In my latest column for Hindustan Times, I respond to the recent Foreign Affairs article by Ashley Tellis "India’s Great-Power Delusions” (July/August 2025)".
I argue that Trump’s policy towards the region is not because of what India is, but because of who Trump is.
A recent article by noted Indian-American scholar Ashley Tellis in Foreign Affairs, titled “India’s Great-Power Delusions,” argues that India’s utility to the United States has diminished for three key reasons:
First, India’s shift towards domestic illiberalism has eroded its soft power and its ability to be a great power espousing liberal values;
second, India undermines American unipolarity by advocating for multipolarity;
and third, Delhi has been reluctant in supporting Washington in countering China’s rise.
I agree that Washington’s new regional approach has suddenly complicated India’s regional and global strategies. However, attributing India’s sticky geopolitical situation today solely to its own choices or domestic political issues is a misdiagnosis of the larger systemic causes.
Let’s examine these arguments in two separate categories: the general American approach to India and the Trump administration’s approach.
These two are largely distinct, as Trump’s foreign policy stands in direct contrast to the traditional American foreign policy prior to his second tenure.
Let’s first examine American policy towards India before Trump.
Was the Biden administration’s approach towards India deeply influenced by a liberal decline in Indian politics?
Of course, Americans occasionally commented on media curbs, the rise of right-wing politics, and growing anti-minority policies, among others.
However, I have found little evidence suggesting that the U.S. was losing interest in India due to these issues, or that India’s moral standing internationally was being compromised to the extent that it affected its ability to rise as a great power.
In any case, great powers do not rise on the basis of domestic liberal values. Imperial Britain, 20th-century America, Bolshevik Russia, Nazi Germany, and Communist China did not become great or superpowers by serving as moral exemplars for the rest of the world.
Most of them bothered little about how others thought of their moral standing. In fact, I cannot think of a single great power that followed such a path. The argument here is not that being illiberal is acceptable, but that liberal values do not determine whether a country becomes a great power or not.
Has Delhi’s dalliance with multipolarity and its refusal to align as an American ally prevented the U.S. from supporting India’s rise as a great power?
To begin with, could the U.S. have over the past two decades truly facilitated India’s ascent as a great power?
I doubt it.
Becoming a great power is a far more serious endeavour both historically and today; military or diplomatic support from another power alone cannot make a country a great power.
In fact, how many countries around the world has the United States actually elevated to great power status—except perhaps indirectly helping China by accommodating it into the U.S-led global order?
If India today is not yet a great power, it is because we Indians have not unleashed the necessary reforms and have not undertaken the much-needed military modernisation. Let’s not credit the Americans for our own inadequacies.
Has India’s pursuit of multipolarity alienated the Americans? Perhaps yes, but the decline of American unipolarity is not India’s doing—it’s due to America’s own actions or other powers catching up. Let’s not accept any credit for American inadequacies.
That said, much of India’s multipolar rhetoric remains just that—feel good rhetoric. What exactly is India doing to promote multipolarity beyond participating in forums like the BRICS and SCO (former is expanding to irrelevance and the latter becoming a Chinese shop)?
Thirdly, let’s closely examine the argument that India’s decision not to become Washington’s foot soldier in Asia to curb China’s rise has upset the United States.
In other words, would India have been better off if it had joined the American alliance to counter China?
For one, there is little doubt that an India that teamed up with the U.S. to check China might have been worse off today.
Surely, when it comes to China, India is not in a sweet spot, but given how U.S. allies today often find themselves high and dry, there is no guarantee that Washington would have been willing to support India against China.
If so, a country sitting next to China (India) that chose to be an American ally or partner to contain China’s rise would have been worse off in the era of Trump.
Secondly, I have not seen, heard, or read any invitation from the Americans for India to join their military alliance.
At best, India might have been a country outsourced with the loyal duty of resisting China’s rise in the region on behalf of the US, with the hope that eventually the US would support India’s emergence as a great power (while China looks on passively?).
Thirdly, it is not as if India has been bandwagoning China or not trying to balance China at all (even if not doing enough) within its current capacity.
In any case, a next-door India will need to think carefully before jumping into a distant superpower’s grand strategy to contain China, especially when it is caught between a far more powerful China and a Pakistan that it arms—who, incidentally, is also armed by the US.
All this was before Trump arrived on the scene. Now what does Trump’s track record of abandoning Ukraine after leading it on the garden path, forsaking its longstanding NATO allies in Europe, striking deals with its ‘archenemy’ China, and courting Pakistan - especially after Rawalpindi helped the Taliban humiliate and force the U.S. and its allies out of Afghanistan - say about his approach to international commitments and alliances?
Do you believe that if India had been more liberal, did not entertain any multipolar aspirations, or actively helped Washington contain China in the past, Trump would have been more positively disposed towards India?
I will let you answer that question for yourself.
Trump’s America doesn’t care whether India is illiberal, seeks multipolarity or assists Washington in balancing China. Trump would likely have behaved exactly the same with a liberal India supporting a U.S.-led world order and assisting in checking China’s rise in Asia as he does now.
Simply put, Trump’s policy towards the region is not because of what India is, but because of who Trump is.
In my latest article for @IndiasWorld_mag, I outline "Nine Elements of India’s Emerging Strategy Against Terrorism" which I term "Deterrence by Exhaustion".
1. Assured conventional retaliation against sub-conventional attacks.
This strategy involves publicly declaring a conventional military response to Pakistan, unlike 2016, when actions were unannounced and only acknowledged afterwards, and then following through on these commitments. Through the new approach, which entails openly communicating its intentions to Pakistan and the international community, India aims to establish a well-publicised tripwire strategy, which may deter Pakistan from crossing certain red lines. India not only wants to take punitive action but also wants to be seen as doing so openly and visibly. Setting public redlines for the adversary to enhance deterrence is the objective here.
2. This strategy aims to progressively increase the costs, stakes, scope, and intensity of the response with each escalation following a terror attack.
Since the 2001 Parliament attack, there has been a gradual escalation in the intensity of India’s response to terrorism, culminating in the 2025 Pahalgam attacks. The most intense Indian response to terrorism so far was seen this month which combined unprecedented degrees of kinetic and non-kinetic responses.
The underlying idea is that if Pakistan uses terrorism as a cost-effective strategy to pressure India and internationalise Kashmir, India’s response should aim to make Pakistan’s strategy costly and unsustainable. Expecting Pakistan not to respond conventionally is unrealistic, but the message about assured conventional retaliation to terror strikes by India is unlikely to be missed out on in Pakistan.
"Twelve Arguments to make sense of ‘Operation Sindoor’"
I write for INDIA'S WORLD
1. Operation Sindoor underscores the idea that the government of India is determined to respond to terrorism, regardless of the consequences of such a response.
With Operation Sindoor—a high-intensity, open, and public military operation—Indian policymakers seek to establish a 'military response to terrorist attacks' as a doctrinal innovation.
2. Low-level military actions (like 2016 and 2019) may not be the preferred response any longer. The recent (declared, publicised and unambiguous) response is a strategy to mainstream Indian response as a doctrinal move.
In my column for Hindustan Times this morning, I discuss PM Modi's visit to the United States.
For those of us studying international relations through the lens of history and state behaviour, the foreign policy of the newly inaugurated Trump presidency feels like a déjà vu moment.
International politics is an anarchic place. Powerful States attempt to set the terms, and the less powerful ones strategise their moves. This framing is important to make sense of not just the world according to President Trump but also Indo-US relations.
2 pointes to be noted:
- Isolating America’s relations with India from the broader context of Trump’s foreign policy will be an analytical error.
- The crisis in world politics today resulting from Trumpian disruption offers an opportunity to realise India’s global ambitions.
If so, what does Trump’s month-long presidency tell us about his potential impact on international politics? This context is crucial for assessing Modi’s recent visit to the US and for speculating about the future of Indo-US relations.
Is India a moral/normative actor in world affairs?
The West often accuses India of not adhering to liberal values or norms, with India pushing back vigorously.
What is often overlooked is that Western criticism & Indian pushback are also a result of the divergent ways liberal internationalism evolved in the West and India.
Western liberal internationalism is rooted in Enlightenment ideas, democracy, free trade, Wilsonian idealism & individual rights. India’s liberal internationalism emerged during its struggles against colonialism, racism, and imperialism, drawing inspiration from anti-colonial, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist movements, and Western & Soviet/communist influences.
The Indian version is far more complex.
While the West emphasized democracy, free markets, and global institutions, India championed the Non-Aligned Movement, Third-World solidarity, and South-South cooperation. As a result, India remained deeply sceptical of post-war institutions, often seeing them as tools for perpetuating US and colonial dominance.
In my latest column for Hindustan Times, I discuss the four dilemmas faced by the 'Quad'.
I start by arguing that "Quad, unlike traditional military strategies such as deterrence and defence, works on the logic of non-military dissuasion. It works to create conditions that shape Beijing’s perception of the non-military costs and consequences of its aggression towards Quad members. Unlike deterrence, there is no assured retaliation; and unlike defence, Quad makes no promise to defend its members."
Dilemma 1: Agenda
"A narrow military agenda may be too sensitive and confrontational for many of the region’s middle and smaller powers, while a limited public goods agenda may be too little to be useful for anyone.
Therefore, a huge public goods agenda with little military component appears to be a compromise to deal with the dilemma regarding its plan of action. But this approach may make the agenda too crowded, promise too much and deliver too little."
Dilemma 2: China
"Quad’s decision to pussyfoot around the China challenge highlights its second dilemma. Naming China as an aggressor might attract China’s ire; however, not naming China, on the other hand, could suggest that the Quad Four lack the courage to stand up to China’s aggression.
The compromise chosen by the Quad Four appears to be an indirect castigation of China which it might not object to considering that the Quad’s wording can be open to interpretation. While it is perhaps the best available strategy, it still runs the risk of the Quad giving out the message that it is indirectly following the redlines set by Beijing."
1/14
I have taken some serious flak for suggesting, consistently since 2017, that India should talk to the Taliban. Critics from the right, left and centre have called me a Taliban-apologist.
2/14
The government of India met with Taliban leadership in Doha earlier today. I've had several major disagreements with the BJP government’s foreign policy choices. But on this issue, I will not only stand by the government but also congratulate it for making this bold move.
3/14
For a far right-wing government, it might not be easy to justify this decision to some of its hardcore supporters domestically. That is why the decision is bold.