I think this one chart sums up what's wrong with anyone pointing to unemployment as a sign the labor market is "solid."
If not for collapsing labor force participation since April, unemployment would've climbed to 4.9% today instead of 4.25%.
A lot to unpack in the 🧵
The labor force participation rate has dropped from a recent peak of 62.8% back in Nov '23 to 62.2% in July '25.
The pace of that decline accelerated sharply in May and has continued through July.
If not for the recent drop in the participation rate, unemployment would be meaningfully higher.
Back in May, it was a surge in workers exiting the workforce driving the decline in participation.
While that surge hasn't continued, flows out of the labor force remained elevated through July.
As for the unemployed population, a rising share have come from people previously employed and those who were not recently in the labor force.
That "not in the labor force" segment of the unemployed surged in July as new entrants not finding jobs put 15bps of upward pressure on the headline unemployment rate.
The new entrant / youth unemployment angle is not new, but it is clearly the segment of the labor market feeling the greatest softening in recent months.
It's not just new entrants not being able to find jobs and ending up in the unemployed cohort, workers are increasingly resorting to part-time work as full-time employment has trended lower.
So, it's clear the labor market is not "solid" when looking under the hood of the household survey, it also doesn't exactly look rosy in the establishment survey either.
Job growth has cooled to an average of just 35k over the past 3 months from nearly 130k just back in April and ~230k at the beginning of the year.
That brings me to my favorite metric from the establishment survey: the private job growth diffusion index, which reflects the breadth of job gains across industries.
The 3m index dropped below the 50 expansion / contraction threshold back in May and remained at 46.8 in July, down from 60.8 back in Jan '25.
Within private sector employment, manufacturing has been even uglier...
The diffusion indexes for manufacturing have been in contraction territory since early 2023 despite a brief spike earlier this year that subsequently collapsed.
Looking at the sector level, you can see a similar high-level split, with roughly half of sectors contracting vs expanding.
One sector stuck out prominently in the chart above and viewed another way, it is clear:
*All of the recent job growth is currently coming from Education and Health Services alone*
Lets look more broadly at recent 3-month trends in sector-level job growth ...
It's again clear, nothing looks very "solid" outside of Education and Health Care.
Ok, so the economy isn't really adding many jobs at this point, but at least wage growth is still solid, right?
Well, that's generally true for private service industries, where wage growth has been roughly in-line with the pre-COVID avg over the past 6 months...
But wage growth has dropped precipitously for goods producing sectors, which has been in contraction since early '23 as I noted in the diffusion chart above.
With the diffusion index for the broader private sector having flipped into contraction territory, it's not likely that service sector wage growth will remain resilient for much longer.
I heard an argument that seasonal adjustments were to blame for the job growth slowdown, so let's look at the non-seasonally adjusted data (nsa).
Looks to me like jobs declined by more than normal in July and the pace of job growth is now well below the pre-COVID norm and trending lower.
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Secondary mortgage spreads are down a massive 20bps+ on the week, with most of that move happening this morning.
What's happening? The mortgage market is undergoing a structural repricing following the directive for Fannie & Freddie to deploy $200B into MBS.
Let's dig in a bit in the 🧵
The $200B figure is massive relative to GSE capital. For context, Fannie and Freddie have a combined accumulated net worth of ~$173B as of late 2025.
By directing a $200B build-up, the administration is effectively deploying the entirety of the capital cushion built up over the last six years to support the secondary market.
Look again at the Current Coupon MBS OAS.
We are seeing a "forced" mean-reversion of spreads toward 2018–2019 levels.
By acting as a price-insensitive buyer, the GSEs will be bypassing the Fed and targeting mortgage spreads directly.
If the spread stays compressed, mortgage rates can fall even if 10y UST yields remain elevated.
Pretty notable upward revisions to 2Q25 real GDP growth this morning: up 50bps to 3.8% from 3.3% prior.
All of the upward revision was due to stronger than previously reported Consumer spending on of Services, Business Investment and a modest bump to Government consumption.
More details in the 🧵
Looking at the revised series, here's contributions to real GDP growth over time, showing all of the slowdown occurred in Q1, with exports and inventories driving most of the swing.
Stripping out those two volatile categories (i.e. inventories & net exports) gives you a good view on the core underlying drivers of the economy: Final Sales to Private Domestic Purchasers.
Again, now we see there was a modest dip in Q1, with Q2 back to the prior trend pace.
After spiking to a new post-pandemic high due to fraudulent claims in Texas, initial jobless claims have plunged back below their 3y average (222k) to 218k.
Meanwhile, continuing claims also ticked down (1,926k vs 1,928k the week before) but remained near post-pandemic highs.
Some details in the 🧵
After one of the highest weekly increases in jobless claims in a while, we now have had outsized back-to-back weekly declines...
What happened?
As mentioned at the top, a massive surge in fraudulent claims in TX is fading after spiking a few weeks ago.
Cumulatively, there have been nearly 40k excess claims above normal for this time of year in TX over the past 3 weeks.
After sitting on the backburner for some time, jobless claims are back in the headlines with the highest weekly print since the pandemic.
Initial jobless claims jumped by 32k to 263k during the week ending Sept 6.
Let's see what's going on in the 🧵
Let's start with how big of a weekly increase this was.
We've only seen a handful of jumps in the 30k range post-pandemic.
Let's next recall that we just had a holiday, Labor Day.
There is generally a lot of volatility in hiring & firing around holidays and the timing of exactly which week the holiday falls in any given year can shift (see below).
The Aug PPI declined -0.1%, softer than expected (0.3%) although PPI excluding food, energy & trade was in-line with expectations at 0.3%.
What does this mean?
Core goods prices are still rising at an above trend pace, while broader price pressures eased.
Details in the 🧵
Let's look at Goods Less Food And Energy, what I was referring to as "Core Goods."
Prices for core goods were up 0.32% in Aug, which is well above trend despite stepping down slightly from July.
Looking specifically at Finished Core Consumer Goods and Private Capital Equipment, it's clearer that there is still upward pressure on goods inflation.