Adam May Profile picture
Jul 28 7 tweets 9 min read Read on X
$ABVX may be up a lot since last week, but the upside from $66 remains significant. IMO, $ABVX is probably the single most obvious M&A candidate I have ever seen, and the price it's trading at remains quite attractive relative to M&A comps.

You could argue that UC has been the single biggest indication for biotech M&A over the last ~5 years. So far, essentially everything else that has made it past P2 successfully has been bought out (with lofty valuations to boot). $ABVX is in rare territory now, since nothing else like this has even made it this far (past P3) without getting bought out!

Let's go over $ABVX's data and compare it to M&A cases. I'll explain why $ABVX's final destination is, in my biased opinion, well north of $150/share.
1) What $ABVX Just Showed
The results of their P3 studies were incredible. $ABVX has shown:
➡️The 3rd highest clinical remission delta ever seen in a P3 program (16.4%). The only two drugs to have higher deltas are Rinvoq and Veslipity, both with dangerous safety warnings on label.
➡️Squeaky clean safety. Adverse event rates were essentially the same on drug as with placebo...transient headaches were the only tolerability signal (already known from P2 data), and they only lasted an average of 2 days before going away on their own...
➡️Excellent Secondary Endpoint Efficacy. Specifically, a 27% endoscopic improvement delta (the most objective endpoint in UC) is the 2nd highest ever recorded in P3, exceeded only by Rinvoq (which has multiple potentially fatal side effects with black box warning).

$ABVX posted these incredible results despite the facts that:
➡️Their trial enrolled the highest percentage of JAKi refractory patients in any UC trial EVER. Much like their P2b, their P3 showed incredible results despite treating more severe patients than any comparator drug.
➡️Their induction timepoint was only 8 weeks. Most other new studies are using 12-14 week induction timepoints, because the remission delta increases with longer treatment. $ABVX cut no corners, and is still beating the comps that sandbag their data by running longer induction periods.

Top tier efficacy and water-like safety despite treating the most severe patient population ever, all in a convenient once-daily pill that requires no pre-initiation bloodwork/lab testing...this P3 readout for $ABVX was a GRAND SLAM.
2) General M&A Comps for $ABVX

🗒️Important Note: There are no post-phase 3 data M&A comps we can make for $ABVX because...EVERYTHING ELSE HAS BEEN BOUGHT OUT *BEFORE* PHASE 3 DATA ARRIVED!

The table attached summarizes the main M&A case studies in this space, with $ABVX's upside to those prices ranging from 37%-120%.

In the slides that follow, I will break down these comps and explain why I think that $ABVX should be valued even higher than the high end of that M&A range (yes, I think remaining upside should be >120%).Image
3) $ABVX Vs S1P1 M&A Comps
Zeposia and Velsipity are S1P1 drugs that were acquired for $7.2B and $6.7B respectively (37-47% upside from $ABVX's current valuation). Here are the reasons that $ABVX's drug should be valued much higher than these S1P1 comps were:

1⃣ SAFETY! ABVX is headed for a squeaky clean safety label. This is not only comforting for doctors/patients, but it also opens the door to combination therapy with other drugs that might be immunosuppressive without worrying about increasing infection risk.

2⃣Ease of Use! Both are once-daily oral drugs, but the S1P1 class has highly burdensome initiation requirements. Once your GI doctor decides to put you on one and goes through the infection risks with you, you then have to go through many other hoops BEFORE you can start the drug:
↪️Bloodwork must be performed and result normal (CBC, LFTs, Hep B/C, VZV IgG, HIB, TB test)
↪️Ophthalmologic (eye) exam must be done (due to risk of macular edema from the drug)
↪️Electrocardiogram (heart monitoring) due to the risk of heart block
👉$ABVX's obefazimod should have none of these burdensome initiation requirements. Your GI doc prescribes it that day, and you are both DONE. GI docs will vastly prefer this low-friction prescription, and given that it has high efficacy with no safety concerns...why wouldn't they?!

3⃣Uniqueness of MoA! There were multiple S1P1 drugs in the pipeline for UC at the time of these acquisitions (Velsipity and Zeposia approved in the US, and VTX-002 was among a list of others). The fact that there would be intra-class competition in the S1P1 market was known at the time of these acquisitions, however...
↪️$ABVX's miR-124 MoA is the only drug known to be in development ANYWHERE with that MoA right now! There is no competition anywhere in site for this drug. This will be a huge advantage for its uptake.
➡️In an era where any promising drug target gets flooded with dozens of "me too" drugs with the same MoA, it is incredibly rare to see a drug with a unique MoA like this be so efficacious in such a large indication with ZERO competition. This is a truly rare asset for big pharma.

4⃣Timeline advantage. $ABVX is already through the bulk of its P3 studies, whereas the S1P1s were bought out months to years BEFORE P3 induction readouts. Not only is ABVX closer to making money, but they also have less risk than the S1P1s did, and ABVX will require far less funding to finish up their P3 program than the S1P1s did!

Noting the 4 points above, it is obvious to me that $ABVX's Obefazimod is worth significantly more than the $6.7-$7.2B price tags that these S1P1 drugs fetched. The current $4.9B valuation cannot, in my opinion, last long.
4) $ABVX Vs TL1A M&A Comps
The two main comps for TL1A valuations are RVT-3101 from $ROIV And Tulisokibart from $RXDX. Let's focus on why I think $ABVX should be worth MORE than the $10.8B price tag that Tulisokibart fetched.

1⃣Uniqueness of MoA. TL1A has interesting P2 data so far, but it is another victim of the "me too" phenomenon in biotech. There are at least 4 TL1A drugs with P2 level data ALREADY (tulisokibart, RVT-3101, Afimkibart, Duvakitug).
↪️$ABVX's obefazimod is the ONLY drug with its MoA with data of any kind, and it is already through phase 3 data! The uniquness of obefazimods' will be a HUGELY valuable asset in its launch, but the "me-four+" status of the TL1As hasn't stopped pharma from paying >$10B for these drugs...how much more could $ABVX be worth as potentially the only unique asset in the IBD space?

2⃣Development Timeline. $ABVX is years ahead of all TL1A drugs. It will make its mark and take market share for years before a single TL1A arrives on the market to compete.

3⃣SAFE and ORAL treatment. $ABVX's obefazimod is on track for a perfectly clean safety label. TL1As have not yet shown major safety risks, but their data is all very early (versus 4-6 year OLE and P3 level data for $ABVX). TL1A is in the TNFa pathway, which already has a black box warning...there is a strong chance that the TL1A drugs all end up with some safety warning and/or lab testing requirements that Obefazimod will not have.
↪️And of course, $ABVX's drug is a once-daily oral, versus all TL1A drugs being infusion and/or SubQ injections!

4⃣Efficacy Comparisons. The TL1a class has so far boasted P2 induction remission deltas in the 20s, which would hurdle $ABVX's 3rd-highest-ever phase 3 rate of 16.4% IF the TL1As can reproduce those numbers in larger trials. However, there are huge caveats to consider here, and I feel strongly that $ABVX's drug is actually MORE efficacious than the TL1A class is!
↪️$ABVX's remission delta was measured at only 8 weeks...the TL1a drugs are all using 12-14 week timepoints for induction, so they are artificially increasing their efficacy numbers by simply running longer induction studies!
↪️The point above is potentially proven by comparing the phase 2 maintenance data of obefazimod versus tulisokibart. See the figure attached. When you compare the maintenance data $ABVX generated in P2 versus Tulisokibart's, $ABVX absolutely crushes the TL1A class's efficacy on this apples-to-apples maintenance data comparison.

So, I think that the case is strong to support the idea that $ABVX's Obefazimod is better than the TL1A class in every way. More efficacious, safer, unique MoA, and further along in development. IMO, $ABVX should fetch a buyout valuation HIGHER than the $10.8B price tag that Tulisokibart did.

That would set the M&A valuation floor at ~$146/share with $ABVX's current OS.Image
5) $PTGX and $MORF $ABVX Valuation Comps
$MORF should be minimally discussed, as it was bought out SUPER early without even having any randomized data. Still, its $3.2B valuation goes to show how even tiny/unvalidated datasets in UC can be very valuable for safe, oral drugs. This shows how $4.9B post-P3 induction data for $ABVX is an absurdly low valuation.

The more interesting value comparator is likely $PTGX, who owns only 6-10% of their oral IL-23 drug (Icotrokinra). This small royalty ownership makes it hard to precisely value their UC asset, but on the day they disclosed their P2 UC data, their valuation rose $1.25B. If you use the high end of their royalty ownership (10%) and multiply their stock move by 10, the "value" of that P2 dataset that day was $12.5B.
↪️This would translate to a price per share of $169 for $ABVX
➡️Note that $PTGX's P2 remission delta was 19% (higher than $ABVX's 16.4% in P3), but I fully expect that $PTGX's phase 3 efficacy will be LOWER than ABVX's.
❓Why❓
👉$PTGX's numbers were small n, and UC is a noisy indication. Note that in ABTECT1 (one of $ABVX's 2 phase 3 studies) both the 25mg and 50mg arms had HIGHER remission deltas than $PTGX had in P2 at 21.4% and 19.3%.
↪️So, in Phase 3, I expect $PTGX's efficacy to come down and be lower than $ABVX's 16.4% week 8 number.
👉I am confident in this prediction because there are already 4 (!!!) IL23 inhibitors approved for ulcerative colitis, and NONE of them has EVER shown a clinical remission delta as high as $ABVX just showed. We already know what the IL23 MoA is capable of in UC, and $ABVX hurdled that bar. $PTGX will match the historic IL-23 bar at best, which is lower than what $ABVX has shown.

So, again, we have the $PTGX comp that would get $ABVX's valuation close to $170/share, DESPITE the fact that $PTGX has a me-five MoA that is multiple YEARS behind $ABVX's obefazimod...the stock price in the $60s continues to look like ridiculous value any way we cut the data.
$ABVX Valuation Summary & My BIASED Opinion:

The high end of IBD M&A comps of $10.8B would put $ABVX's current valuation at $146/share. The (very rough) $PTGX "value" comparison gets it close to $170/share. Despite these numbers conveying significant upside from here, I don't think that even these lofty numbers adequately capture the incredible value of $ABVX's asset.

➡️$ABVX has the ONLY drug with a unique MoA on the UC market (assuming MORF gets to market). TL1A is already at Me-four. IL-23 is at me-five. Meanwhile, $ABVX's obefazimod doesn't even have any competitor drugs in human studies....
➡️$ABVX is likely to have a squeaky clean safety label with no pre-initiation testing requirements. This is not only good for patient/physician uptake, but also means that it can be combined with any MoA on the market without worrying about safety risks!
➡️$ABVX's efficacy is top-tier, likely only clearly beat by Rinvoq, which has the worst safety label on the market. Even the TL1A class looks inferior to Obefazimod when you look at available maintenance data comparisons and adjust for longer induction timepoints! Eventual oral competitors like $MORF and $PTGX are using me-too MoAs that we already know the efficacy ceiling for from their injectable counterparts...$ABVX beat those class's induction efficacy in P3 already!
➡️$ABVX is further along in development than all of these valuation comps! They are not only closer to commercialization, but the bulk of their trial burn is behind them AND the risk of disappointing P3 induction data is eliminated already!

So how do *I* value $ABVX's potential M&A price tag? Well, as discussed above, I think the drug is clearly worth more than the $10.8-$12.5B high end of comparators for multiple reasons.

The blockbuster Entyvio is already doing >$6B annual sales in IBD, largely because it is a SAFE drug that works. $ABVX's drug is looking just as safe, but more efficacious, and ORAL as opposed to IV infusion like Entyvio...Assuming that $ABVX gets to just HALF of the peak sales of Entyvio is likely conservative IMO...so $3B peak sales for Obefazimod. Then assign a 5x valuation multiple to that, and you arrive at a very rough $15B M&A value for $ABVX, or ~$203/share.

Yes, this may seem lofty, but I actually think this is plausible. I expect a bidding war for this asset as it could fit in LITERALLY ANY big pharma's UC strategy. There is no UC drug that obefazimod *couldn't* be combined with. It is HIGHLY efficacious. It is EXTERMELY safe. It will be the only drug on the market with a unique MoA. It is YEARS ahead of other drugs that have already fetched $10B+ valuations. IMO, GI doctors will be handing this drug out like candy to IBD patients and pharma companies will engage in a bidding war to make it their own.

Although $200+/share may seem like a stretch when you see the stock currently trading around $66, if you look at the data and the comparator valuations...I personally don't think such a price tag is a stretch at all.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Adam May

Adam May Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @A_May_MD

Jul 21
I won't share in depth pitches like $NKTR often (2/year?). Only with really compelling setups. I've got another one now. The market says PoS is VERY low and that upside could be 10x+. Like with $NKTR, I think the data say success is far more likely than the market thinks.

The name is $ABVX (Abivax).
Like with $NKTR, I will share my long-form research on $ABVX, for free, via google doc (linked below). This $ABVX research is extensive, and the document is substantially longer than $NKTR’s was at ~25,000 words. It will take a lot to get through it, but I think the case for ABVX here is compelling. IMO the market hasn’t even remotely priced the stock correctly for what I think are relatively high odds of success yielding multibagger potential in August.

With that said, we need to cover some REALLY important notes on bias and risk:
1⃣ I am long $ABVX, meaning my opinions here are heavily biased. Keep this in mind throughout any of my research that you read.
2⃣THIS IS AN EXCEPTIONALLY RISKY READOUT WITH 90%+ DOWNSIDE POTENTIAL ⚠️📉⚠️
➡️NKTR’s downside potential was “only” ~50%. $ABVX is FAR riskier, and nearly your entire position could be wiped out when the data come if it fails. PLEASE consider the extreme risk involved in this setup!!!

Now, I actually believe that $ABVX’s odds of success are higher than $NKTR’s were going into data, and I spend a ton of time attacking the existing $ABVX data from every possible angle in order to support this opinion. I’ll post the link to my research below. The next slide provides a rough outline of this thread. If you’re not going to follow/understand anything else from this entire pitch, make sure you check out “Slide 6” 😉

docs.google.com/document/d/1NI…Image
Outline of $ABVX thread (don’t miss slide 6!):
Slide 1⃣: Overview of $ABVX and its past
Slide 2⃣: Why is it so cheap?! Overview of main bear theses
Slide 3⃣: P2b Induction data
Slide 4⃣: P2b Maintenance data
Slide 5⃣: P2a+P2b Long term OLE data and attrition analysis
Slide 6⃣: P3 pre-disclosed maintenance arm enrollment (the🔑slide, IMO!)
Slide 7⃣: What is success worth? UC M&A case studies
Slide 8⃣: My projections for the upcoming P3 readout
Slide 9⃣: Summary of thoughts
Read 12 tweets
Mar 31
My $HIMS short thread.

I’ve been open about being short $HIMS (so understand I am biased). At first this was mostly a counter-momentum short during the short squeeze over $70. However, since then, it has become clear to me that the company is being led into serious legal trouble with apparent reckless abandon.

I’m not a lawyer, but as a biotech investor I do have a better understanding of pharma IP than the “average” person, as well as a better understanding of physician liability as a doctor myself. However, frankly, you really don’t need legal experience to understand why parts of the $HIMS strategy *cannot* not be allowed. If bulls can take of their rose-tinted glasses at least momentarily and actually consider the points I’ll make here, I think basic common sense would suffice to arrive at many of the same conclusions I have.

tl;dr summary of points:
➡️The personalized semaglutide scam being committed at scale would kill pharmaceutical IP, leading to the end of new drug development (yes, I'm serious). HIMS is on a one-way train to getting their assess sued off for this.
➡️Physicians who take part in the personalized dosing scam should be aware that they are opening *themselves* up to huge legal liability in so doing.
➡️HIMS CEO is making bold statements about the efficacy of the oral weight loss “solution” that go against medical evidence. The company is at *high* risk of the FDA taking legal action on this false advertising.
➡️The $HIMS super bowl ad also skirted drug advertising laws, and litigation for this appears likely to me as well. Oh, and the blurred out images of Ozempic that they included in the commercial will bring $NVO lawyers knocking at their door as well.
➡️The company employs unscrupulous and dangerous prescribing behaviors by pushing medications without appropriate medical review (as reviewed in a recent WSJ article)

All of this translates to an untrustworthy company. Do you really want to take their word for how bullish their setup is *while their leadership is constantly dumping shares on the open market*?
The "personalized" semaglutide dosing scam.

$HIMS *cannot* be allowed to sell “personalized” semaglutide at scale. The company has doubled & tripled down on this idea both on the recent earnings call and on the Hims House podcast last week. The thought is that the company can make “personalized” (i.e. non-commercially available) doses of semaglutide through a 503A compounding pharmacy loophole that allows special doses to be made for patients in rare situations where, for some abnormal reason, the standard dosing will not work for them.

People must understand that exploiting this loophole “at scale” like $HIMS is trying to do WOULD MEAN THE END OF PHARMACEUTICAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.

If a generic drug company like $HIMS can simply slightly modify dosing or formulation of an on-patent drug and suddenly be allowed to reap substantial profit from something that a pharma company discovered, developed, and owns, *what would stop generic drug companies from doing this with EVERY patented drug in the world?* There would be nothing to stop generic/compounding companies from stealing the intellectual property of every drug on the market by simply dose-modifying or adding inert compounds to the formula.

$HIMS manipulating the 503A specialized dosing rule may seem innocuous at first - “So what, some people will get some cheap Ozempic and $NVO will lose some money.” But if you actually consider the implications of this precedent even for a moment, it is clear that this scheme could be applied to *any* patented drug. Suddenly pharmaceutical IP is meaningless, and now there is no longer *any* financial protection/incentive for discovering new drugs. New drug development stops.

IMO, it is not at all a stretch to see how the first domino of $HIMS mass-selling “personalized” doses of semaglutide leads to others doing the same thing with other patented drugs, which leads to the end of the pharmaceutical industry and new drug development as we know it.

“Oh come on Adam, that will never happen”. Correct. It will not happen because $HIMS will NOT be allowed to get away with this. The 503A specialized dose “loophole” exists for RARE exceptions in order to help patients who would be at risk of serious harm (example - a small child with a cancer that is treated by a drug that has so far only been approved in adults. They need a much smaller dose than what is available, so 503A allows a compounding pharmacy to legally help this child with a non-commercially available dose).

The 503A specialized dose “loophole” does NOT exist so that $HIMS and other generic drug leeches can steal Novo Nordisk’s intellectual property and make their own c-suite rich by selling stock. If the company actually goes through exploiting this well-intentioned rule in that way, they will be stopped. They will be stopped because they *MUST* be stopped if we are going to preserve the system for developing new drugs.

The idea that $HIMS will actually be able to get away with this is ludicrous, and the CEO repeatedly telling his retail investors that it's not going to be a problem MASSIVELY undermines his credibility and trustworthiness in my book. When he reassures us about something that is so obviously wrong/not going to work, why would we believe him about anything else?
HIMS contracted physicians are at *huge* liability risk in the personalized dosing scam

Another note on this $HIMS “personalized” dosing scam. The physicians who are complicit with prescribing these off-label doses en masse had better watch their backs. You are opening yourself up to incredible legal liability by being a part of this IP scam.

Prescriber data is readily available to regulatory bodies. Outlier prescribers of *any* drug/dose are easy to find. If $HIMS is successful in pumping the personalize dosing scam to thousands of patients, we will be able to see that something like 0.01% of prescribers wrote >90% of the personalized doses of semaglutide.

How is it possible that these few physicians somehow have almost *all* of the patients in the world who needed “personalized” doses of semaglutide? It isn’t. This will be all the evidence we need to confirm that $HIMS has pushed this strategy and funneled patients down the path of seeking personalized doses in order to get cheap drug.

This necessitates that the physicians prescribing such high rates of non-standard semaglutide are COMMITTING MEDICAL FRAUD by repeatedly claiming that there is an indication for off-label dosing whether there actually is or not. There is no way that *only* $HIMS patients are the ones who would “need” personalized dosing.

So, when the prescriber data shows that a bunch of the $HIMS contracted physicians are massive outlier prescribers of personalized doses, those physicians are going to have some explaining to do.

“How can you explain that 99% of physicians prescribed ZERO personalized semaglutide at all in 2025, yet you prescribed it to over half of your patients? How is it possible that only *you* ended up with the few patients for whom this atypical dosing was indicated?”

Caught red handed, because the only plausible answer here is that it actually *wasn't* indicated - these physicians are just going along with the company's goal of pushing patients toward personalized doses whether there is a medical necessity or not. The outlier prescriber data on this matter will not lie, and they will not be subtle.

If these complicit physicians don’t have legal action taken against them directly, I would bet that they'll be dragged into the broader lawsuits against $HIMS when shit finally hits the fan here.

Add in the questionable medical “assessments” that $HIMS performs (see WSJ article that discusses prescriptions being written within 60 seconds of requests having been submitted) and these docs are just setting themselves up for legal slaughter. Good luck arguing that you thoroughly assessed all these patients and found that they needed some nuanced dose through your 1-minute long online assessment where you didn’t even talk to or examine the patient. This won’t hold up.

Oh, and, by the way - these personalized doses are definitionally off-label. This opens up yet another liability can of worms.

IMO the physicians contracted with $HIMS would be absolutely nuts to go along with this scam.
Read 8 tweets
Nov 7, 2024
I have never pinned anything on X, but I am going to keep this thread calling out $CGEM as being undervalued pinned for a while, because I am feeling pretty confident about it. I want to call my shot on this one. The thread isn't short, but I hope it does a good job of documenting the general basis for what I think is a significant mispricing of Cullinan.

In the $15s right now, the market cap is under a billion, and the EV is <$200M with their surprisingly strong balance sheet.

Maybe there is some value in their oncology assets (they did get some good $ for half of zipalertinib ownership), but personally I am writing those off completely and focusing on CLN-978, their CD3xCD19 T-Cell Engager for I&I.
Part 1: The Foundational Data.

The CD19 I&I hype really started with a small cohort of patients from Georg Schett. This showed impressive efficacy of CD-19 CAR-T in 15 patients with Lupus, Inflammatory Myositis, and Systemic Sclerosis.

The most impressive data was from the Lupus patients, who universally went from severe disease that was refractory to essentially all available treatments to having no disease activity and no need for continuing medications after the CAR-T infusion.

This got a lot of people excited, as it looks like some patients have been *cured* of their lupus. Given how severe their disease was and how poor the standard of care is even for less severe cases of Lupus, these results were truly remarkable.

Since then, several other small studies of CD19 CAR-T in multiple different I&I conditions have been published showing similar, sometimes curative-appearing results (won't discuss all of these for the sake of brevity, but there's a lot going on in this space).

ash.confex.com/ash/2023/webpr…
Part 2: CAR-T has I&I POC - So why not just use CAR-T? Why would you need $CGEM's TCE?

The simplest answer is that it is flat-out not possible to scale current CAR-T technologies to the massive markets in I&I indications. Sure, maybe it could scale profitably for a few thousand of the most severe patients in the world, but we are talking about indications with hundreds of thousands to millions of patients. Conventional CAR-T can't address a fraction of that. Take $JNJ's Carvykti as a case study. The demand for the drug is greater than they can supply and has been for years despite efforts to scale up. They are losing out on money because they literally can't make enough doses. Yet, if you back out how many patients are being dosed based on Carvytki revenues, it is only a few thousand patients per year at most. This is not a reasonable modality for large I&I markets

$CGEM's TCE, however, uses an antibody modality that can easily scale to I&I mass market demand.

Scalability is just the simplest answer though. Other drawbacks of CAR-T include dangerous and unpleasant lymphodepletion (chemotherapy) requirements, as well as the outstanding question of the long-term cancer risk associated with current lentivirus-based CAR-T programs. These are not suitable for mass market I&I conditions. TCE's like $CGEM's would not have these problems.
Read 14 tweets
Dec 9, 2021
Cell Tx soap box 2:

Lymphoconditioning is in absolutely no way a rate-limiter to the widespread and early-line adoption of cell therapies.
I get that chemotherapy lymphodepletion isn't sunshine and roses, but treating it like this is some huge hurdle for cell therapy to overcome is ignoring the backbone of how we have treated hematologic malignancies for the last half century.

CHEMOTHERAPY.
SOC in NHL? R-CHOP. Tons of chemo.

SOC in HL? ABVD. Tons of chemo.

SOC in MM? CyBorD. Tons of chemo.

SOC in AML? 7+3. TONS of chemo.
Read 7 tweets
Dec 9, 2021
Cell Tx Soap Box 1:

What leg is the "Targeted NK cells can't generate durable responses" argument left standing on?

At this point, that argument looks like an assumption based entirely on preclinical assays or historical clinical data of non-targeted allo-NKs.
What is the point of preclinical assumptions when we have a growing body of CLINICAL data to guide our thinking?

We now have 3 strong examples of durable responses using targeted NK cells, with 3 different targets, in 3 different indications.
1) Katy Rezvani's work with CD-19 CAR-NKs in CD19+ lymphomas/leukemias

nejm.org/doi/full/10.10…
Read 7 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(