Why India isn't joining the chorus of condemnation against the US attack on Venezuela.

There is a lot of noise about India’s silence on the Caracas strikes.

Here are the 5 reasons why I THINK official India may not condemn it.

PS: As an individual Indian, I condemn the American action! But states don't function like individuals. India didn’t condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, so it is unlikely to condemn the US in Venezuela.

I think there is a belief in India that Great Powers operate in spheres of influence.

What New Delhi hates is being pressurised to condemn one side while the other side does the same.

In my latest column for Hindustan Times, I respond to the recent Foreign Affairs article by Ashley Tellis "India’s Great-Power Delusions” (July/August 2025)".

I argue that Trump’s policy towards the region is not because of what India is, but because of who Trump is. A recent article by noted Indian-American scholar Ashley Tellis in Foreign Affairs, titled “India’s Great-Power Delusions,” argues that India’s utility to the United States has diminished for three key reasons:

In my latest article for @IndiasWorld_mag, I outline "Nine Elements of India’s Emerging Strategy Against Terrorism" which I term "Deterrence by Exhaustion".

1. Assured conventional retaliation against sub-conventional attacks.

This strategy involves publicly declaring a conventional military response to Pakistan, unlike 2016, when actions were unannounced and only acknowledged afterwards, and then following through on these commitments. Through the new approach, which entails openly communicating its intentions to Pakistan and the international community, India aims to establish a well-publicised tripwire strategy, which may deter Pakistan from crossing certain red lines. India not only wants to take punitive action but also wants to be seen as doing so openly and visibly. Setting public redlines for the adversary to enhance deterrence is the objective here. 2. This strategy aims to progressively increase the costs, stakes, scope, and intensity of the response with each escalation following a terror attack.

Since the 2001 Parliament attack, there has been a gradual escalation in the intensity of India’s response to terrorism, culminating in the 2025 Pahalgam attacks. The most intense Indian response to terrorism so far was seen this month which combined unprecedented degrees of kinetic and non-kinetic responses.

"Twelve Arguments to make sense of ‘Operation Sindoor’"

I write for INDIA'S WORLD 1. Operation Sindoor underscores the idea that the government of India is determined to respond to terrorism, regardless of the consequences of such a response.

With Operation Sindoor—a high-intensity, open, and public military operation—Indian policymakers seek to establish a 'military response to terrorist attacks' as a doctrinal innovation.

In my column for Hindustan Times this morning, I discuss PM Modi's visit to the United States.

For those of us studying international relations through the lens of history and state behaviour, the foreign policy of the newly inaugurated Trump presidency feels like a déjà vu moment.

International politics is an anarchic place. Powerful States attempt to set the terms, and the less powerful ones strategise their moves. This framing is important to make sense of not just the world according to President Trump but also Indo-US relations. 2 pointes to be noted:

- Isolating America’s relations with India from the broader context of Trump’s foreign policy will be an analytical error.

- The crisis in world politics today resulting from Trumpian disruption offers an opportunity to realise India’s global ambitions.

Is India a moral/normative actor in world affairs?

The West often accuses India of not adhering to liberal values or norms, with India pushing back vigorously.

What is often overlooked is that Western criticism & Indian pushback are also a result of the divergent ways liberal internationalism evolved in the West and India. Western liberal internationalism is rooted in Enlightenment ideas, democracy, free trade, Wilsonian idealism & individual rights. India’s liberal internationalism emerged during its struggles against colonialism, racism, and imperialism, drawing inspiration from anti-colonial, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist movements, and Western & Soviet/communist influences.

The Indian version is far more complex.

In my latest column for Hindustan Times, I discuss the four dilemmas faced by the 'Quad'.

I start by arguing that "Quad, unlike traditional military strategies such as deterrence and defence, works on the logic of non-military dissuasion. It works to create conditions that shape Beijing’s perception of the non-military costs and consequences of its aggression towards Quad members. Unlike deterrence, there is no assured retaliation; and unlike defence, Quad makes no promise to defend its members." Dilemma 1: Agenda

"A narrow military agenda may be too sensitive and confrontational for many of the region’s middle and smaller powers, while a limited public goods agenda may be too little to be useful for anyone.

Therefore, a huge public goods agenda with little military component appears to be a compromise to deal with the dilemma regarding its plan of action. But this approach may make the agenda too crowded, promise too much and deliver too little."

1/14
I have taken some serious flak for suggesting, consistently since 2017, that India should talk to the Taliban. Critics from the right, left and centre have called me a Taliban-apologist. 2/14
The government of India met with Taliban leadership in Doha earlier today. I've had several major disagreements with the BJP government’s foreign policy choices. But on this issue, I will not only stand by the government but also congratulate it for making this bold move.

1/12 Some reflections on doing national security research in India in the context of the new rule notified by the government of India on the 31st May, 2021. 2/12 Over the past few months, my own academic work on national security has been facing major challenges due to a recent government rule. I am sure other researchers must be facing the same situation as well.

My takeaways from Karan Thapar’s interview with Pak NSA Moeed Yusuf for @thewire_in

1/22

Pakistan is still trying to come to terms with India’s Kashmir decisions of August 2019. But it is (in a roundabout way) signalling that it is willing to make major ‘concessions’ on Kashmir 2/22

One key reason behind its willingness to make ‘concessions’ is the unfolding situation in Afghanistan.

Strategically, how Afghan geopolitics unfolds in the months ahead is more crucial to Pakistan than what happens in Kashmir. But that's not a public position Pak can take!

A thread on Kashmir: Some facts and Analysis

1/9

I must say that the NEW narrative emanating from Pakistan on Kashmir could undo the progress made by the two sides on J&K over the years.

Let me clarify a few things. 2/9

There seems to be a new and vigorous demand from the current Pakistani establishment that no bilateral improvement can take place without resolving the Kashmir issue "as per the UN resolutions", i.e., a plebiscite in Kashmir.

So let's examine the UN resolution.

Long post/thread on 'national security'. (2 threads)

I've been teaching & researching ‘national security’ for over 15 years now & for most of my career I have believed that the traditional definitions & notions of national security are deeply problematic & should be challenged. My ‘alternative views’ on national security begun to crystalize during my MPhil days at JNU (2001-03) when I wrote a short book on the national security implications of HIV/AIDS pandemic. As expected, my arguments were dismissed, short of ridiculed, by most of my peers.