1. Russia pulled most of the tanks that were already in working condition from storage right after the mobilization started, in order to equip new units and quickly replace losses. This is why we started seeing un-upgraded T-54/55, T-62, and T-72Ural tanks at the front.
1. Since then, they have focused on refurbishing and upgrading stored T-72Bs, T-80B/BVs, and T-62s, in addition to expanding T-90M production. As a result, the share of upgraded tanks has increased, and the tank fleet has actually become 'newer'.
2. The first new development is that they might be preparing to remove more T-72As (not T-72Bs) from storage, which have so far seen a relatively low removal rate. This likely indicates that the supply of T-72Bs and T-80B/BVs from storage bases has dried up.
2. The removal of visible T-72Bs from the 1311th storage base is particularly noteworthy, as this base is the only one still holding a significant number of this tank type and has likely compensated for previous removals through its garages or by relocations from other bases.
2. The number of T-72Bs and T-80B/BVs in storage and at BTRZs is likely approaching zero, and the number of tanks being taken from storage has decreased dramatically. However, there are still tanks remaining (T-54/55, T-62, T-64, and T-72A). Some of them could still be utilized.
3. The active Russian tank fleet is likely still very large. According to our counts more than 4,100 tanks have been removed from visible storage, in addition to an unknown number taken from covered storage. Furthermore, T-90M production has increased significantly.
3. I don't know how many tanks are currently active or sitting at workshops, BTRZs, and factories, but comparing our data to the losses recorded by Oryx suggests that the total number might still be comparable to pre-war levels.
4. The main problem with the video is that it suggests the Russian army will collapse due to running out of tanks, even though we are currently seeing a large number of Russian assaults being carried out without armor.
4. Don't get me wrong—most of the useful equipment has already been removed from storage, and Russia is facing numerous challenges that could significantly worsen its situation or even lead to an end to the war. However, running out of tanks is not one of them.
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1/ Here are some interesting things I found in the new high resolution imagery from the russian 111th storage base. ⬇️
2/ Looking at tank and BMP numbers over the years since the 2022, it is clear that this base has been a large provider of tanks (mostly T-80, T-62 and some T-55).
3/ All T-80s have likely been removed and only some hulls that were partially scrapped in 2022 remain. Interestingly these have been moved from the red area to the area marked in blue. They might try to safe the hulls eventhough they have been without a turret for two years.
1/ Getting reliable data regarding attrition of the Russian artillery forces is very hard, but there are some trends that can be observed based on what is being removed from the storage bases, which I will present in this thread.⬇️
2/ Here are the equipment numbers visible on satelite images. Almost 11000 towed artillery units, self-propelled guns and towed mortars have been removed from visible storage since the start of the invasion.
3/ A large inital drop in the number of stored artillery systems can be observed. These were likely needed for the force expansion after the mobilization, since towed guns can be reactivated faster than SPGs, which have been removed at a more linear rate of roughly 900 per year.
1/ Since the start of the invasion Russia has removed at least 8300 units of towed artillery and mortars from their storage bases. I will provide some additional information to the count we published recently.
2/ First of all I would like to explain the new ID system. I tried to make more use of measuring the guns to put them into categories. I would like to thank @bentanmy , for looking into which systems might be in storage based on guns removed for exhibits.
3/ I have also linked all of his threads about the individual systems below. Interestingly there were even ZiS-2 and ZiS-3 removed from storage for exhibits.
1/ Here is our updated count of self propelled guns at Russian storage sites, with data points for 2022, 2023 and 2024. With @CovertCabal ⬇️
2/ As usual here is the data. Russia has so far removed roughly 1700 SPGs from storage and 60% of of their stocks remain at the bases in various conditions.
3/ Interstingly some systems have been removed at a roughly linear rate: ~220 per year for the 2S1, ~160 for the 2S3 and ~140 for the 2S9.
1/ Someone should update the "List of equipment of the Russian ground forces" on Wikipedia with Military Balance 2024 numbers. ⬇️ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_e…
2/ Many bad assesments of Russian equipment are based on numbers from , which in turn seems to be at least partially relying on the Wikipedia article I mentioned above:globalfirepower.com
3/ The main problem with this article is that it is using some outdated numbers from The Military Balance 2022 that were corrected in 2023 and 2024.
1/ This thread aims to provide some open-source and reproducible facts about Russian pre-war tank storage. ⬇️
2/ The main reason I am writing this thread is that the only other source (except our previous counts) is The Military Balance 2022 (10200 tanks: 7000 T-72, 3000 T-80 and 200 T-90), which they have later corrected in TMB2023 and TMB2024.
3/ The IISS lists 5000 tanks of all types in storage for 2023 and 4000 for 2024, which are both very reasonable numbers. This is cleary not only an adjustment of the numbers caused by the war, but also a re-evaluation. Sadly these numbers are only quoted rarely.