Trump's new tariff rate lack rhyme or reason (other than rewarding big countries that made an effort to give him a win ... )
But -- as the decision on Brazil showed -- it is always important to know the exclusions as well as the headline rate ...
1/
The 35% tariff rate on Canada is crazy. Nuts. Insane. dumb. Shows a lack of interest in supporting US manufacturing (the US runs a surplus in manufactures with Canada).
But if oil and USMCA compliant trade are exempt, its practical impact will be modest ...
2/
Same with the high tariff on Switzerland. Crazy. Even to my eyes, and I am no fan of Switzerland's coddling of corporate tax avoidance.
But most US imports from Switzerland are pharmaceuticals and gold, and both are exempt from the reciprocal/ IEEPA tariffs
3/
Taiwan didn't get a deal -- unlike Korea. But the reward for a deal is modest, a 15% tariff relative to a 20% tariff ...
& until there is a semiconductor 232, most of Taiwan's exports to the US (chips and chip heavy electronics) aren't tariffed.
4/
This is in no way a defense of tonight's tariff actions.
It is intellectually and economically indefensible to have a higher headline term 2 tariff on Canada (where the US runs a surplus ex oil) than on China (a true global problem ... ) even in Trumpian terms ...
5/
I don't get why it makes sense for most of southeast Asia to be tariffed at 19% while Vietnam is at 20% -- extra administrative complexity for no real reason ...
6/
Tariffing "transshipped" goods ( transshipment for tariff avoidance is already illegal, so the term is being misused) from China at 40% when the tariff on goods coming straight from China face a 30% base tariff (plus the 301 tariff, minus 10% for a 232 sector) makes no sense 7/
There aren't yet actual rules defining the Vietnamese content needed to make a good Vietnamese rather than Malaysian or Chinese, but a higher tariff on transshipped goods than on goods from China penalizes Vietnamese assembly ... 8/
Chinese parts, assembled in China & shipped from China, in a non 301 sector and a non 232 sector = 30% ...
Chinese parts, assembled in Vietnam and shipped from Vietnam = 40% tariff ... (or so it seems ...)
9/
This isn't just protectionism, it is bad protectionism -- and will have all sorts of unintended consequences.
But its actual impact for now depends on the scale of the exclusions
10/
Also seems like 15% is the new base tariff -- with some lucky countries getting 10% and a big exclusion for now for USMCA compliant trade (in non-232 sectors, which is about 20% of US non-oil imports) and a lot of 20% and 30% bringing the overall tariff rate up
11/11
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China appears to have changed its intervention rule, and now intervenes (via the state banks) at the mid point of the band, not the strong side of the band ...
Hope others find this chart as helpful as I did -- the yuan has spent very little time on the strong side of the fix (the theoretical mid point in the band) and, more importantly, the proxy for state bank intervention shoots up if spot is close to the fix
2/
The failure of the yuan to stay consistently on the strong side of the fix is sometimes taken as evidence either of a lack of appreciation pressure or as evidence of a lack of (dollar buying) intervention -- but I don't think either is true
Probably the most important chart for the world economy right now -- Chinese export growth in both q1 and q2 was close to 10%; Chinese import growth has been flat (q2) or negative (q1)
With exports 20% of GDP, implies a huge net export contribution ...
1/
This excellent FT story provides the narrative to go along with the hard data -- China's localities have tremendous incentives to subsidize the production of overcapacity in new and old sectors alike. & with internal demand weak, exports result
Combine weak internal demand, a weak CNY & overly enthusiastic support for new sectors inside China & China ends up distorting the entire global economy.
The census advance June trade data shows the goods trade deficit (which in accurately measured at a high frequency) fell back to around $1 trillion USD in June
1/
The big swing in the data came from consumer goods (which includes pharma) and is partial payback for a super strong q1 ...
2/
Industrial supplies remains volatile, but without the tariff fear induced q1 imports of gold, imports have dipped a bit
But we don't need to guess about the impact of China's industrial policy successes (and macroeconomic failures) on the US -- EU exports to China are already in a sustained decline
Americans, understandably focused on the (past and present) antics of Donald Trump, tend to underestimate the shift in elite European views toward China
Von der Leyen is perhaps a bit more hawkish than the European consensus, but there is no way this kind of message would have been delivered 4 years ago --
2/
And it isn't hard to figure out the source of the shift --
The pandemic swing in trade wasn't a blip, it was a change in trend ...
Turns out that there was indeed a disturbance in the force -- the global balance of payments that is -- back when China changed its balance of payments methodology in 21/22 ...
(see the black line in first figure in the first box in the IMF's ESR)
1/
That disturbance -- which I felt, and so did Logan Wright and Adam Wolfe -- came as China used a new internal data set (then undisclosed) to adjust its exports down and move its imports up (relative to its previous methodology, note the fit v the old data before 2020)
2/
The net result was a downward adjustment in China's BoP goods surplus (and its overall current account surplus) that topped $300 billion (1.5 pp of GDP) for a while ...