I think this one chart sums up what's wrong with anyone pointing to unemployment as a sign the labor market is "solid."
If not for collapsing labor force participation since April, unemployment would've climbed to 4.9% today instead of 4.25%.
A lot to unpack in the 🧵
The labor force participation rate has dropped from a recent peak of 62.8% back in Nov '23 to 62.2% in July '25.
The pace of that decline accelerated sharply in May and has continued through July.
If not for the recent drop in the participation rate, unemployment would be meaningfully higher.
Back in May, it was a surge in workers exiting the workforce driving the decline in participation.
While that surge hasn't continued, flows out of the labor force remained elevated through July.
As for the unemployed population, a rising share have come from people previously employed and those who were not recently in the labor force.
That "not in the labor force" segment of the unemployed surged in July as new entrants not finding jobs put 15bps of upward pressure on the headline unemployment rate.
The new entrant / youth unemployment angle is not new, but it is clearly the segment of the labor market feeling the greatest softening in recent months.
It's not just new entrants not being able to find jobs and ending up in the unemployed cohort, workers are increasingly resorting to part-time work as full-time employment has trended lower.
So, it's clear the labor market is not "solid" when looking under the hood of the household survey, it also doesn't exactly look rosy in the establishment survey either.
Job growth has cooled to an average of just 35k over the past 3 months from nearly 130k just back in April and ~230k at the beginning of the year.
That brings me to my favorite metric from the establishment survey: the private job growth diffusion index, which reflects the breadth of job gains across industries.
The 3m index dropped below the 50 expansion / contraction threshold back in May and remained at 46.8 in July, down from 60.8 back in Jan '25.
Within private sector employment, manufacturing has been even uglier...
The diffusion indexes for manufacturing have been in contraction territory since early 2023 despite a brief spike earlier this year that subsequently collapsed.
Looking at the sector level, you can see a similar high-level split, with roughly half of sectors contracting vs expanding.
One sector stuck out prominently in the chart above and viewed another way, it is clear:
*All of the recent job growth is currently coming from Education and Health Services alone*
Lets look more broadly at recent 3-month trends in sector-level job growth ...
It's again clear, nothing looks very "solid" outside of Education and Health Care.
Ok, so the economy isn't really adding many jobs at this point, but at least wage growth is still solid, right?
Well, that's generally true for private service industries, where wage growth has been roughly in-line with the pre-COVID avg over the past 6 months...
But wage growth has dropped precipitously for goods producing sectors, which has been in contraction since early '23 as I noted in the diffusion chart above.
With the diffusion index for the broader private sector having flipped into contraction territory, it's not likely that service sector wage growth will remain resilient for much longer.
I heard an argument that seasonal adjustments were to blame for the job growth slowdown, so let's look at the non-seasonally adjusted data (nsa).
Looks to me like jobs declined by more than normal in July and the pace of job growth is now well below the pre-COVID norm and trending lower.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
One of the big surprises in today's jobs report was the contraction in government payrolls.
Consensus expected total job growth of 104k, of which 100k would be private jobs - implying growth of 4k for government payrolls.
Instead, the government sector lost -10k jobs, thanks to a -14k decline in Federal workers (non-USPS).
This shouldn't have been a big surprise...
I'll explain quickly in the 🧵
There has been a clear rebound in initial claims by federal employees for unemployment insurance, which surged higher in July.
This coincides with the reference week for the jobs report, so economists should have been forecasting a notable drag from federal layoffs this month.
Why the renewed spike?
On July 8, 2025, the Supreme Court lifted a lower court’s injunction that had blocked Trump's February Executive Order directing agencies to prepare for reductions-in-force (RIFs) under the DOGE initiative.
The Court did not rule on the underlying legality of the executive order—only that the administration was “likely to succeed” in defending it.
Given the upward revisions to May PCE and modest upside surprise for core inflation, control group inflation accelerated to 0.46% m/m in June, above my 0.38% model estimate and up from 0.31% in May.
This was the hottest monthly print for control group inflation outside the pandemic in over 20 years.
This means even more of the rebound we saw in June retail sales was simply due to higher prices, not a rebound in real consumption.
Real control group spending inched up by only 0.11% in June, while inflation accounted for the remainder of the 0.49% gain.
June Retail Sales beat expectations up 0.6% m/m (0.1% consensus), with Control Group (which feeds directly into GDP) also up 0.5% vs expectations for a 0.3% gain.
Very solid figures in nominal terms, but it's important to note that core goods inflation has picked up in recent months.
So, to understand if consumers are really ramping up spending or simply keeping up with higher prices, we need to adjust for inflation.
The trend is clear: consumers have been spending less and less in real (inflation-adjusted) terms over the course of 2025 as goods inflation has accelerated.
Some details in the 🧵 including a simple model for how much inflation has picked up for the Control Group.
Here's a look at the simple model I used to estimate the PCE Control Group price index, which leverages CPI and PPI price indexes that correspond to Control Group spending categories like appliances, furniture / furnishing, construction materials, consumer electronics, recreational goods.
As I've noted in my recent posts regarding the CPI & PPI reports, prices for many of these goods have accelerated notably in recent months and the model picks this up nicely.
Here's what the monthly data looks like with the breakout for control group inflation vs real spending growth.
While the June real implied spending growth turned back slightly positive, it remains very weak.
About that "no evidence of inflation" from tariffs...
If you know where to look, it seems pretty clear that inflationary pressures are building in the product categories most exposed to tariffs.
Case in point from today's June CPI report: Household Furnishings & Supplies, which saw prices jump nearly 1% m/m in June.
This was the sharpest monthly increase since the peak of the pandemic-driven inflation in early '22.
More evidence in the 🧵
Looking at the categories flagged as being most exposed to tariffs by two Fed staff economists earlier this year, you'll see a lot of the products in the Household Furnishings & Supplies category on this list 👇
UMich Consumer Sentiment jumped to 60.5 in June (prelim), a rebound from May's 52.2 which was its lowest level since 2022.
This is the first monthly gain for UMICH Consumer Sentiment in half a year and well above consensus expectations (53.6).
The rebound was broad-based across sentiment measures.
Is this a turning point in consumer moods or just a "relief rally"?
More in the 🧵
As noted at the top, there was a widespread rebound, with consumers' assessment of Current Economic Conditions and Expectations both rising, by a respective 4.8 and 10.5 points.
Despite the bounce, the current level is still below the prior 6m and 12m averages.
One of the biggest movers within the UMICH survey in 2025 has been inflation expectations, in particular the year-ahead.
The preliminary June reading marked the first convincing reversal of the prior surge in inflation expectations, which spiked sharply after Trump's inauguration.
Political ideology continues to skew perceptions massively, with Democrats now expecting inflation to exceed 10% by June 2026 vs only 1.5% for Republicans.