In the early morning of July 26th, multiple videos surfaced showing a UAV strike on the Russian "Signal" radio plant in Stavropol. Our team has conducted a preliminary BDA assessment and gathered key context on the facility’s role in Russia’s military production. 🧵Thread:
2/ The factory is located roughly 500 km from the area under Ukrainian control. The strike targeted one of its production facilities, around the 2nd and 3rd floor. The building appears to have avoided critical structural damage, though localized fires were reported
3/ The facility serves both military and civilian sectors. In recent decades, Signal has been involved in a range of defense and industrial projects. Notably, it supplied cathodic protection equipment for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran.
4/ The facility makes various types of radio-electronics. It is known to be involved in the design and production of EW systems such as the SAP-518 and SAP-518SM, as well as the “Khibiny” jamming stations, which are deployed on aircrafts such as the Su-34, Su-35S, and Su-27SM3
5/ The facility supplied the “Bars” system for Russia’s Liana reconnaissance satellite and supplies “Redut” electronic warfare system for the Tu-160 strategic bombers. It has also played an active role in the development and modernization of the Krasukha EW
6/ The Signal facility includes 7 production workshops, a testing center, and 2 design bureaus: the Microelectronics Workshop, the Mechanical Workshop, the Electroplating and PCB Workshop, the Power Electronics Workshop, and the Assembly and Mounting Workshop.
7/ Given the facility’s size and multiple buildings, our team assesses that the damage from the strike was likely limited. Some equipment may have been damaged by fire or the initial blast, potentially delaying production if the damaged section involved critical bottlenecks.
8/ As our team previously assessed, while successful, the strikes on Russian production facilities in 2024–2025, despite increasing in frequency and effectiveness, have generally lacked the payload necessary to cause prolonged disruptions or complete shutdowns of production.
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10/ The photo matches the building on the video and appears authentic. Damage is concentrated on the impact floor, indicating a localized damage. Vertical burn marks suggest a fuel-based fire, but no visible signs of spread, meaning that the fire was quickly contained
11/ Another video shows a second drone flying over the already-hit building. The lack of smoke implies no major fire followed the initial strike. The impact of the second strike is unclear. OSINT geolocator @99Dominik_ suggests the nearby facility was hit
Another Ukrainian drone strike inside Russia, likely targeting a railway traction substation in the Volgograd region. The strike caused a visible fire. Some reports mentioned a nearby oil refinery, but our analysis points to the substation. More details in the thread:
2/ NASA’s FIRMS system locates the fire in the area where the substation is located, marked by the red rectangle on the map. The governor of Volgograd also stated - due to falling drone debris, power supply to the railway’s network in the Oktyabrsky district has been disrupted
3/ The Zhutovo railway traction substation (110/35/27/10 kV) powers the electrified rail line between Volgograd and Kotelnikovo. Disabling it cuts power to electric trains, disrupting traffic along this important logistical route. But what makes it particularly important?
When it comes to the results of Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia, one of the most asked questions is why Ukrainian drone strikes cause damage that often appears insufficient. The answer lies largely in engineering trade-offs: the balance between range and payload. Thread 🧵:
2/ Drones that fly far have to allocate a lot of their weight and space to fuel/batteries, which leaves less room for explosives. Long range also creates aerodynamic issues - to carry more fuel, drones needs to be bigger, which makes them heavier, slower, easier to intercept
3/ Advanced materials and engineering could help mitigate these limitations, but such solutions often dramatically increase costs and reduce scalability, which are critical factors in a war of attrition. And even high-end drones remain vulnerable to simple and cheap air defense
Frontelligence Insight estimates that by the end of June 2025, Russian combat fatalities may have reached, or even surpassed, 250,000. The projection is based on a synthetic estimation model that extrapolates from regionally confirmed, by-name casualty records.
🧵Thread:
2/ The team drew on confirmed casualty data compiled by Idel.Realities and Baikal Stories, tallying losses by region of origin and comparing them to each region’s working-age male population (defined as ages 16 to 60). The analysis covered 17 Russian regions.
3/ For example, in Buryatia, as of mid-June 2025, 2,924 service members killed in action had been confirmed by name. Official data puts the region’s male population at around 455,000, with ~284,800 (about 62.6%) aged 16 to 60. That gives a 1.03% KIA rate among working-age men
The Pokrovsk area remains the most active, with over a third of the 174 combat engagements recorded along the frontline in the past 24 hours taking place in this area, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:
2/ Russian forces continue pressing to cut the T0515 Pokrovsk – Dobropillia road, particularly around Rodynske and Bilytske. This route, once a logistical route for Ukrainian troops, has seen reduced use due to sustained drone threats
3/ Logistics are only part of the concern. Should Ukrainian forces be forced to withdraw from Pokrovsk, a safe passage would be vital to avoid a repeat of Bakhmut, where retreat routes were reduced to narrow corridors exposed to Russian artillery and ATGM fire
Strong and timely piece from the FT on Andriy Yermak, head of the Presidential Administration and Ukraine’s “Grey Cardinal.” While I don’t agree with everything, the reporting offers valuable criticism worth unpacking in a thread. Key takeaways:
2/ Andriy Yermak isn’t Ukraine’s president but he often acts like one. As Head of the Presidential Office, he drafts peace plans, conducts back-channel diplomacy, and appoints key official. Both the prime minister and senior military leaders are said to routinely defer to him.
3/ In interviews with Financial Times over 40 sources, current and former Ukrainian officials, Western diplomats in Kyiv, and officials in Europe and Washington, many said Yermak holds influence equal to, or greater than, President Zelenskyy.
Instead of replying to each question, I decided to put together a thread that better explains the context of the recent protest, and why this particular law triggered such an unexpected reaction, especially for those, who don’t follow internal Ukrainian politics. 🧵Thread:
2/ It’s no secret that Ukraine has struggled with corruption. That was one of the main drivers behind the 2013–2014 protests, which eventually led to President Yanukovych being ousted. In the years that followed, Ukraine created specialized anti-corruption institutions to fight it
3/ These institutions were strongly supported, and even required, by the EU and Western partners as conditions for deeper integration and the visa-free regime. The goal was to establish bodies that were independent of presidential control and subject to civilian oversight.