1/x On 15th April 2014, the South Korea Sewol ferry carrying 476 people which included 325 high school students on a school trip, capsized and claimed the lives of over 300 passengers including the vast majority of students. A 🧵
2/x Sewol was a 146m Ro-Pax ferry, originally built in Japan (1994) and later modified in South Korea. Her refit added cabins and cargo capacity but raised her center of gravity dangerously. Stability tests were not properly enforced post-modification.
3/x At 9pm on April 15, 2014 MV Sewol, departed from Incheon bound for Cheju Island. The majority of the passengers, 325, were 16- and 17-year-old students of Danwon high school in Ansan City. Despite her maximum allowance for 987 tons of cargo,
4/x Sewol was carrying 2,142.7 tons of cargo, which had been improperly secured. Sewol maintained a speed of 17–21 knots along its route. At 08:46, the third mate ordered a course change from 135° to 140°. At 08:49, a second course change to 145° was ordered.
5/x The helmsman executed a sharp turn to starboard, causing the ship to tilt rapidly to port. Cargo shifted violently, exacerbating the tilt. By 10:25, Sewol had capsized with a tilt of approximately 108°, and by 10:31, it had sunk, leaving only the bow visible above water.
6/x The captain and first mate tried to use the heeling tanks to stabilize the ship but failed. At 08:55, the first mate contacted Jeju VTS via radio to report the accident and request rescue. The first internal announcement told passengers to stay where they were.
7/x At 09:00, Jeju VTS advised the crew to prepare passengers for possible evacuation and to wear life jackets. However, the second mate instructed the purser to tell passengers to remain inside. The crew contacted the shipping company but did not receive clear instructions.
8/x At 09:13, a nearby cargo ship (Doola Ace) offered to help rescue passengers, but the Sewol crew did not initiate evacuation. At 09:25, the VTS told the captain to evacuate passengers, but no action was taken.
9/x Crew members tried to contact the captain for evacuation instructions but received no response. By 09:39, engine room crew had evacuated to a Coast Guard vessel. At 09:48, the captain and seven deck crew abandoned ship via the bridge wing.
10/x At 09:50, the final announcement told passengers to stay inside. The crew then evacuated. By 09:34, the ship had tilted 52°, and by 10:10, it reached 77.9°. At 10:25, the ship tilted 108° and capsized. By 10:31, only the bow remained above water.
11/x After being modified in South Korea, Sewol’s center of gravity rose by 51 cm, reducing its stability. The ship’s maximum approved cargo load dropped from 2,437 tons to 987 tons, and required ballast water increased from 307 tons to 1,703 tons.
12/x On April 15, 2014, Sewol departed with only 761 tons of ballast water and 2,143 tons of cargo, violating safety standards. The helmsman used excessive rudder angle during a course change, causing a rapid starboard turn.
13/x This led to a sharp portside heel of 15–20°, which exceeded the ship’s ability to recover. Simulations confirmed that such rudder input at Sewol’s speed (19 knots) could cause dangerous heel angles.
14/x Vehicles and containers were not secured according to approved plans. Many tie-downs were missing or insufficient. Containers were fastened with ropes instead of twist locks or bridge fittings. This allowed cargo to shift and topple during the heel, worsening the imbalance.
15/x The captain was not present on the bridge during the critical moments of the turn. He returned after the ship began tilting but did not issue clear evacuation orders. Crew members requested guidance via radio, but received no response.
16/x The captain and senior crew evacuated via the bridge wing at 09:48 AM, well before most passengers. Investigators concluded that the captain lacked intent to evacuate passengers and failed in his duty to ensure their safety.
17/x In 2015, Lee was convicted of gross negligence, violation of maritime law, and homicide. He had failed to order evacuation, abandoned command, and made no attempt to assist passengers. The court called it “murder through willful negligence.”
18/18 He was originally sentenced to 36 years, but South Korea’s Supreme Court upgraded the sentence to life imprisonment. It ruled that as captain, Lee had a legal duty under Korean law to ensure passengers’ safety, especially after the vessel began listing.
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1/x Im' just looking at it from a "maritime law" viewpoint. Israel is given the right to board this vessel in (international) waters on a platter by the Freedom Flotilla Coalition. I advise the FFC to read UNCLOS article 92 and article 110 by the time they send out another vessel
2/x Looking at all the flags on the vessel, the status of this vessel will be regarded as "ship without nationality" as per UNCLOS 92 par. 2
3/x A warship may not board or "visit" another vessel on the high seas unless there is ground for suspecting that: (article 110.1.d): The ship is without nationality. Basically by decorating the vessel with all those flags, the FFC is shooting themselves in the foot.
1/x So I've explained General Average in the York-Antwerp Rules in a previous thread, but how exactly is salvage governed? Do you become rich when you salvage a ship?
2/x Salvage law governs the rights and compensation when a ship, its cargo, or the marine environment is saved from danger at sea. It’s a voluntary, successful rescue that rewards effort but does not transfer ownership of what is saved. (you don't own the ship you salvage)
3/x To claim salvage, three conditions must be met: 1) A real marine peril exists, 2) the rescue is voluntary (no prior contract), and 3) some success has been achieved, either partial or complete. Without all three, there is NO salvage claim.
1/x I had another "maritime law" thread in the pipeline, so here goes: The HAGUE-VISBY RULES. When goods are lost or damaged at sea, who pays the price? The answer often lies in a treaty from 1968: the HVR. Still used worldwide, they shape how cargo liability works in shipping.
2/x The Hague-Visby Rules are an international convention regulating the carriage of goods by sea. They set minimum obligations for shipowners (carriers) and define when they’re liable (and not liable) for loss or damage to cargo.
3/x They originated as the Hague Rules in 1924, a response to decades of imbalance between cargo owners and shipowners. At the time, shipowners could insert sweeping “exemption clauses” into bills of lading, making themselves immune from almost any responsibility.
1/x Can attacking a merchant ship justify going to war?
Throughout history, states have used such incidents as casus belli. Here's how that’s played out from the Age of Sail to the modern UN era. 🧵
2/x In the 18th century, Britain went to war with Spain over the mutilation of a British (Welsh) merchant captain.
Captain Robert Jenkins had his ear cut off by Spanish coastguards.
The 1739 War of Jenkins’ Ear followed.
3/x In the 1790s, France began seizing US merchant ships trading with Britain.
This led to the undeclared Quasi-War (1798–1800), where the US Navy was authorized to retaliate against French vessels.
1/x In 2021, the Ever Given blocked the Suez Canal, holding up $9 billion in trade per day. When it was finally refloated, the shipowner did something curious: they declared General Average. What does that mean—and why should thousands of cargo owners care?
2/x General Average is one of maritime law’s oldest principles. It says that when cargo is voluntarily sacrificed to save a ship during an emergency, everyone shares the loss—not just the unlucky owner of the jettisoned cargo.
3/x The idea dates back over 2,000 years to the Rhodian Sea Law, but in 1890, shipowners and insurers met in York and then Antwerp to standardize the rules. These became the York-Antwerp Rules—and they still govern this process today.
1/x NTSB Issues Preliminary Report on Mexican Navy Tall Ship Collision with Brooklyn Bridge. At the time of departure, both a sea pilot and a docking pilot were aboard the vessel, positioned with the ship’s captain on the open conning deck.
2/x The vessel’s six mooring lines were let go about 2016. About 2019, the 2,800-hp twin screw tugboat Charles D. McAllister assisted the Cuauhtémoc off the pier. The docking pilot gave astern commands to the captain on the conning deck, which were acknowledged by the captain,
3/x translated to Spanish, and relayed to another crewmember on the deck below, outside of the navigation bridge. This crewmember then relayed the orders to crewmembers within the navigation bridge, where commands were inputted.