The UK’s #OnlineSafetyAct shows nativity and stubbornness of MPs asserting parliamentary sovereignty over technical expertise.
MPs and ministers were warned REPEATEDLY that secure client-side scanning is not technically possible. Yet, they legislated for it anyway.
MPs and ministers were warned REPEATEDLY that secure client-side scanning is not technically possible. Yet, they legislated for it anyway.
Encryption experts, civil society groups, and former intelligence officials described the Act’s surveillance powers as “magical thinking.” The proposed powers would require the impossible: encryption backdoors usable only by the state, and safe from abuse. They do not exist.
Despite this, government ministers insisted they could compel platforms to develop or source “accredited” scanning technologies even while conceding such tools are currently unavailable.
In short: they passed law on the assumption that reality would bend to Parliament’s will.
In short: they passed law on the assumption that reality would bend to Parliament’s will.
It is a fundamental misunderstanding of how encryption works.
End-to-end encryption cannot be selectively bypassed. If a backdoor exists, it can be exploited.
There is no “only the good guys” key.
End-to-end encryption cannot be selectively bypassed. If a backdoor exists, it can be exploited.
There is no “only the good guys” key.
During committee stages and floor debates, ministers gave verbal reassurances: they would not use these powers “until it is technically feasible.” But crucially, the legal authority remains. The law empowers Ofcom to mandate backdoors, should Parliament desire it.
Essentially the government claimed: “We are sovereign. If Parliament says it must be possible, then it shall be.”
This ideological primacy of sovereignty over science is deeply concerning and sets a dangerous precedent for digital rights.
This ideological primacy of sovereignty over science is deeply concerning and sets a dangerous precedent for digital rights.
Endangering encryption threatens journalists, whistleblowers, vulnerable communities, and everyday citizens. It undermines both safety and privacy, and risks criminalising security itself.
Platforms cannot talk about or promote VPNs without risk of very heavy criminal fines.
Platforms cannot talk about or promote VPNs without risk of very heavy criminal fines.
The Online Safety Act reveals the hazards of legislating without comprehension. It is one thing to govern. It is another to govern in willful ignorance of expert consensus, technological reality, and the long-term consequences.
A functioning democracy does not ask whether it can compel the impossible. It asks whether it should and listens when the answer is no.
The UK is no longer a functioning democracy.
The UK is no longer a functioning democracy.
@threadreaderapp please unroll
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