The Financial Times recently published a report on Ukraine’s mobilization problems. While the article offers a broad and insightful overview, especially for those who are not familiar with the topic, I believe some additional context can help complete the picture:
2/ First, let's start with the fundamentals. One of the core underlying issues is timing. Nationwide mobilization efforts would have been most effective during the initial phase of the war. That window has closed, but that doesn't mean the situation can't be improved
3/ Second, while the Ukrainian government may have overused claims of insufficient Western aid to deflect criticism and maintain internal support, the point isn’t without merit. For example, the 2023 summer counteroffensive was pitched as a turning point to secure big aid package
4/ Many of the problems stem from bureaucratic inefficiencies and a poorly structured recruitment system. One illustrative case: A man visited his local recruiting office several times to update his personal information, provided his phone number, and confirmed readiness to serve
5/ And yet, despite having submitted all his information, he was abruptly pulled off the street and forced into a van just weeks later. He didn’t resist, though the treatment was unnecessarily rough. He is now serving and holds no personal grudge - but not everyone is like that.
6/ This is a clear example of how unnecessary resentment can arise from simple disorganization and poor coordination within recruiters. At times, it may simply "easier" to mobilize multiple people at a bus stop than to call individuals one by one and wait for them to appear.
7/ Another recurring issue, one I’ve raised before, is the mobilization of individuals who are exempt from service. It’s not uncommon for recruitment officers to mobilize such individuals simply to meet quotas. What happens afterward is often seen as someone else’s problem.
8/ The result is a predictable and costly cycle: these individuals, now in uniform, pursue legal action to secure their release. This drains time and resources from frontline units, while recruitment offices, having fulfilled their numbers, bear no responsibility for the fallout
9/ And finally, the problem that concerns many people, is the cases where recruitment officers or police clearly overstep their authority and use force in situations where it's not warranted. Even worse is when authorities dismiss complaints, calling them russian psyops
10/ While reports of excessive force are frequently discussed online, they account for less than 1% of all recruitment cases. For example, with 18,000 mobilizations per month, 50 such videos would still represent a fraction under one percent.
11/ Four such videos per month would be enough to release at least one video per week, creating a magnified effect of a dreading problem that is obviously exaggerated given the scale of nationwide mobilization. However, the Russians are effectively using this.
12/ None of the problems mentioned above are unsolvable. Cases of unnecessary and excessive force must be punished and prosecuted, with clear consequences. Since potential recruits already have their data linked to a mobile app, they should simply receive a notification to report
13/ If recruit fail to show up or respond, it becomes a matter for the police, not military. Proper legal adjustments must be made if necessary; otherwise, the use of people in military uniform against civilians will only continue to fuel animosity toward the army
14/ I believe that the TCK has become a vulnerable point that Russia is actively exploiting, and for that reason, it requires both reform and a rebranding at this stage. Additionally, we need to increase salaries for our personnel, with financial assistance from Western partners
15/ Finally, we must continue working on attracting foreign fighters, offering them the prospect of residency in Ukraine under revised immigration laws and competitive pay. Russia has used this approach effectively, and there is no reason Ukraine can't do the same on scale
Link to the original FT article by @fabrice_deprez:
A few observations drawn from insider insights, open-source data, information from russian internal documents, and conversations with senior officers, frontline soldiers, and volunteers - based on developments from Spring through Summer 2025. Thread🧵:
2/ Since early 2025, Russia's personnel losses have remained among the highest since the war began. But at the same time, Ukraine has faced a sharp rise in desertion and AWOL cases. The pace of Russian territorial advances is higher than during the same period in 2024.
3/ Each year follows a similar pattern: Russian forces form a pocket around a town, Ukraine cites manpower shortages and lack of aid, Russia takes heavy losses but advances, Ukraine inflates already high Russian casualty figures, while Moscow grossly downplays them
Penza Military Plant “Elektropribor”: Preliminary Damage Assessment
🧵Thread:
1/ In the early hours of August 2, Ukrainian UAVs struck multiple targets in Russia, including refineries and military-industrial sites. Here’s what’s known so far about the strike on Elektropribor
2/ First, we verified the strike by geolocating both the recording’s POV and the impact site. The location matches satellite imagery, confirming social media reports that the Elektropribor plant in Penza was targeted by a drone. Impact coordinates: 53.224696, 44.966005
3/ Elektropribor supplies a range of electronic products to both the Russian military and law enforcement: automated control systems, encrypted communications equipment, radar technology, and more. Construction of the targeted facility began around 2018.
What we know about today's ambush on Russian mercenaries in Mali.
🧵Thread: 1/ The attack likely took place on August 1st in the Mopti/Segou region, central Mali. At least 3 mercenaries were killed, though the actual toll is likely to be 4 KIA and 8 WIA from the African Corps:
2/ The perpetrators are JNIM, an Al-Qaeda branch in Sahel. There are currently no indicators suggesting Tuareg separatist involvement.
Equipment was damaged as well. In the video, our team identified what appears to be a Ural-4320 MTP-A2.1, delivered to Mali earlier this year
3/ In January 2025, our team documented hundreds of Russian vehicles moved to Mali via Guinea. Since then, at least two more shipments have followed. Based on visual comparison, we’re confident is the same Ural MTP - a mobile workshops that helps to recover and repair vehicles
Early Damage Assessment of Drone Attack on Penza Radio Plant - July 31, 2025
Preliminary analysis of imagery reveals multiple buildings suffered damage ranging from light to severe. One building appears likely to be completely inoperable. Frontelligence Insight reports. Thread:
2/ Based on high-resolution imagery, unavailable for public release due to license, our team concluded: at least one building sustained severe damage; another has signs of penetration and fire, a third likely suffered penetration but no fire; and a fourth appears lightly damaged
3/ Overall, this attack appears to have been more successful than several others on larger facilities, primarily due to the significant fire damage inflicted on at least one building. The strike’s depth is also notable - approximately 600 km from Ukrainian-controlled territory.
In July, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte claimed Russia produces 4 times more artillery ammo than the NATO. To assess this, RFE/RL and CIT analyzed data on Russian vs. NATO ammo production and concluded that the situation is not as nearly dramatic. Thread with key findings🧵:
2/ According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Russia produced 250,000 152mm rounds in 2022, one million in 2023 and planned to produce 1.325 million in 2024. In practice, however, researchers note that Russia produced slightly more than 1.3 million 152mm rounds
3/ Ukrainian military intelligence offered a higher estimate. According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, Russia produced a total of 2 million 152mm and 122mm artillery rounds in 2023 and planned to produce 2.7 million rounds in 2024
An earthquake with a magnitude of 8.7 struck near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, a city located in the same bay that hosts several key Russian submarine facilities and naval infrastructure. Given the quake's intensity and the resulting tsunami, some damage is possible. 🧵Thread:
2/ The earthquake’s epicenter was located roughly over 100 kilometers from Avacha Bay, home to Russia’s Pacific Fleet, which hosts both diesel and nuclear submarines. Early footage from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, indicates damage from both ground shaking and tsunami.
3/ The bay has multiple installations, but three stand out: the North-Eastern Repair Center, which services both diesel and nuclear submarines; the Rybachiy Submarine Base, home to Pacific Fleet submarines; and a specialized SLBM loading jetty used for arming submarines.