Among the many interesting details provided is this golden nugget, which supports existing understandings of the current limitations of Chinese machine tools.
A limitations already described in this very important report by Rhodus on Russian missiles.
With due respect, I would be very cautious before making such confident and sweeping predictions.
Over the past ten years, many have been urging Western countries to stop procuring stealth bombers and fighters and focus on "MALE" drones and on long-range missiles instead.
The country whose force structure most resemble those prescriptions is Iran. We saw in June how well that force structure fared when facing an aerial attack: it seems quite clear those suggestions were definitively premature and unwarranted.
In the end, the Ukrainian naval-drone attacks have been made possible by the relatively limited size of the Black Sea, by the overall poor effectiveness of Russian shipborne defenses, and by access to surveillance & targeting capabilities (likely by the US).
VHF radars (VHF stands for very high-frequency, but they are actually very low frequency, in the 30-300MHz) can detect stealth aircraft with bow-tie shape because the wavelength is going to be reflected by vertical fins. They have also very long range of detection, in general.
However, the laws of physics dictate that to emit very low frequency signals (long wavelength) you need a large aperture antenna. And therefore, these systems are bulky and hence not very mobile. This is why Jugoslavia placed its early warning radars in Montenegro, and why
North Vietnam placed them above the 22 parallel (if my memory doesn't betray them): because these areas were, for diplomatic reasons, outside of firing zone for the U.S.
Data la malafede dimostrata, qui metto alcuni pensieri sparsi sul dilemma della sicurezza - che è diventato parte del dibattito politico sul programma di riarmo Europeo per via di Barbero, e ora tutti ne parlano.
Punto primo: l’idea è tanto semplice quanto banale, ovvero la corsa agli armamenti sarebbe una sorta di profezia che si auto avvera. Gli Stati si armano per difendersi, ma così facendo, il riarmo crea paura nei vicini.
Così, questi vicini si trovano a dover scegliere di attaccare “preventivamente” per scongiurare di trovarsi, nel giro di pochi anni, si fronte ad una minaccia militare troppo forte che non possono più fermare.
Yesterday I had the pleasure to give a presentation at the European Central Bank about European defense. The discussion was very interesting and enriching. Here are a couple of points that I made during & after the presentation:
1) European countries depend on the US for several “enablers” (in the language of economics: complementary goods), & it will be very demanding to replace the US. In this regard, the discussion about the kill-switch about the F-35 hides a much larger dependency
of European countries on American technology: the architecture for long-range detection, identification and tracking/geolocating of targets and for transmitting in real time the targeting data beyond line of sight over advers territory, airborne electronic warfare,
For those who wonder, this relatively unknown books helps understand what the US is trying to achieve with its tariffs. Of course, things are much more complicated, but the US, in virtue of the size and dynamism of its economy, has the "go-it-alone" power, as the author calls it
Which means that it suffers much less than its partners in restricting trade with them. Such "inequality in pain", if you want, is a source of leverage for the US. The US has always used such leverage, as the author demonstrates in its book.
The Trump administration is simply bringing the use of such leverage to a new level.
Very happy to see that the article "Weapons of the Weak: Technological Change, Guerrilla Firepower, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes" that @CostantinoPisch @aa_gilli and I have written is finally out in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, open access.
Our articles starts from a simple but important question, namely: what explains counterinsurgency outcome (COIN)? This topic has received extensive attention over the past 20+ years, and existing contributions have enhanced our understanding of the dynamics .
As we note, however, existing works have, for the most part, not investigated the role of insurgent firepower, and whether variation in firepower explains variation in counterinsurgency outcomes.