1/ The Russia-Georgia war in 2008 revealed many problems with the Russian army, which had not been addressed by the time that Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. A series of commentaries on the 'Vault No. 8' Telegram channel highlights some of the lessons not learned. ⬇️ 
2/ "The same problem [arose] in control both in 2008 and in 2022: infantry and armoured vehicles cannot communicate with each other because they have different radio stations, and armoured vehicles do not have built-in telephones for communicating with the crew from outside.
3/ "Another problem that remained unchanged between 2008 and 2022 was the low accuracy of the 2A42 cannon on the BMP-2, the crews' lack of training in the use of anti-tank guided missiles, and the fact that most BMPs were not equipped with them.
4/ "Alternatives in the form of using an ATGM installation in a platoon on foot, which supposedly should be available, were also usually not available.
Equipment problem: in 2008, you would rarely see night vision and, even more so, thermal imaging sights among the infantry.
Equipment problem: in 2008, you would rarely see night vision and, even more so, thermal imaging sights among the infantry.
5/ "The same is true today — I once asked about thermal imaging devices among machine gunners (in connection with my note on the re-equipment of motorised infantry from 2020 or 2021) in one of the motorised infantry battalions.
6/ "I asked: how many thermal imaging sights do you have in your company? They replied: we have eight (8) for the entire battalion.
7/ You will not be mistaken in thinking that platoon and squad commanders had problems with observation and navigation devices in 2008 and 2022. It's good if you have officer's binoculars and a compass.
8/ Organisational and staffing problem: at one point, the assistant machine gunner was removed from our motorised rifle unit. This resulted in the machine gunner being overloaded with ammunition.
9/ This problem remained unchanged until 2022 and even worsened, as in the 2010s we switched to PKM/PKP machine guns in motorised rifle platoons (the weight of the machine gun and ammunition increased).
10/ "By and large, the only positive changes were the introduction of new field uniforms and the evolution of personal protective equipment.
11/ "After all, the VKPO [All-Season Field Uniform Kit] is better than the "flora" [camouflage pattern], the 6B45 bulletproof vest is better than any 6B5, and the 6B47 helmet is better than the SSh-68.
12/ The availability (albeit in limited quantities) of 6Sh117 load-bearing vests and backpacks instead of ‘Sidor’ type duffel bags is also good.
13/ "As for the training and tactics of the infantry in combat, in the cases of 2008 and 2022, participants from the infantry noted the low level of their initial training compared to what they had to do. With the exception of regimental reconnaissance.
14/ "The issue of physical and tactical training deserves separate consideration. In both 2008 and 2022, most motorised infantry units of the Russian Armed Forces did not practise marching on foot over significant distances (10 kilometres or more).
15/ "The infantry did not learn to fight on foot, but in both conflicts they began to operate on foot from the very first days.
16/ "This was partly due to losses in combat equipment — the same peacekeepers in the town on the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali lost all their armoured vehicles and broke out of the encirclement on foot.
17/ "The fighting and mop-up operations in Tskhinvali were mainly conducted on foot. The fighting in the suburbs of Kyiv (Irpin and Bucha) was mainly conducted on foot. The fighting in the Serebryansky Forest was also conducted on foot.
18/ "I repeat, only the regimental reconnaissance unit had some practice in this area during combat training in peacetime.
19/ "Speaking of regimental intelligence, you can read an interview with a sergeant from the reconnaissance company of a motorised rifle regiment who participated in the fighting in South Ossetia on our public page.
20/ "He notes that, as a rule, special equipment (rangefinders, geolocation devices, on-board short-range reconnaissance radars) did not work on BRM-1K combat reconnaissance vehicles. And all this equipment was already hopelessly outdated in 2008.
21/ "The BRMs entered the Special Military Operation in the same condition. Therefore, a significant portion of them have already been utilised in meat attacks, used not for their intended purpose, but as taxis for assault groups.
22/ "Both in 2008 and in 2022-2025, regimental reconnaissance units had limited resources for the same ground reconnaissance tasks:
23/ "— 1-2 Fara radars per regiment, often not working (in the Special Military Operation there is the "Sobolatnik", but in the same quantities and with the same serviceability).
— Lack of or severe shortage of periscopes, reconnaissance tubes.
— Lack of or severe shortage of periscopes, reconnaissance tubes.
24/ "— Complete lack of modern video cameras with multiple zoom (and operating in IR mode), directional microphones and control panels for them.
— Complete or almost complete lack of thermal imaging sights and observation devices.
— Complete or almost complete lack of thermal imaging sights and observation devices.
25/ "— Almost complete lack or severe shortage of night sights (1-2 generation) and observation devices.
I would like to note separately: the lack of small drones in regimental reconnaissance companies was a constant both in 2008 and, in most cases, in February 2022.
I would like to note separately: the lack of small drones in regimental reconnaissance companies was a constant both in 2008 and, in most cases, in February 2022.
26/ "For this reason, scouts were used merely as trained infantry in both conflicts. In the Special Military Operation, scouts were saved from complete extinction only by the appearance of reconnaissance quadcopters, which are now used as the main means of reconnaissance." /end
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