crucial to solving them in the next few seasons. Short 🧵

1. Execution / coaching:
Amorim has had limited with the squad and is trying to introduce lots of change and more control. Biggest one is moving from player-driven to pattern-driven play.

- more time to learn patterns & triggers: they need to become second nature rather than substantial cognitive effort

- confusion and insecurity in build up: players seem uncertain when to recycle and when to progress, esp. when pressed. previous setup demanded going direct a lot

- final 3rd frenzy / box attacking: as noted in many previous posts, moving away from hero ball to structured attacks will be a long process

- pivot passivity: central midfield players often stay covered during build up, not moving enough to offer viable progression options or pressing baits

2. Personnel gaps
United lack many profiles & traits in the squad, which was constructed for ETH’s direct model and personal preference.

- DM / CM: we’ve lacked a central playmaker for years, esp. a press-resistant one who could help with with deep build up, progression & play orchestration

- LWB / LB: between Shaw’s issues and Malacia’s rawness, pretty clear we need a starter here, a top physical profile

- CB: Yoro is the only one with elite channel defending potential & he is 18. Need to replace Lindelof and Evans

- AM: my suspicion is that we’ll need another Amad-like profile here, more of a playmaker than a runner into spaces

3. Tactics & structure
Even with enough time and perfect personnel, which parts of Amorim’s model might be suboptimal in the PL?

- relatively passive out of possession play: a concern when Amorim was announced

- demands on WBs: as @Silvakn0ws noted, they need to be both wingers & FBs now. tactical adjustments might be necessary

- set pieces: both due to personnel but also structural issues ⚠️

- commitment to building attacks: we still rush forward & fail to commit enough bodies to build up & 2nd phase Of course, many of there are interlinked and execution levels will ultimately depend on player quality and compatibility.

But it’s important to understand what the intent is, where the issues are coming from and how to tackle them.

THE RETENTION DEFENSE: Amorim tried something new against Arsenal

Amorim went for something new, fresh and progressive against Arsenal; he should be applauded for trying and mostly getting it right in the 1st half.

In that half, Arsenal had:
- 0 xG from open play (‼️)
- 0.23 total xG
- 3 shots on goal, 0 on target

Instead of our usual low block / counter tactics in big derbies, Amorim decided to mix his long-term principles with a pragmatic, low-risk approach.

The key element he used was United’s defending through retention, on a more proactive and ambitious scale than I assumed before the game.

The idea is simple, effective and employed by many top teams = when we have the ball, we don’t have to chase the ball.

While transitional teams love the ball-chasing chaos in order to generate more chaos, possession-first teams prefer the safer option of retaining.

Even if your attacking aspirations are limited - as ours against Arsenal clearly were - you can defend well by retaining well, greatly improving the risk-reward ratio.

There are numerous positive consequences:

🟢 when ball is lost, gaps betweeen players are smaller => structure intact

🟢 players executing fewer horizontal sprints, both to attack and defend => fresh when sprints are really needed

🟢 opposition starts losing patience & rushing => gaps appear in their block

🟢 more time on the ball => more strategic & less chaotic block manipulation.

The model is especially good when paired with vertical threats, meaning that you keep the ball and then release your runners when it makes sense to.

Granted, our execution was not ideal.

The risk-reward ratio was too much on the cautious side, so while we managed to stop Arsenal for ~50 mins, we barely created anything noteworthy.

We especially struggled to keep possession in their half, as Arsenal were exceptional at stopping our transitions.

Still, United rarely went for retention-as-defense in recent years; it is not a subtle change and deserves to be recognized as a good step forward.

And most importantly, it’s completely in line with our long-term vision👇 Since the Mou era, our approach in big games has mostly been to give up possession, move to a low or mid block and try to counter.

Sometimes, the block was higher, with more aggressive pressing to try and force mistakes.

Under Ole, this usually worked well:

THE AMORIM CHAIN REACTION: What is it and how to get it working?

The game model Ruben Amorim used at Sporting relied on interconnected vertical rotations to achieve control, progression, dynamism, numerical advantage & space manipulation.

It’s a key aspect of his game model and one that he will need to replicated at United if he is to be successful. 🧵👇

What do I mean by interconnected vertical rotations?

A player who formally belongs to one line automatically moves to the next line as play progresses. Which allows for a player from that line to move to the next one.

A chain reaction all over the pitch.

A player who starts as a central defender but spends most of his in posession time as a defensive midfielder. Which enables that a player who starts as a deep connector ends up as an attacking midfielder.

One rotation enabling the next, multiplying in energy and potency.

At their core, these vertical rotations are following the fluid logic of WBs in a modern system.

The WBs, by definition, constantly move from being part of the defensive unit to being part of the attacking unit during the game. They are both and they are neither.

Under Amorim, this same logic is applied to the spine of the team - the key central positions - to get positional flexibility & numerical advantage, line by line.

Almost every top team does a version of this somewhere on the pitch, usually a FB moving to midfield, but at Sporting, Amorim seemed completely dedicated to this.

It was systematic and automated, fluidity through rigidity, an in-possession cheat code. How does it work?

- a GK moves forward & becomes a CCB, to split the CBs and form a back 3

- that allows the CCB to move forward & become a DM to form a double pivot, in a very early stage

These two changes now form a back 5 in a 3-2 structure.

AMORIM'S BUILD UP: GOOD INTENT, POOR EXECUTION

The best part bout United yesterday’s performance was the new intent in how we want to build attacks.

We aimed to start building from very deep areas, in order to bait the Ipswich to attack us high, and we aimed to use short passing to play through their press.

It was a refreshing change from what we used to do, especially when faced with high pressing: against Tottenham, for example, we were pumping it long, hoping to avoid their press by not having the ball.

If we want to build a progressive game model, it begins with a high-ceiling build up model.

Now, to be clear: the execution of said build up intent against Ipswich was pretty bad. For the most part, we struggled to bait, progress and manipulate their blocks.

But the intent was clearly there, and that's what matters. Now we have to stick with it and improve it through game experience, coaching & personnel upgrades.

Let's dig in - a short thread on how we tried to build attacks. 👇


Here is Onana, in one of our first settled possessions, forming a back 3 with Evans and Maz, with a Case - MDL pivot in front of them.

They are positioned extremely deep, to bait the press. Onana waits quite a bit to invite pressure before passing to MDL.

MATTERS OF CHARACTER

After Rashford and Casemiro praised Amorim’s first training sessions, many were quick to note similar praise for ETH when he was getting started.

The implication was clear: these players will praise everyone at first and then fail to deliver when it matters.

It plays into a common myth, perpetuated by the rage-baiting media complex, that United players are getting their manages sacked - either on purpose or by lack of effort.

Even fans who don’t go that far will often claim that a cultural reset in the dressing room is needed before any further gameplay considerations.

And the previous manager also spent years claiming that United’s problems stem from player mentality, not his tactics.

Do we really need another cultural reset? Were our previous projects merely victims of bad player mentality, their low determination and poor character?

In short, have the recent issues at United been primarily cultural - matters of mentality and character, not tactics nor technical ability?

Are United’s players getting the managers sacked because they struggle with pressure?

It’s an intriguing theory. And one that is flat out wrong.

One can only claim that if one knows next to nothing about group dynamics, organizational psychology and management principles.

Let’s dig in 🧵👇 Firstly, what is character in football?

There seems to be a romantic notion of players as soldiers and managers as cheiftains, marching into battle to spill sweat, blood and tears.

It’s an image that plays well with general audiences, often promoted by tough-talking ex-players.

Was ETH doomed by United's bad attackers?

Under ex-manager Erik Ten Hag, Manchester United created 27 big chances in the PL this season, missing 22 of them.

United have also been also the most underpeforming team in terms of goals scored versus xG created - only 8 goals out of 14.84 xG⚠️

The logical conclustion is that poor shot conversion is what doomed ETH this year and ultimately led to his sacking. If you can't score what you create, how can you expect to win games and get points?

And does this mean that Amorim or whoever comes next will face the same problems with our attack? In other words, if these big chance misses doomed ETH, will they doom the next manager, as well?

But of course, it's a bit more complicated than that. A quick look👇 First, what is a big chance, anyway? The official definition provided by Opta:

“There is no such thing as a new idea. Only new and curious combinations” - Mark Twain

I maintain that this United squad is closer to competing for top spots than is generally acknowledged; after the calamity of last season and the turbulent start to his season, it’s easy to be gaslighted into thinking our quality is mid table.

But realistically, it’s a squad full of exciting young talent & players ready to peak in the next few seasons.

What the squad most urgently lacks:
- playmaking DM (starter-level)
- progresssive LB (starter-level)
- specialist 1v1 winger (rotation)
- channel-defending CB (rotation)

And at some not-too-distant point, we’ll also need a connector-type CM to rotate with Mainoo (though Mount can play there, too).

The good news is that in many of these positions, we have players that will need replacing anyway: Casemiro, Eriksen, Lindelof, Evans, Anthony… And there will a hard but necessary decision to make on Shaw.

It’s not a perfect squad and lacks some key profiles - namely a playmaking #6 organizer - but with the right additions, it could become extremely strong.

And yet… We have a good mix of experienced players (Bruno, Onana, Rashford, Maguire), players about to peak (Dalot, MDL, Martinez, Ugarte, Mount, Maz) and great young talent (Garnacho, Mainoo, Hojlund, Amad, Yoro…).

UNITED - BRENTFORD TACTICAL PREVIEW

The game against Brentford will be an interesting matchup, and one that United should be winning. But…

Brentford are pragmatic, tactically layered, aggressive with pressing but usually low with their block, smart and savy, direct when opportune, with a very high level of efficiency in attack.

They are complex: a team that often defends deep and uses long balls, but loves to rush forward into high areas for tackles and second balls.

A team that uses lots of long passes, but can keep possession and build its attacks carefully, as well.

Look at these Brentford stats:
- 20th in PPDA
- 20th in allowed box entries per opposition attack
- 18th in defensive line height
- 1st in blocks, 2nd in saves
- 2nd in successful long passes
- 1st in successful long passes by GK

From this you’d think they are are a traditional low block & counter-attacking underdog, reliant on blocks, saves and long balls. But then:

- 3rd in pressing intensity
- 2nd in tackles won in opposition third
- 1st in xG per shot
- 1st in % of shots on targets
- 1st in avg. distance to goal per shot

Brentford allow most passes per defensive action in the PL, but they are also 2nd in tackles won in opposition third.

They use lots of long balls and direct attacks, but are in 1st shooting efficiency and 1st in shooting close to the goal. 🤯

Layered and flexible.

Using the limited resources at his disposal, Frank has constructed a very solid team that has been careful not to press too high for their own good & to go direct when it has sense to.

And when they attack, they mean it - for example, after kick-offs, they attack like a NFL team, committing players forward with elaborate schemes to get into good crossing positions.

It should thus be a fascinating and tough game for us.

They will allow us time on the ball & relatively easy progression into final 3rd - but it comes with some important caveats 🧵👇 At 16.8, Brentford’s PPDA (passes per defensive action) is the highest in the PL and 2x the league median, indicating a low press and usually no intent to stop opposition build up:

HOW ETH IS FAILING TO GET THE MOST OUT OF HIS BEST PLAYERS

A key aspect of our poor perfomances in the last 14 months is how ineffective some of our best players have been.

EETH is very good at identifying individual traits and utilizing them; his lucklustre game model, however, is very poor at combining that into a coherent whole.

An element of compromise and flexibility exists in every setup, but generally speaking, you want your best players to have the highest chance of success.

That’s how to make your whole larger than the sum of all parts. And our best players are clearly not getting the best conditions to succeed.

Nowhere is this more apparent than with Marcus Rashford, Bruno Fernandes and Andre Onana 🧵👇


1. Marcus Rashford 🔴

In 3 seasons under ETH, Rashford has consistently been having fewer and fewer shots:

2022 / 2023 - 3.38 shots per 90
2023 / 2024 - 2.28 shots per 90
2024 / 1025 - 1.13 shots per 90

A dramatic 66% drop ⚠️

I have no idea what goes on during United’s sessions and how we prepare for specific opposition.

But what Benni seems to be saying here is that the players are high-quality players who then fail to perform well in matches, which comes as a shock to ETH.

Either all of our players are suffering from imposter syndrome and collective panic attacks once they enter the pitch, or the way we set them up is poor.

If you watch the games, the answer is really obvious: no level of mental fortitude can make a player overcome our terrible plan against Tottenham.

It’s just impossible - throw peak Messi into that mess and fans would be rage-posting about him being a shite player and a fraud.

More broadly, this goes in line with how ETH approaches players and tactics in general.

Unlike managers like Pep who say they create solutions which allow their players to execute well, ETH wants the players to come up with solutions during games.

He sets broad & flexible principles, based on player availability, opposition & game state, but clearly expects the players to solve things like build-up patterns on their own.

In-game rondos, beloved by the “tactics don’t exist” crowd, are an example of excellent player problem-solving that sadly isn’t scalable nor very replicable.

If you have the best players in the league, you can rondo your way out of a high press, for example - but it’s not really sustainable, which is why top teams develop advanced patterns and habits.

It’s therefore completely logical that ETH sees excellent players in training who then fail to replicate that during the games. For him, it’s *always* on the players, never the system.

And I just don’t think that’s correct. We have lots of young players in the team, but many are ex-Bayern, PSG, Juventus, Chelsea & Ajax who have dealt with pressure and big stages before.

You can’t tell me these guys got reduced to dust upon seeing the great Ange and his gorious side, currently sitting in 9th.

ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM How Ten Hag's initial success created a ghost

In 2022 / 2023, his first season at United, Erik Ten Hag created a pragmatic tactical model that maximized individual quality and got great results, until it started collapsing.

And 2 years later, United are still haunted by it. 🧵

The model relied on a compact mid / low block off the ball and quick vertical movement on the ball, an effective cocktail of box defending and fast attacking of the opposition's box.

There were important differences between that and what Ole did in previous seasons.

While Ole was looking to win the ball in the midfield, compressing it with a high defensive line, ETH was content to soak up more pressure and rely on reactive box defending.

Why? Because the model actually invited teams to press us, so that we could play through them. We wanted Licha and Shaw to have time on the ball, baiting opponents into high pressing.

It was, in fact, the model's key feature: when teams took the bait, we'd quickly get the ball to Eriksen or Casemiro, who would then spray risky progressive passes up front to Rashford or Bruno.

It was simple, but very effective, maximizing quality in the team:
- Varane's box defending
- Casemiro's ball-winning & progressive passing
- Eriksen's connective passing & switches
- Bruno's progressive passing & finishing
- Rashford's runs in behind and finishing

For a few months it seemed like a magic potion, a cheat code, god mode enabled, because it did what a model is supposed to do. It gave the players context to successfuly excecute, while masking some of their weaknesses.

Which is why Casemiro looked so good - minus problems with rest defense, we were relatively compact and gave him the ideal platform to dive into tackles with minimial risk and play it forward.

Why is why Rashford scored so much - freed from playmaking & defensive duties, he was given the ideal platform to utilize his running, carrying and finishing from wide positions.

It was clearly not a high ceiling approach, but seemed like a triumph of short-term pragmatism, tactical micro-ploys and correct usage of key players.

Even when we didn't play very well, you just had a sense we would get the win. United were back and all was good. All was good, that is, until we stopped getting the wins. 👇 The system had a lethal, Death Star-level flaw: when teams refused to take the bait, or had elite pressing that suffocated us, there was no alternative plan for building & progressing.

Which is exactly what started happening mid-season, and the magic was soon gone.

ERIK TEN HAG’S FINAL PLEA: Should we trust the process?

The most telling detail last night was not something that happened during the game.

Nothing in the game was new - we’ve seen it all before. The naive press structure, shambolic central gaps, last-ditch box survival.

The most telling detail, in fact, occured after, during ETH’s post-game interview.

“Don’t judge us now. We’re in the process. Judge us at the end of the season”, he said.

It’s a pretty common line used by many a managers under pressure. Give us more time, let us weather the storm.

Granted, a bit cynical and unconvicing coming from a manager in his 3rd year. But common and expected.

But then Erik Ten Hag let something else slip.

“That’s what I said last season as well, and…”

And this, I think, is the crux of the issue; he genuinly seems to think last season ended up being a successful one because of the FA Cup win.

That he was right all along last year, as well, that more time was needed for his process and that the process yielded a cup win.

But that’s not what happened at all. 🧵

Process would suggest we’ve seen some journey from point A to point B, some positive development of the team, some signs that a brighter future was possible.

There was no process, only chaos; there was no development, only sporadic incidents; there were no bright signs, only outcries of individual quality.

In fact, as the season went on, we got worse and worse. Save for the last few games, when the team managed to consolidate & win the cup.

And yet, ETH says he would trust the process, and everything will he fine. Just like it was last year, as well. Last season was not a desirable outcome, a hallmark of success, an argument in favor of process; it was a graveyard of football that we need to prevent from happening ever again.

And what needed to happen was for us to be born again; otherwise, we would end up being busy dying.

TECHNICAL VERSUS TACTICAL: Do players make the tactics or do tactics make the players?

In 1997, as the infamous story goes, Steve Jobs went back to Apple.

The place was in shambles: financially ruined, with a terrible corporate culture, bad products, misguided strategy, no clear vision and pack of elite talent in key areas.

At one point in 1997, Apple was 90 days from going bankrupt.

The crux of the problem was that the company was clinging to sweet yet toxic memories of its glory days - while also forgetting what had brought them glory.

If it sounds familiar, that’s because it is familiar; at one point or another, it’s a destiny of many a great organizations and individuals.

Jobs had a clear insight on what was fundamentally wrong, and out of that, his plan was hatched. You can call it his philosophy, vision, strategy or, in football terms, tactics.

But the comeback started with a clear idea on what to do.

Apple, he sensed, was trying to do to much - personal assistant gadgets, printers, a different zillion computer models - while doing none of it at a very high level.

It was trying to pretend it hadn’t lost the computer war to Microsoft and that it was still a big company, the default choice for most consumers. Which then led to countless terrible product decisions.

Jobs tore right through that dangerous illusion.

Instead of running away from it, he embraced the underdog position; he cherished being the alternative and not the default; he wanted Apple to be different and to announce it was for people who think different.

And everything he did stemmed from that simple, yet brilliant idea.

He redefined the product lineup, simplifying it radically. He slimmed down the company. He fired bozos and clowns. He recognized and promoted internal talent in areas such as industrial design. He recruited key people to execute on his plan.

And everything his Apple did post-1998 was in line with this new “we’re the cool underdog for cool underdogs” strategy.

Every marketing campaign, product design call, every hiring decision, every word uttered on stage.

Did he adapt his vision to what the company could realistically do, and to the skillset of people he found there?

Of course he did - Apple did not randomly announce it would be building spaceships or phones. But he also knew where he wanted the organization to be in 1, 3 and 5 years.

And that’s how the company knew who fits and who doesn’t; whom to promote and whom to recruit; what to absolutely do and what to avoid doing. And they prospered.

Without a plan, they would have just continued to drift along, and away, trying everything, which usually means doing nothing.

Which brings us to football, United, and the glorious debate of players versus the manager, the technical versus the tactical, the vision versus the intent. 👇🧵 What comes first and what comes last, the idea or the resources for the idea; the players and players’s skills, or the tactics and utilization of players?

The diplomatic answer, the view from nowhere, would be: they are equally important, one can’t exist without the other etc.

ETH'S CARDINAL MISTAKE What really caused the calamity against Tottenham

The season thus far has been bad and schizophrenic because it's been a season of two very different parts:

a) games against much weaker opposition
b) games against comparable or better teams

The dichotomy is clearly reflected in the results: big dominant wins against bad teams and big pathetic losses against comparable or better teams.

But it's not that we are unable to compete with better teams due to isolated mistakes, lack of profiles or others execution-related issues. That would be a problem, but it would be a solvable problem.

Rather, whom we face has largely influenced how we play, not just in terms of execution, but more problematically, in terms of tactical intent.

Simply said, we are more willing to do enforce in-possession control against very bad teams and are running away from it against stronger teams.

This immediate retreat from all tactical principles been the key problem, at the very core of what have been doing wrong for years now.

Instead of sticking to a clear philosophy and getting it to work through coaching, games and recruitment, ETH abandons his intent immediately, if an important player is injured or if the opposition is strong or if the game is not going well.

And this has caused the catastrophe against Tottenham. 👇 How we play against much weaker teams and why it works

Against much weaker opposition in recent games, we have been able - and willing - to implement a more patient style with these features:

- deeper build-up with more bodies committed
- retention as a strategy to bait and build
- progression through shorter passing
- sustained final 3rd pressure
- patient manipulation of blocks & channels

WHAT NOW? A simple plan to patch up Man Utd, at least for now

It's much easier to convince yourself that better players and more recruitment is needed, but look at the stats and the games: Man Utd's biggest problems are tactical & structural and not technical & individual. 🧵

Consider the following:

🔴 we struggle even with fundamentals
🔴 teams with more staff turnover and worse players have better structure
🔴 not much improves even when best players are in the team
🔴 same problems for years, even though most of the team has changed

Is our squad perfect? No, of course it's not - and I don't mean that in the philosophical sense that no squad is.

We clearly lack certain profiles and elite traits, in progressive carries, recirculation, isolated wing play, wide defending etc.

But we are not talking about winning the league.

We are talking about putting together a well-structured team with good ideas that can compete for top 4 while it perfects its vision and becomes a contender.

That seems like the bare minimum requirement after 2 full seasons and lots of tailor-made recruitment, mostly focused players previously known to the manager.

But since the end of 2022/2023, we have been strugging in all phases:

In possession:
🔴 hectic build up, intent on getting to goal in 3-4 passes whenever possible
🔴 struggles against settled blocks, going around and over lines of pressure
🔴 players commited forward too soon, waiting for long balls & counter-pressing
🔴 difficulties progressing & entering final 3rd, half spaces & opposition box
🔴 reliance on direct attacks and low-passing sequences
🔴 low quality chances & low xG produced

Out of possession:
🔴 huge gaps in OOP structure & rest defense, due to issues in possession
🔴 narrow pressing used to force quality turnovers, not halt opposition progression
🔴 high press not supported with a high line (even if players start high, they immediately drop back to box defending)
🔴 lots of shots, entries and xGA conceded

And yet, there is a way forward. A way for ETH to stay true to his transitional vision while radically improving the model. 1. FIXING THE BUILD UP

It all starts with this. In my recent thread I higlighted some issues with how United build👇

🔴 both FBs moving too high too fast
🔴 not enough players commited to 1st & 2nd phase, leading to huge gaps
🔴 limited passing channels for GK & CBs
🔴 rushing forward after recoveries, focused on long progressive passes
🔴 avoidance of central progresssion
🔴 Casemiro’s problematic deep role
🔴 poor baiting of pressure & exploatation of pressure

Issues in our 1st to 2nd phase progression set the stage for a whole host of later problems.

BUILDING FROM THE BACK - United still have a serious build-up problem

It's really hard to accept that a backline / central midfield with options such as Onana, Martinez, Dalot, Mainoo, Mazraoui, De Ligt, Maguire & Mount should somehow be incapable of short build-up.

Maybe not against the very best teams - we still lack a deep-playing DM - at least not until coached and perfected for months.

But against a majority of PL teams, short & patient build-up, utilizing small-space passing, should be our primary weapon. Not as a nice-to-have option, an occassional rondo, but as our fundamental intent.

With our impressive technical levels, it should used to systematically bait opposition, manipulate blocks, create progression avenues, manufacture overloads, make space for switches, carries & run-ins.

Martinez could be used in a Stones-like role; Dalot, Mazraoui & Mainoo could commit deeper, either centrally or wide, to give additional options against a 4-2-4 press, similar to what City seems to be doing. Onana is a build-up treasure waiting to be used.

Instead, build-up has been one of our main problems. While there seems to be more of an attempt to build short, at least compared to our worst games last year, it's still seems random and full of structural gaps:

- both FBs moving too high, leaving the backline without options & forcing them to go around or over the press

- Onana launching long balls too often, instead of commiting to short & progressive passes

- players committing to attack right away, esp. after opposition turnovers, waiting for long passes or 2nd ball duels, leaving us in a 2-2-6 or even 2-1-7 structure

- overuse of tactic that has Bruno moving into deeper LCM areas, spraying switches into other flank

- in general, overuse of our left side, with Martinez, Dalot, Mainoo, Bruno & Rashford there, but without exploatation of such overload; seems intuitive rather than strategic

- until Liverpool game, clear avoidance of building centrally and finding central progression avenues

- lack of rotations, movements & alternative plans (e.g. moving Martinez to midfield, commiting more players back, switching between 3-1, 2-3, 2-4 etc)