HOW AMORIM ADAPTED

After the Brentford defeat, Amorim managed to implement a number of pragmatic tweaks to his system; and to his credit, they seem to be working well

What changed, specifically?

1. New progression method

By introducing Lammens into the team, we also introduced going long from GK to forwards much more often.

Percentage of goal kicks launched:
- 33% vs Brentford
- 87.5% in post-Brentford games
- 75% vs Brighton

Same thing for open-play passes by GK, in terms of short vs long: 41.7% launched vs Brentford, then 75% in the 3 games after that.

What is even more interesting is that we are involving the GK more than before, to launch those long passes.

Passes attempted by GK:
- 24 vs Brentford
- 36 in post-Brentford games (avg.)
- 41 vs Brighton

Of course, as dicussed previously, relatively few of these end up as successful long passes, claimed by the player they were meant for.

But that’s not the point: the point is for the team to be positioned well as the pass is made, to duel for 2nd balls and counterpress if ball is lost.

What has this change led to?

Basically, bypassing the first and second phases of possession - and the opposition’s press - to quickly transfer play up front.

From Amorim’s view, this has 2 advantages: a) limiting the dangers faced vs m2m pressing and b) getting our most dangerous players close to the goal and facing the goal.

Percentage of touches in final 3rd:
- 15% vs Brentford
- 24% in post-Brentford games
- 28.8% vs Brighton

This massive increase of 89% between Brentford and Brighton means that United are spending much more time where they should be - in front of the goal.

This direct threat should ease the willigness of opposition teams to press us high, in a m2m system, because they will fear getting caught in the back.

Amorim must use this fact to re- introduce short build up and press baiting: a combo of these two basic strategies could prove unstopabble.

But if we end up over-exploiting one method, teams will find a way to stop us. Side note: funnily enough, inverting the CCB works much better with this long, direct strategy rather than short build up.

The CCB moves up, which means one of the CM can move up, too, to better challenge for second balls.

Let’s give credit where credit is due: Amorim did very well to prepare the game. Three key calls:

▪️Cunha instead of Sesko
▪️5-4-1 mid-block instead of 5-2-3
▪️Amad & Maguire starting

Sesko would have likely been very isolated and unable to impose himself aerially as much as he did in previous games.

The 5-2-3 block has been a disaster, vacating the midfield and exposing the flanks; been calling for a deeper block in a 5-4-1 shape for months now.

This should be United’s pragmatic blueprint for all big games: drop deep, congest the midfield, concede possession. When ball is won back, use Bruno and Casemiro to spray passes forward.

That being said, this was not a perfect game: it was fairly easy for Liverpool to play through our block. Whenever we tried to press or attack, we failed to stop or control their transitions.

And once things descended into chaos in the 2nd half, Liverpool managed to create a fair amount against our settled low block, too.

It might have not been a perfect game, but it was definitely a great, resilient win. What Amorim needs to solve now is the approach against teams that won’t be as generous with space.

The current go-to option seems to be to use wide overloads or, if those fail, hoof it long to Sesko and focus on 2nd balls.

Don’t think that’s sustainable.

WHY UNITED MANAGERS FAIL

“"All my successes have been built on my failures” - Benjamin Disraeli

There is, I believe, an underappreciated reason why post SAF-managers have all failed to have long, sustainable & frutiful tenures, chasing PL and UCL titles. 🧵

For sure, there have been numerous, oft-discussed factors: toxic club culture, ownership and cashflow issues, lack of expertise on the sporting side, short-term commercial pressure etc.

But in addition to that - or rather, as a product of that - United keep making the same mistake when selecting managers.

With every mangerial appointment, the club has been trying to correct the last guy’s sins and mistakes.

If you analyze the picks carefully - as well as what was briefed to the media at the time - you’ll notice this clear & problemtaic trend.

It’s been an extremely, almost comically reactive approach.

Instead of thinking what the next person could bring to the table, how his ideas fit the squad, whether the game model can evolve, is it a match for the PL, it’s always been about atoning for the last person in charge.

All of our success will be built on all failures. Every new manager was a reactive attempt to correct the biggest flaw, real or perceived, that the last manager had. 👇 As Moyes was nearing his end, the general thinking was: we went with a smaller-club manager with little relevant experience, and that needs to be corrected.

We now need someone who’s been at the very top, coached big players, has their respect & necessary tactical accumen.

AMORIM’S PLAN OF ATTACK

Why is United going for a new CF in general and why Sesko in particular? And why another expensive forward after spending so much on forwards already? 🧵

It’s clear what Amorim views as his ideal attacking formula.

First, use 1st phase of possession to bait the opposition into pressing central areas. Then, one of the following:

a) pass around the block, into wide areas & half channels to progress, or
b) pass over the block, directly to CF, or
c) progress through 1v1s third man runs, rotations & combos

In case of a), at least one of the 10s will be constantly dropping deep and receiving under pressure.

Hence Mbeumo and Cunha, to play as actual 10s in the 2nd stage, and transition into inside forwards later on.

Amorim clearly decided that Garnacho, Antony & Sancho won’t be able to do this (while Mount, Amad & Bruno will).

In case of b), the CF has to be able to receive with a man on his back, control it extremely well, then find a good pass and run into the box.

Amorim’s conclusion is clearly that Hojlund nor Zirkzee cannot do this well enough and must thus be upgraded on.

Option b) is extremely important: the threat of going direct means opposition will be cautious when pressing high, giving us more time & space to build attacks.

Without being able to go direct, build up and progression will suffer. Without the credible threat of using option b), your primary option becomes less effective.

That’s why Amorim wants a physical CF who can win aerial duels, control long passes under pressure, pass it well once he’s got it under control & be a box threat.

It’a tough ask, especially in the PL.
Thus, the intent to splash extravagant cash on forwards is not just about the final third & scoring more goals.

In Amorim’s view, it’s crucial for build up and ball progression into the final third:l, as forwards will often be receiving from the GK, WCB, WB…

AMORIM’S BUILD UP: The fatal flaw 🧵

Building attacks from own third - build up, as we call it - has been one of the worst aspects of Amorim’s United tenure so far.

Most criticism is focused on inverting the CB into the midfield during goal kicks, a frustrating gimmick, executed poorly, that has become the poster child for all woes.

And while it contribute greatly to bad structure since it eliminates a player from the equation, it’s far from being the only issue with United’s build up:

- reluctance to use central progression, with midfield pivot often marked out of games
- CBs too passive, not carrying enough to invite pressure and distrupt blocks
- both WBs too static and deep, not arriving dynamically into space nor pinning players down
- GKs trying to go long and direct too often, leading to turnovers & defensive gaps
- inability to progress into desirable half-space channels, with WBs and AMs often occupying the same wide zones

Why has the build up been so bad? Why do we struggle to attract presure, manipulate blocks, create space & progress into good zones?

Why are teams, not just top ones, able to stop United’s progression so easily?

My theory is that it has to do with fundamental differences in level of OOP play in the PL versus most other leagues 🧵👇 Firstly, what is Amorim trying to do? The macro idea is to lure opposition to press centrally, which opens up wide areas for progression.

Here, you can see Maguire acting as a decoy to attract pressure, allowing Onana to go short to WCBs or long to WBs.

📷 credit: @EBL2017

Rasmus Hojlund was excellent at Atalanta and had a very solid 1st season at United. Last season he struggled, was not used to his strengths & by the season’s end was shattered and lacking confidence.

But United failed him, too 🧵👇

Hojlund is clearly not a facilitator nor a deep carrier; he lacks skills to provide hold-up play; he leans into defenders too much, often neglecting the ball in favor of contact.

He doesn’t have the technical ability to dominate small spaces nor win 1v1s from a static position. What he is great at is running from channel into box, usually from the LHS, into space and behind the lines.

The problem is that United never really needed him to do that; we needed him to do the stuff he can’t do well.

His usage & tactical role changed completely from his Atalanta days.

Only shortsighted online hyenas could spend their time deriving perverted pleasure from a promising U2’s struggles - struggles that he cannot be entirely blamed for.

Let’s look at the context of what happened instead ⬇️ First, at Atalanta, Hojlund was constantly receiving passes into space that he obviously needs to flourish:

Since the beginning of last season, ETH’s second in charge, Manchester United have played a total of 75 matches in the league.

🔴 more losses than wins (32 vs 28)
🔴 37% win rate (28 wins)
🔴 99 points (1.32 per game)
🔴 -14 goal difference
🔴 99 goals scored (16th)

This would cumulatively place us at 10th in the league for these two seasons. With 3rd for most lost games in this period.

The past few weeks have been historically terrible, but let’s bear in mind that things have been bad for a while now.

Not that it’s easy to forget, lol. In fact, ETH’s 1st sesson was the only anomaly in the past 4 years of near-total disaster since Ole left.

It’s the only season in which we managed a positive goal difference & win rate higher than 50%.

THE WINGBACK PREDICAMENT

Most of Manchester United’s gameplay issues come from not using the wingback role well. A thread 🧵👇

In possession:
• building in a 2-3-5, the WBs should be up the pitch, pinning the opposing FBs back
• alternatively, one of them might drop & rotate to distrupt press & create space
• instead, United’s WBs are taking up FB positions and congesting the 1st phase
• they are too deep and static, making it easy for opposition to press & deny space
• issue is made worse by CCB pushing up and getting marked out of the game
• this + lack of rotations makes us very vulnerable against good M2M presses

This setup gives an illusion of control in our own half, at the expense of progression and 2nd phase possession.

Furthermore, it means United’s WBs are often arriving late to final third, resorting to hopeful crosses against settled defenses.

Out of possession:
• WBs dropping back or pinned back to form a flat 5
• often dropping way too deep and narrow, to defend the box instead of stopping entries and crosses
• not supporting the press, negating the fact there is an extra CB in the back
• all of this leads to passive rather than proactive defending, moving our line deep

All in all, suboptimal use of two crucial players in a 3-4-3 system.

WBs should be providing fluidity and flexibility in all phases - at a level that FBs sometimes cannot provide due to their defensive duties.

Instead, we basically added an extra CB without managing to truly integrate the WB role into our system.

Wrote about this problem back in January and I think this still stands: Has there been any improvements in recent months? Much less than I would like.

You can see a positive change in Europa League games, with Dalot and Dorgu managing to run behind defenses and pin opposition back.

In fact, I would argue that key difference between PL and EL games has been our ability to force the WB as a much more proactive role.

This is due to:
• different physical levels: As Amorim said, we are able to dominate physically
• lower tactical levels: opposition not as quick to adapt & read our intention
• lower press intensity & organization

Even in EL games, though, it’s far from ideal, especially out of possession.

THE TWO TRANSITIONS PROBLEM

The problem for United is that they have simultaneously undertaken 2 major tactical transitions.

One is the move away from ETH’s direct model, which usually resulted in chaos-ball all over the pitch. In broad strokes, this means:

🔴 going long & direct from our half -> 🟢 controlled build-up with short passing, baiting and building with numbers

🔴 rushing or skipping 2nd stage progression -> 🟢 strategic progression through wide and central areas, using vertical rotations, switches & carries

🔴 direct and quick attacks, through high pressing, counters or winning 2nd balls -> 🟢 sustained final 3rd play & chance creation

🔴 relying on player’s decision-making -> 🟢 setting patterns to help players make decisions

🔴 high press as a chance-creation tool, mixed with quick retreat to box defending -> 🟢 more compact block with a high defensive line

These are broad principles that make sense for most teams looking to establish dominance; unfortunately for United, they were ignored for years.

The 2nd tactical transition is the way Amorim wants to achieve this control, which is very specific and includes positions, roles & traits we currently either don’t have, or are not elite at.

Examples include lack of natural WB options; limited passing & carrying range in the pivot, which increases the onus on WB progression; scarcity of #10 options, etc.

I might be wrong, but I’m beginning to think that the 1st, more fundamental transition, is not helped by starting the 2nd transition right away.

There are more players in the squad capable of 1st transition than there are players necessary for the 2nd.

And the 1st transition, the one of key principles, is much broader and more vital than the 2nd, which is more akin to application of said principles.

The 2nd cannot succeed without the 1st; the 1st is a prerequisite for the 2nd.

By starting both at the same time - which is to say, mid-season, without preparation, without specific personnel - we might be impeding both. A better plan might have been to use this season to develop building blocks and install fundamental principles of a control-based model, while maximizing assets in the squad.

And then use the summer to start the upgrade towards Amorim’a desired model.

DECAY & REPAIR

There are 3 main sources of gameplay issues at United. Understanding which is which is crucial to solving them in the next few seasons. Short 🧵

1. Execution / coaching:
Amorim has had limited with the squad and is trying to introduce lots of change and more control. Biggest one is moving from player-driven to pattern-driven play.

- more time to learn patterns & triggers: they need to become second nature rather than substantial cognitive effort

- confusion and insecurity in build up: players seem uncertain when to recycle and when to progress, esp. when pressed. previous setup demanded going direct a lot

- final 3rd frenzy / box attacking: as noted in many previous posts, moving away from hero ball to structured attacks will be a long process

- pivot passivity: central midfield players often stay covered during build up, not moving enough to offer viable progression options or pressing baits

2. Personnel gaps
United lack many profiles & traits in the squad, which was constructed for ETH’s direct model and personal preference.

- DM / CM: we’ve lacked a central playmaker for years, esp. a press-resistant one who could help with with deep build up, progression & play orchestration

- LWB / LB: between Shaw’s issues and Malacia’s rawness, pretty clear we need a starter here, a top physical profile

- CB: Yoro is the only one with elite channel defending potential & he is 18. Need to replace Lindelof and Evans

- AM: my suspicion is that we’ll need another Amad-like profile here, more of a playmaker than a runner into spaces

3. Tactics & structure
Even with enough time and perfect personnel, which parts of Amorim’s model might be suboptimal in the PL?

- relatively passive out of possession play: a concern when Amorim was announced

- demands on WBs: as @Silvakn0ws noted, they need to be both wingers & FBs now. tactical adjustments might be necessary

- set pieces: both due to personnel but also structural issues ⚠️

- commitment to building attacks: we still rush forward & fail to commit enough bodies to build up & 2nd phase Of course, many of there are interlinked and execution levels will ultimately depend on player quality and compatibility.

But it’s important to understand what the intent is, where the issues are coming from and how to tackle them.

THE RETENTION DEFENSE: Amorim tried something new against Arsenal

Amorim went for something new, fresh and progressive against Arsenal; he should be applauded for trying and mostly getting it right in the 1st half.

In that half, Arsenal had:
- 0 xG from open play (‼️)
- 0.23 total xG
- 3 shots on goal, 0 on target

Instead of our usual low block / counter tactics in big derbies, Amorim decided to mix his long-term principles with a pragmatic, low-risk approach.

The key element he used was United’s defending through retention, on a more proactive and ambitious scale than I assumed before the game.

The idea is simple, effective and employed by many top teams = when we have the ball, we don’t have to chase the ball.

While transitional teams love the ball-chasing chaos in order to generate more chaos, possession-first teams prefer the safer option of retaining.

Even if your attacking aspirations are limited - as ours against Arsenal clearly were - you can defend well by retaining well, greatly improving the risk-reward ratio.

There are numerous positive consequences:

🟢 when ball is lost, gaps betweeen players are smaller => structure intact

🟢 players executing fewer horizontal sprints, both to attack and defend => fresh when sprints are really needed

🟢 opposition starts losing patience & rushing => gaps appear in their block

🟢 more time on the ball => more strategic & less chaotic block manipulation.

The model is especially good when paired with vertical threats, meaning that you keep the ball and then release your runners when it makes sense to.

Granted, our execution was not ideal.

The risk-reward ratio was too much on the cautious side, so while we managed to stop Arsenal for ~50 mins, we barely created anything noteworthy.

We especially struggled to keep possession in their half, as Arsenal were exceptional at stopping our transitions.

Still, United rarely went for retention-as-defense in recent years; it is not a subtle change and deserves to be recognized as a good step forward.

And most importantly, it’s completely in line with our long-term vision👇 Since the Mou era, our approach in big games has mostly been to give up possession, move to a low or mid block and try to counter.

Sometimes, the block was higher, with more aggressive pressing to try and force mistakes.

Under Ole, this usually worked well:

THE AMORIM CHAIN REACTION: What is it and how to get it working?

The game model Ruben Amorim used at Sporting relied on interconnected vertical rotations to achieve control, progression, dynamism, numerical advantage & space manipulation.

It’s a key aspect of his game model and one that he will need to replicated at United if he is to be successful. 🧵👇

What do I mean by interconnected vertical rotations?

A player who formally belongs to one line automatically moves to the next line as play progresses. Which allows for a player from that line to move to the next one.

A chain reaction all over the pitch.

A player who starts as a central defender but spends most of his in posession time as a defensive midfielder. Which enables that a player who starts as a deep connector ends up as an attacking midfielder.

One rotation enabling the next, multiplying in energy and potency.

At their core, these vertical rotations are following the fluid logic of WBs in a modern system.

The WBs, by definition, constantly move from being part of the defensive unit to being part of the attacking unit during the game. They are both and they are neither.

Under Amorim, this same logic is applied to the spine of the team - the key central positions - to get positional flexibility & numerical advantage, line by line.

Almost every top team does a version of this somewhere on the pitch, usually a FB moving to midfield, but at Sporting, Amorim seemed completely dedicated to this.

It was systematic and automated, fluidity through rigidity, an in-possession cheat code. How does it work?

- a GK moves forward & becomes a CCB, to split the CBs and form a back 3

- that allows the CCB to move forward & become a DM to form a double pivot, in a very early stage

These two changes now form a back 5 in a 3-2 structure.

AMORIM'S BUILD UP: GOOD INTENT, POOR EXECUTION

The best part bout United yesterday’s performance was the new intent in how we want to build attacks.

We aimed to start building from very deep areas, in order to bait the Ipswich to attack us high, and we aimed to use short passing to play through their press.

It was a refreshing change from what we used to do, especially when faced with high pressing: against Tottenham, for example, we were pumping it long, hoping to avoid their press by not having the ball.

If we want to build a progressive game model, it begins with a high-ceiling build up model.

Now, to be clear: the execution of said build up intent against Ipswich was pretty bad. For the most part, we struggled to bait, progress and manipulate their blocks.

But the intent was clearly there, and that's what matters. Now we have to stick with it and improve it through game experience, coaching & personnel upgrades.

Let's dig in - a short thread on how we tried to build attacks. 👇


Here is Onana, in one of our first settled possessions, forming a back 3 with Evans and Maz, with a Case - MDL pivot in front of them.

They are positioned extremely deep, to bait the press. Onana waits quite a bit to invite pressure before passing to MDL.

MATTERS OF CHARACTER

After Rashford and Casemiro praised Amorim’s first training sessions, many were quick to note similar praise for ETH when he was getting started.

The implication was clear: these players will praise everyone at first and then fail to deliver when it matters.

It plays into a common myth, perpetuated by the rage-baiting media complex, that United players are getting their manages sacked - either on purpose or by lack of effort.

Even fans who don’t go that far will often claim that a cultural reset in the dressing room is needed before any further gameplay considerations.

And the previous manager also spent years claiming that United’s problems stem from player mentality, not his tactics.

Do we really need another cultural reset? Were our previous projects merely victims of bad player mentality, their low determination and poor character?

In short, have the recent issues at United been primarily cultural - matters of mentality and character, not tactics nor technical ability?

Are United’s players getting the managers sacked because they struggle with pressure?

It’s an intriguing theory. And one that is flat out wrong.

One can only claim that if one knows next to nothing about group dynamics, organizational psychology and management principles.

Let’s dig in 🧵👇 Firstly, what is character in football?

There seems to be a romantic notion of players as soldiers and managers as cheiftains, marching into battle to spill sweat, blood and tears.

It’s an image that plays well with general audiences, often promoted by tough-talking ex-players.

Was ETH doomed by United's bad attackers?

Under ex-manager Erik Ten Hag, Manchester United created 27 big chances in the PL this season, missing 22 of them.

United have also been also the most underpeforming team in terms of goals scored versus xG created - only 8 goals out of 14.84 xG⚠️

The logical conclustion is that poor shot conversion is what doomed ETH this year and ultimately led to his sacking. If you can't score what you create, how can you expect to win games and get points?

And does this mean that Amorim or whoever comes next will face the same problems with our attack? In other words, if these big chance misses doomed ETH, will they doom the next manager, as well?

But of course, it's a bit more complicated than that. A quick look👇 First, what is a big chance, anyway? The official definition provided by Opta:

“There is no such thing as a new idea. Only new and curious combinations” - Mark Twain

I maintain that this United squad is closer to competing for top spots than is generally acknowledged; after the calamity of last season and the turbulent start to his season, it’s easy to be gaslighted into thinking our quality is mid table.

But realistically, it’s a squad full of exciting young talent & players ready to peak in the next few seasons.

What the squad most urgently lacks:
- playmaking DM (starter-level)
- progresssive LB (starter-level)
- specialist 1v1 winger (rotation)
- channel-defending CB (rotation)

And at some not-too-distant point, we’ll also need a connector-type CM to rotate with Mainoo (though Mount can play there, too).

The good news is that in many of these positions, we have players that will need replacing anyway: Casemiro, Eriksen, Lindelof, Evans, Anthony… And there will a hard but necessary decision to make on Shaw.

It’s not a perfect squad and lacks some key profiles - namely a playmaking #6 organizer - but with the right additions, it could become extremely strong.

And yet… We have a good mix of experienced players (Bruno, Onana, Rashford, Maguire), players about to peak (Dalot, MDL, Martinez, Ugarte, Mount, Maz) and great young talent (Garnacho, Mainoo, Hojlund, Amad, Yoro…).

UNITED - BRENTFORD TACTICAL PREVIEW

The game against Brentford will be an interesting matchup, and one that United should be winning. But…

Brentford are pragmatic, tactically layered, aggressive with pressing but usually low with their block, smart and savy, direct when opportune, with a very high level of efficiency in attack.

They are complex: a team that often defends deep and uses long balls, but loves to rush forward into high areas for tackles and second balls.

A team that uses lots of long passes, but can keep possession and build its attacks carefully, as well.

Look at these Brentford stats:
- 20th in PPDA
- 20th in allowed box entries per opposition attack
- 18th in defensive line height
- 1st in blocks, 2nd in saves
- 2nd in successful long passes
- 1st in successful long passes by GK

From this you’d think they are are a traditional low block & counter-attacking underdog, reliant on blocks, saves and long balls. But then:

- 3rd in pressing intensity
- 2nd in tackles won in opposition third
- 1st in xG per shot
- 1st in % of shots on targets
- 1st in avg. distance to goal per shot

Brentford allow most passes per defensive action in the PL, but they are also 2nd in tackles won in opposition third.

They use lots of long balls and direct attacks, but are in 1st shooting efficiency and 1st in shooting close to the goal. 🤯

Layered and flexible.

Using the limited resources at his disposal, Frank has constructed a very solid team that has been careful not to press too high for their own good & to go direct when it has sense to.

And when they attack, they mean it - for example, after kick-offs, they attack like a NFL team, committing players forward with elaborate schemes to get into good crossing positions.

It should thus be a fascinating and tough game for us.

They will allow us time on the ball & relatively easy progression into final 3rd - but it comes with some important caveats 🧵👇 At 16.8, Brentford’s PPDA (passes per defensive action) is the highest in the PL and 2x the league median, indicating a low press and usually no intent to stop opposition build up:

HOW ETH IS FAILING TO GET THE MOST OUT OF HIS BEST PLAYERS

A key aspect of our poor perfomances in the last 14 months is how ineffective some of our best players have been.

EETH is very good at identifying individual traits and utilizing them; his lucklustre game model, however, is very poor at combining that into a coherent whole.

An element of compromise and flexibility exists in every setup, but generally speaking, you want your best players to have the highest chance of success.

That’s how to make your whole larger than the sum of all parts. And our best players are clearly not getting the best conditions to succeed.

Nowhere is this more apparent than with Marcus Rashford, Bruno Fernandes and Andre Onana 🧵👇


1. Marcus Rashford 🔴

In 3 seasons under ETH, Rashford has consistently been having fewer and fewer shots:

2022 / 2023 - 3.38 shots per 90
2023 / 2024 - 2.28 shots per 90
2024 / 1025 - 1.13 shots per 90

A dramatic 66% drop ⚠️

I have no idea what goes on during United’s sessions and how we prepare for specific opposition.

But what Benni seems to be saying here is that the players are high-quality players who then fail to perform well in matches, which comes as a shock to ETH.

Either all of our players are suffering from imposter syndrome and collective panic attacks once they enter the pitch, or the way we set them up is poor.

If you watch the games, the answer is really obvious: no level of mental fortitude can make a player overcome our terrible plan against Tottenham.

It’s just impossible - throw peak Messi into that mess and fans would be rage-posting about him being a shite player and a fraud.

More broadly, this goes in line with how ETH approaches players and tactics in general.

Unlike managers like Pep who say they create solutions which allow their players to execute well, ETH wants the players to come up with solutions during games.

He sets broad & flexible principles, based on player availability, opposition & game state, but clearly expects the players to solve things like build-up patterns on their own.

In-game rondos, beloved by the “tactics don’t exist” crowd, are an example of excellent player problem-solving that sadly isn’t scalable nor very replicable.

If you have the best players in the league, you can rondo your way out of a high press, for example - but it’s not really sustainable, which is why top teams develop advanced patterns and habits.

It’s therefore completely logical that ETH sees excellent players in training who then fail to replicate that during the games. For him, it’s *always* on the players, never the system.

And I just don’t think that’s correct. We have lots of young players in the team, but many are ex-Bayern, PSG, Juventus, Chelsea & Ajax who have dealt with pressure and big stages before.

You can’t tell me these guys got reduced to dust upon seeing the great Ange and his gorious side, currently sitting in 9th.

ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM How Ten Hag's initial success created a ghost

In 2022 / 2023, his first season at United, Erik Ten Hag created a pragmatic tactical model that maximized individual quality and got great results, until it started collapsing.

And 2 years later, United are still haunted by it. 🧵

The model relied on a compact mid / low block off the ball and quick vertical movement on the ball, an effective cocktail of box defending and fast attacking of the opposition's box.

There were important differences between that and what Ole did in previous seasons.

While Ole was looking to win the ball in the midfield, compressing it with a high defensive line, ETH was content to soak up more pressure and rely on reactive box defending.

Why? Because the model actually invited teams to press us, so that we could play through them. We wanted Licha and Shaw to have time on the ball, baiting opponents into high pressing.

It was, in fact, the model's key feature: when teams took the bait, we'd quickly get the ball to Eriksen or Casemiro, who would then spray risky progressive passes up front to Rashford or Bruno.

It was simple, but very effective, maximizing quality in the team:
- Varane's box defending
- Casemiro's ball-winning & progressive passing
- Eriksen's connective passing & switches
- Bruno's progressive passing & finishing
- Rashford's runs in behind and finishing

For a few months it seemed like a magic potion, a cheat code, god mode enabled, because it did what a model is supposed to do. It gave the players context to successfuly excecute, while masking some of their weaknesses.

Which is why Casemiro looked so good - minus problems with rest defense, we were relatively compact and gave him the ideal platform to dive into tackles with minimial risk and play it forward.

Why is why Rashford scored so much - freed from playmaking & defensive duties, he was given the ideal platform to utilize his running, carrying and finishing from wide positions.

It was clearly not a high ceiling approach, but seemed like a triumph of short-term pragmatism, tactical micro-ploys and correct usage of key players.

Even when we didn't play very well, you just had a sense we would get the win. United were back and all was good. All was good, that is, until we stopped getting the wins. 👇 The system had a lethal, Death Star-level flaw: when teams refused to take the bait, or had elite pressing that suffocated us, there was no alternative plan for building & progressing.

Which is exactly what started happening mid-season, and the magic was soon gone.

ERIK TEN HAG’S FINAL PLEA: Should we trust the process?

The most telling detail last night was not something that happened during the game.

Nothing in the game was new - we’ve seen it all before. The naive press structure, shambolic central gaps, last-ditch box survival.

The most telling detail, in fact, occured after, during ETH’s post-game interview.

“Don’t judge us now. We’re in the process. Judge us at the end of the season”, he said.

It’s a pretty common line used by many a managers under pressure. Give us more time, let us weather the storm.

Granted, a bit cynical and unconvicing coming from a manager in his 3rd year. But common and expected.

But then Erik Ten Hag let something else slip.

“That’s what I said last season as well, and…”

And this, I think, is the crux of the issue; he genuinly seems to think last season ended up being a successful one because of the FA Cup win.

That he was right all along last year, as well, that more time was needed for his process and that the process yielded a cup win.

But that’s not what happened at all. 🧵

Process would suggest we’ve seen some journey from point A to point B, some positive development of the team, some signs that a brighter future was possible.

There was no process, only chaos; there was no development, only sporadic incidents; there were no bright signs, only outcries of individual quality.

In fact, as the season went on, we got worse and worse. Save for the last few games, when the team managed to consolidate & win the cup.

And yet, ETH says he would trust the process, and everything will he fine. Just like it was last year, as well. Last season was not a desirable outcome, a hallmark of success, an argument in favor of process; it was a graveyard of football that we need to prevent from happening ever again.

And what needed to happen was for us to be born again; otherwise, we would end up being busy dying.